QUESTS
OLD AND NEW

291.14
Mea/Que
16087

G. R. S. MEAD

THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY
Town Hall, Bombay.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Dr. Rani Karur
on 12 April, 2019

Quests Old and New

BY

G. R. S. MEAD

EDITOR OF 'THE QUEST' & 'QUEST SERIES.' AUTHOR OF 'THRICE-GREATEST HERMES,' 'FRAGMENTS OF A FAITH FORGOTTEN,' ETC.

LONDON
G. BELL & SONS, LTD.
1913

291.14
Mea/Que
16087

10 DEC 1963
NC

00016087

CONTENTS.

		PAGE
I.	THE WAY OF THE SPIRIT IN ANCIENT CHINA	1
II.	THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRUE MAN IN ANCIENT CHINESE MYSTICAL PHILOSOPHY	20
III.	SPIRITUAL REALITY IN PROGRESSIVE BUDDHISM	46
IV.	THE IDEAL LIFE IN PROGRESSIVE BUDDHISM	73
V.	SOME FEATURES OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY	95
VI.	THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION ETHICALLY CONSIDERED	121
VII.	SOME MYSTICAL EXPERIMENTS ON THE FRONTIERS OF EARLY CHRSTENDOM	149
VIII.	THE MEANING OF GNOSIS IN THE HIGHER FORMS OF HELLENISTIC RELIGION	177
IX.	'THE BOOK OF THE HIDDEN MYSTERIES' BY HIEROTHEOS	203
X.	THE RISING PSYCHIC TIDE	226
XI.	VAIHINGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE 'AS IF'	248
XII.	BERGSON'S INTUITIONISM	276
XIII.	EUCKEN'S ACTIVISM	303

PREFACE.

ALL the studies or sketches in this volume are illustrative of the quest of reality, the search for truth, or the restless striving of the human soul for the satisfaction of its needs, spiritual or philosophical, mystical or psychical. The subjects are gleaned from the past and present, from east and west; and all of them, each in their different ways, seem to the writer to be of deep interest and great importance, even though some are little known and may appear on first acquaintance somewhat strange.

The humorous, original and profound Chuang Tzŭ, the follower of the Tao, or Way of the Spirit in ancient China, however, should make friends with many even at first sight. The views of progressive Buddhism, as to its ideals of life and attainment, are so lofty and demand such utter self-sacrifice, that at least the spirit of them, if not their form, seems deserving of our sincere admiration. The subject of Buddhist psychology, again, with the systematic development of which we have only very recently become acquainted in the West, should be full of interest not only from the standpoint of normal but also of abnormal and what we may call supranormal psychology; whatever may be thought of the transcendental scope of this psychological philosophy, its analysis of mind as normally known must be admitted to be one of the

acutest that has ever been thought out. As to the consideration of the doctrine of reincarnation which follows, the wide revival of interest in it in the West of late years marks out the subject as deserving of serious attention; in any case, as it is a fundamental dogma of by far the most numerous body of religionists in the world, it is a topic of very great importance.

Turning now to the ancient West, several mystical experiments in private rites on the frontiers of early Christendom have been selected to illustrate some of the ways of high striving for deeper self-realisation, either outside the pale of the new faith or in one case just within its boundaries. The subject is further developed in a study of the meaning of gnosis in its best sense, as exemplified in the higher forms of the Hellenistic mystery-religions, as they are called. And then, from within the Christian tradition itself, comes the sketch of an arresting mystical treatise hitherto almost totally unknown. It purports to be a book of Hierotheos, and should be of special interest to students of Christian mysticism, and particularly to lovers of the Dionysian writings; for not only is it one of the most daring documents that has ever been conceived, but it may just possibly be of the same derivation as the books of that Hierotheos whom the Pseudo-Dionysius declares to have been his chief teacher after Paul.

The remaining essays treat of endeavours and currents of modern thought. The first calls attention to the remarkable renascence of popular interest in psychic and psychical phenomena, and all

those varied efforts to extend consciousness and develope the non-normal functions of human personality on these lines, which has forerun, but is to be sharply distinguished from, the growing revival of attention to the mystical element of religion. The last three papers attempt to present the main positions of three distinguished thinkers, one of whom is practically unknown in this country, while the names of the two others are heard on all sides. Hans Vaihinger of Halle, though long renowned in his own country for his profound knowledge of Kant's philosophy, has only quite recently, even in Germany, been known as the formulator of one of the most radical criticisms of our human knowledge that has ever been penned. The chief aim of his philosophy is to enquire how it is that though in the theoretical, practical and religious spheres, we progressively arrive at what is right, we do so on a basis and with the help of what is erroneous or clearly wrong. This philosophy of the 'as if' has already made quite a stir in Germany, for though it cannot be said to satisfy our deeper spiritual needs, it is intellectually most stimulating and suggestive,—and in this way illustrates one of the modes of the search for truth. As for the remaining two distinguished thinkers, Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken, it has been said that could they be judiciously and harmoniously blended, we should have a life view that would inaugurate a new, powerful and fruitful movement of genuine philosophical activity. However this may be, without any such combination, they each in his own way stand out so promi-

nently, that no one seriously interested in the chief movements of modern thought, can afford to remain ignorant of the ideas which have made these two thinkers such dominating influences.

It remains to add that most of these studies have appeared in *The Quest*, from time to time during the last four years. For kind permission to republish the paper on reincarnation and the sketch of some mystical experiments on the frontiers of Early Christendom the author has to thank the editors of *The International Journal of Ethics* and of *The Nineteenth Century and After* respectively.

I.

THE WAY OF THE SPIRIT IN ANCIENT CHINA.

THE 'three teachings' of China are Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. Buddhism is of foreign importation and was introduced into China not earlier than the first century A.D.; Taoism and Confucianism are of native origin. The great names of classical Taoism are those of Lao Tzŭ, Lieh Tzŭ, Chwang Tzŭ and Hwai Nan Tzŭ. Of these followers of the Tao (*lit.* the Way), Chwang Tzŭ, who lived in the latter half of the fourth and the early part of the third century B.C., is the most brilliant writer of the classical philosophical period of ancient China. Mystic and 'anarchist,' 'naturalist' and champion of simplicity, witty and whimsical, he is by far the most thorough-going critic that Confucian conventionalism has ever had. He has quite naturally, therefore, been regarded by the Literati or orthodox scholars as an arch-heretic, and his writings have been banned from the official curriculum which mechanically sifts out the Intelligentia of China for state-preferment.

Confucius (551-478 B.C.), though almost deified by his followers, was not an originator, but a hander-on and reformer, rearranging codes and polity from pre-existing material and tradition. In similar fashion Chwang Tzŭ regarded Lao Tzŭ (b. 604 B.C.), Confucius' senior by half a century, as

the reviver of what he claimed to be a still more ancient Way, which he fabled as originating in a primitive and paradisical state of human culture, when men lived 'according to nature,' and the innate 'goodness of the heart of man' was yet unspoiled by what he considered to be the artificial laws and regulations of those who would fain rule others before they had learned to rule themselves—or, perhaps he would have said, before they had re-become themselves and so let the true governance of things operate through them with unimpeded sway.

The reputed words or sayings of Lao Tzŭ are extant in a short *ching*—'canon,' 'classic' or 'scripture'—called the *Tao-Teh-Ching*,[1] which is generally regarded as the most authoritative document of philosophical Taoism—that is, of early Taoism as distinguished from its later degraded forms, blended with folk-superstitions and magic, popular Buddhist rituals, and psychic extravagances of all sorts. The style of this little treatise is rugged in the extreme, quite particleless; it might be said to resemble in language the 'cyclopean' style in architecture. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to translate; nevertheless, owing to this wide margin for guess-work, a larger number of versions of it exists than of almost any other Chinese classic.[2]

[1] Prof. Giles has strenuously assailed the authenticity of this collection as a whole, and claims that the judgment of the majority of native scholars supports him; his view however has not met with acceptance in the West.

[2] In this paper, however, we are not concerned with the *Tao-Teh-Ching;* for Chwang Tzŭ nowhere refers to such a book. He simply quotes a number of sayings of the Old Philosopher, some of which are found in the *Tao-Teh-Ching*, but just as many are not.

The style of Chwang Tzŭ is far more developed, and is universally admired for its great refinement and beauty by the Chinese. He is nevertheless still very difficult to translate. The extant text consists of thirty-three chapters or sections divided into three groups known as the 'inside' (1-7), 'outside' (8-22) and 'miscellaneous' (23-33). The classification is ancient, but why the first two groups were so distinguished is no longer known. Of the 'miscellaneous' chapters some are clearly not written by Chwang Tzŭ himself.

There are three translations, all into English, by Balfour, Giles and Legge.[1] Balfour's pioneer work was naturally superseded by the versions of the last two distinguished sinologists. These were made quite independently of one another; for though two years elapsed between their publication, Dr. Legge informs us that he did not look at the translation of Prof. Giles until he had completed his own. The two versions frequently differ very considerably from each other; as to which is the more correct, however, no one but the most highly skilled sinologist can presume to say, for even the native commentators are in disagreement or at a loss in many passages. It is, however, Giles' version that has charmed me ever since its publication, and I have commended it to many as the most delightful book on Taoism with which I am acquainted. The translator seems to breathe

[1] Balfour (F. H.), *The Divine Classic of Nan-hua; being the Works of Chuang Tsze, Taoist Philosopher* (Shanghai, 1881); Giles (H. A.), *Chuang Tzŭ, Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer* (London, 1889); Legge (J.), *The Texts of Taoism* (*S.B.E.*, vols. xxxix. and xl., Oxford, 1891).

with the spirit of the writer and to throw himself unreservedly into the subject; he is thus generally more easy to follow than Legge, who seems to hold himself apart and at times to have little sympathy with his author. For this reason, and also in the hope that by calling attention to so spirited and charming a volume, the veteran translator may be induced to bring out a second edition, for the first has long been exhausted and second-hand copies are rarely procurable, I have thought it preferable to use Giles' rendering except in such instances as are indicated.[1]

There is little that is systematic in the writings of our mystical philosopher. For the most part the leading ideas are set forth in a series of narratives and illustrations, some of which are most humorously conceived; gay thus mingles with grave, and wit or a comical phrase often comes to the rescue. And so, though Chwang Tzŭ, like Heraclitus, has been called the Obscure, he might more justly be named the Laughing Philosopher, as was Democritus. To give a few instances; an argument ends with the laughing gibe: You are woolly inside (17)[2]; or with such homely proverbs as: You look at your cross-bow and expect to have broiled duck before you (29); or: He has drowned himself on dry land (255). Of self-advertisement it is said: You blaze along as though the sun and moon were under

[1] Alternative renderings of words or phrases are indicated by an L. (for Legge).

[2] The inferior figures refer to the numbering of the sub-divisions in Legge's translation; Giles has not sub-divided the chapters. I omit the quotation-marks where clearly unnecessary.

your arms (19$_{14}$); and of the over-zealous, that they wear all the hair off their shins in their officiousness (11$_3$); while to the ineffectual it is suggested that if you blow through a hole in a sword-hilt, the result will be simply *whssh!* (25$_4$). As to our general ignorance of the simplest things, the sage remarks: The cock crows. But the wisest of us could not say why (25$_{11}$). To these few examples may be added a specimen of the humorous way in which our Laughing Philosopher introduces the discussion of a profound problem:

"The Spirit of the Clouds when passing eastwards through the expanse of Air happened to fall in with the Vital Principle. The latter was slapping his ribs and hopping about; whereupon the Spirit of the Clouds said, 'Who are you, old man, and what are you doing here?'

"'Strolling!' replied the Vital Principle, without stopping.

"'I want to know something,' continued the Spirit of the Clouds.

"'Ah!' uttered the Vital Principle, in a tone of disapprobation" (11$_5$).

At the outset and throughout we are confronted with paradox and contradiction. For we are dealing with a doctrine that is incapable of finding expression in words (5$_1$); the teaching of the Spirit[1] is an instruction without words. Those who understand signify their assent with a smile, they do not speak (6$_{9,11}$); for it is laid down with

[1] I have ventured to call the doctrine the Way of the Spirit. It should, however, be understood that Tao means simply Way, and that there is no agreement as to any further precision of meaning.

much humour that those who understand do not speak, while those who speak do not understand (13$_{10}$, 22$_{1}$). And yet we have the 'Words' of Lao Tzŭ and the 'Writings' of Chwang Tzŭ paradoxically telling us about the Way, though the latter believes that the best language is that which is not spoken and that perfect speech is to put away speech (22$_{11}$). "For speech is obscured by the gloss of this world and the vain-gloriousness of the speaker" (2$_{3}$); it pertains to the state of the contraries (2$_{5}$). Who, it is asked, knows the argument that can be argued without words? For "this alone is the perfect or great argument, the Tao that does not declare itself in words" (2$_{7}$); the discussion of it obscures its reality. "They who discuss it speak of it as the Obscure and are so spoken of themselves" (22$_{7}$). And yet though it cannot be declared by speech, silence also is inadequate for its expression (25$_{11}$).

It is thought by some that the Tao idea is to be genetically derived from the Supreme of the Indian Upanishads, the That from which all speech and thought are said to fall back unable to grasp it, and concerning which all human speculation meets with the answer: No, No! Not this, not that. There is a certain analogy undoubtedly; but direct derivation is difficult to prove.

"By no process of thinking, by no cogitations can it be known; the first step indeed is not to think *about* it, or make it the object of anxious consideration" (22$_{1}$); for so doing we fall out of the pure reality. Yet, in spite of all this, we are paradoxically told that to know Tao is easy (32$_{4}$), for

embracing the contraries, the instruction is by contradiction—an intolerable proceeding for the 'either-or' mind. This, however, becomes slightly less puzzling for the non-mystic when we read (32$_4$): "To know Tao without speech appertains to the natural (L. heavenly). To know Tao with speech appertains to the artificial (L. human)." This seems to mean that the spiritual and the intellectual are very different; and express themselves very differently.

There is a breezy heterodoxy and wide tolerance about it all as compared with the orthodoxy and bigotry of the schools of the time and of many another age, not excepting our own; there is an originality also that sought to free itself from the bonds of convention. For, as is well said, the happiness of ordinary people seems to consist in slavishly following the majority, and not being themselves (18$_1$); men all rejoice in others being like themselves, and object to others not being like themselves (11$_6$); for to that which agrees with our opinions we assent, from that which does not we dissent (27$_1$). On the contrary, we are told, the sages of the past "did not favour uniformity of skill and occupation, and did not demand the same deeds from all" (18$_5$). It is useless treating a bird like oneself, so also in dealing with men of different natures (19$_{11}$). There is need of the greatest sympathy and tolerance; whereas in the schools, every one, alas! he says, regards the course he prefers as the infallible course (33$_1$). For the bigoted, one's own standard of right is the standard, and others have to adapt themselves to it. They will

die for this, he adds ironically (23$_{10}$). Such bigotry, moreover, is defined as "to suffer those who are like oneself, but as for those unlike, not to credit them with the virtues they really possess" (31). On the contrary (32$_{6}$), the true sage is tolerant. "He regards certainties (L. what is deemed necessary) as uncertainties; therefore he is never up in arms (L. at war with himself)." In regard to the views of others "he holds his own opinions, but not obstinately" (25$_{10}$).

In keeping with such notions we are not surprised to find that the authority of books as books is lightly regarded. Books, we are told, are what the world values as representing Tao. But "books are only words, the valuable part of words is the thought contained in them" (13$_{10}$). The 'six canons' of the Confucianists are cavalierly set aside as 'the worn-out footprints of ancient sages' (14$_{8}$). The citation of authorities and of the words of others is characterised as a sign of inner poverty. For "when language is put into other people's mouths, outside support is sought, and language based on weighty authority is used to bar further argument" (27$_{1}$).

But if the artificial and its authority are to be discounted, the natural is inexhaustible in value. There is need of the greatest consideration for the smallest trifle; for there is value in the most insignificant thing. All men know the use of useful things, he tells us; but they do not know the use of useless things (4$_{9}$). There is no size in reality (1$_{3}$); the greatness of a thing depends upon the greatness of its application, as Giles comments

(p. 10). A special meaning is thus given to 'great.' "Great knowledge embraces the whole; small knowledge a part only" (2₂). There is nothing greater than the 'tip of an autumn spikelet' (2₆). For "Tao is not too small for the greatest, nor too great for the smallest" (13₉).

To a mind permeated with the doctrines of the perpetual flux of things, of manifestation by means of contraries, and of the completion of every particular with the whole, paradox and contrariety, as we see, came easily; we find further not only a cheerful admission of the inadequacy of all knowledge, but also a deliberate attempt to ignore the knowledge already acquired. "We can only know that we know nothing, and a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" (33₄). This is not a blend of Socrates and Bacon but the reflection of Shen Tao, who is said to have set himself to work deliberately to discard the whole of his knowledge and self-interest. In all this play on the values of words the meaning of course depends on the point of view; it can be shifted from one to the other contrary at will. Thus we can both affirm and deny such two-faced propositions as: Not to know is profound. To know is shallow. Not to know is internal. To know is external (22₇). But underneath it all there are hints of an attempt to get at a deeper and subtler phase of understanding. Men, we are told, one and all value that part of knowledge that is known. "They do not know how to avail themselves of the unknown in order to reach knowledge" (25₈). As we have seen, there was a deliberate attempt to cultivate what might

be called a 'higher ignorance,' that is, an endeavour to ignore what our philosopher would have called 'little' knowledge, in order to win 'great' knowledge. Further still, and more understandably, we are told: "The perfect man ignores self, the spiritual man ignores merit, the true sage ignores reputation" (1$_3$). Moreover, "the man who nourishes his purpose (L. mind's aim) becomes oblivious of his body; while he who is carrying out Tao becomes oblivious even of his mind" (28$_6$)—that is, presumably, the limitations of his normal mind. And why? Because the activities thus become entirely spontaneous; for "to be unconscious of the feet shows that the shoes are easy" (19$_{12}$).

If, then, knowledge and ignorance are both two-fold and one of another, equally so is mind double-natured. Do not develope your artificial (L. human) intellect, but develope that intelligence that is from God (L. Heaven), is the injunction (19$_2$); for "man's intellect, however keen, face to face with the countless evolutions of things, their death and birth—can never reach the Root" (22$_2$). To make the Root the essential and to regard objective existences as accidental—is of Tao (33$_5$). And yet this is not a simple setting of the abstract over against the concrete, the formless over against that which has form, spiritual against material; for it is the people at large that discuss these contraries, whereas those on the road to attainment care not for these things (22$_5$). Tao cannot be attained by those who solely exercise their faculties in worldly studies, or sink their aspirations in mundane thoughts—such are 'the dullards of the

earth' (16₁). It is again neither by argument (2₁₀), nor from extensive study, that this may be known, nor by dialectic skill (22₅). But Lao Tzŭ goes still further than this, when he is reported to have said: "I have no pretension to be possessed of cunning knowledge, *nor* of divine wisdom" (13₈). This, as so much else in these writings, is directed to a special address. The Chwang Tzŭ movement was a reaction against the tyranny of the Literati, and even Confucius himself is repeatedly brought on the stage and satirised. In many a story he is made to contradict himself and sing the praise of the Tao. It is love of knowledge, Chwang Tzŭ contends, that is at the bottom of all the trouble; things were all right until the philosophers arose. As for their leader, he is said to aim at being a subtle dialectician, "not knowing that such a reputation is regarded by real sages as the fetters of a criminal" (5₃). The retort put in the mouth of Confucius is that the Taoists travel beyond the rule of life (L. way of the world), whereas he travels within it (6₁₁). On the contrary, Chwang Tzŭ contends that the trouble is with the Literati, who "set up their virtue outside themselves and involve the world in such angry discussions that nothing definite is accomplished" (10₃). So long then as the rulers aim at knowledge, the external and artificial, and neglect Tao, the empire will be overwhelmed in confusion (10₄). "Knowledge of the Great Unity—this alone is perfection" (24₁₄).

What then is this? It is of course Tao, the Great Way (20₃), in the sense in which 'Great' has been already defined above (p. 9). It is further

the Supreme Mystery of all things and cannot be described, and yet we are told: Tao has its laws (L. emotions) and its evidences (L. sincerity). It may be transmitted but it cannot be received (L.) —in its fulness apparently; for it may be obtained though it cannot be seen. It has its root and ground in itself. Before heaven and earth were, Tao was. From it came the mysterious existence of spirits, from it the mysterious existence of God (L.). "To Tao the zenith is not high, nor the nadir low; no point in time is long ago, nor by lapse of ages has it grown old" (6$_7$). Tao is that which informs all creation and is of all phenomena the Ultimate Cause (6$_6$), or, as Legge has it, the That Itself from which all things depend, and from which all transformation arises. Yet is it not a pure transcendency, for there is nowhere where it is not (6$_6$). And yet again, Tao causes fulness and emptiness, but it is not either; renovation and decay, beginning and end, accumulation and dispersion, but it is not either (22$_6$). "Nothing can produce Tao; yet everything has Tao within it and continues to produce it without end" (22$_{10}$)—namely in its offspring, says the commentator.

Tao cannot be only one of a pair of opposites. It is individual bias that causes such contraries (2$_5$); whereas those who understand the principle of the identity of all things are called the truly intelligent (2$_4$). "It is only lack of understanding of Tao that speaks of there being true or false in it" (2$_3$). This all seems to be an attempt to suggest a certain state of spiritual consciousness to which, on the one hand, it is said, there is

nothing which is not objective, and equally nothing which is not subjective; while, on the other, we are told symbolically: "When subjective and objective are both without their correlates, that is the very axis of Tao. And when that axis passes through the centre at which all infinities converge, positive and negative alike blend into an infinite One" (2$_3$). But this cannot be a state of abstract unity. For the Tao of God (L. Heaven) operates ceaselessly, and all things are produced (L. perfected); and equally the Tao of the true sage operates ceaselessly and "all within the limit of surrounding ocean acknowledges his sway" (13$_1$), for the one co-operates with the other.

The means whereby Tao expresses itself is Virtue (Teh). This Virtue is the spirit of the universe, and Virtue is also the connecting link between heaven and earth and God and man (12$_1$). Tao produces all things but is not seen. Teh moves through all things but its place is not known (24$_4$). Virtue all embracing,—hence charity or benevolence; Tao all influencing,—hence duty to one's neighbour or righteousness (16$_1$). But when we come to man there is only partial Virtue, for we read: Adaptation by arrangement is Teh. Spontaneous adaptation is Tao (22$_5$). Tao is the sovereign lord of Virtue, and Life its glorifier (23$_{11}$). But this Virtue seems almost as hard to reach as Tao itself; for we are told: If the mind is unobstructed the result is wisdom. If wisdom is unobstructed the result is Virtue (26$_9$). There is a curious subtlety in it all that eludes the normal man; for instance: "As to right and wrong, hold

fast to your magic circle [the axis and centre of which have been already referred to, p. 13] and with independent mind walk ever in the way of Tao. Do not swerve from the path of Virtue; *do not bring about your own good deeds, lest your labour be lost*" (29$_2$). He who makes God (or Heaven) the Source, and Virtue the Root, and Tao the Portal (or Gate),—he is the true sage (33$_1$).

It will be noticed that where Giles uses 'God' Legge prefers 'Heaven,' for the latter strongly objects to the use of 'God' except where the meaning has clear reference to a 'Personal Being.' Into controversy on this point there is no need to enter; God in man (personal) and God in nature (impersonal) and God beyond both seems to be the idea that possessed our sages, one of whom exclaims: "The Master I serve succours all things, and does not account it *duty*. He continues His blessings through countless generations, and does not account it *charity*. Dating back to the remotest antiquity, He does not account Himself old. Covering heaven, supporting earth, and fashioning the various forms of things, He does not account Himself skilled. He it is whom you should seek" (6$_{13}$).

The most remarkable feature of this ancient Taoism is that there is no trace of a Devil in it. The opposition is in man, it is the human that is out of harmony with the Divine; in the perfect or true man alone does the conflict cease (6$_5$).

Among a people so imbued with the idea of filial piety as the Chinese, we are not surprised to find that love to man's greater parents as well is

inculcated. These greater parents, the father and mother of all things, are said to be Heaven and Earth (19$_1$), and of man Heaven in a special sense is father (6$_{10}$): "A man looks upon God (L. Heaven) as his father and loves him in like measure, should he not then love that which is still greater (6$_5$)? That which is 'still greater' is Tao, for "man is born in Tao as fish in water" (6$_{11}$). Heaven in a higher sense stands for the spiritual ruler of heaven and earth (11$_7$), for Spirit. "The Spirit spreads forth on all sides: there is no point to which it does not reach, attaining heaven above, embracing earth beneath. Influencing all creation, its form cannot be portrayed. Its name is 'of God' (L. the Divinity)" (15$_3$). This 'Heaven' is called in Legge's translation the Great Unity, the Great Mystery, the Great Illuminator, the Great Framer, the Great Boundlessness, the Great Truth, the Great Determiner; and Giles continues in his version: "The ultimate end is God (L. Heaven). He is hidden in the laws of nature. He is the hidden spring. . . . May we not call this actuality our Great Guide?" (24$_{14}$).

I cannot but think that there is some connection between these ancient Far-Eastern ideas and the old Oriental æon-cult of Asia Minor, dependent on the supreme idea of Endless Time and Boundless Space, to the elucidation of which Dr. Robert Eisler has devoted so much research and acumen in his recent important work.[1]

For such Space and Time is characterised in

[1] *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, Munich, 1910.

Giles' version as 'existence without limitation and as 'continuity without a starting point,' in a sentence which Legge renders: "He has a real existence, but it has nothing to do with place, such is his relation to space; he has continuance, but it has no relation to beginning and end, such is his relation to time" (23$_9$). So that though all things are said in a certain sense to come from non-existence, yet this very same non-existence (for us) is called the Portal of God or Door of Heaven (*ib.*). The futility of arguing about such matters, however, is well brought out in the humorous sequence: "If there is existence, there must have been non-existence. And if there was a time when nothing existed, there must have been a time before then—when even nothing did not exist!" (2$_6$)—a negation of the negation which is truly Hegelian.

The various stages conceived of from non-existence through being to form or cosmos include a distinct phase of æonology. To anyone acquainted with 'Gnostic' and allied speculations the following reads very familiarly:

"At the beginning of the beginning, even Nothing did not exist. Then came the period of the Nameless. When One came into existence, there was One but it was formless. When things got that by which they came into existence it was called their Virtue. That which was formless, but divided, though without interstice, was called Destiny" (12$_8$).

The last sentence clearly contains the æon-idea, a state of existence in which is no spacial

division; æons like ideas or souls are conceived of as all one of another, not separated corporeally. The destiny-idea as supernal law and order is the very soul of the æon-cult, as Eisler has pointed out. The next stage is differentiated Life, in the sense of Genesis or the Ever-becoming; here existences are spacially separated, and are all under the sway of the contraries, as we are told by Chwang Tzŭ. It is the partial or special as distinguished from wholeness, the realm of time and space as we understand these. Hence it is said: "Take no heed of time nor right and wrong (L. the conflict of opinion). But passing into the realm of the Infinite, take your final rest therein" (2$_{10}$).

In the Zevanist form of Iranian tradition, Boundless Time and Space was supposed to be the unifier of God and Devil, of Ormuz and Ahriman. In our Taoism there is no Devil, but there is a dualism known as the Great Extremes. These are the two primal opposites, or positive and negative forces of the universe—the Yang and Yin. As manifested in the phenomenal world they are called Heaven and Earth, and their symbols are the round and square (2$_7$, 21$_5$, 24$_3$, 31). Heaven and Earth, as we have seen, are said to be the Father and Mother of all things (19$_1$). Alongside this dualism of heaven and earth there is what is called (11$_4$) the primordial integrity of matter (G.) or the original substance of all things (L.). Phenomenally this would stand for a quintessence, or one element, as it were a sort of primordial ether, whereas Heaven and Earth in the spiritual sense are self-determinations of Tao. Thus one of the ancient

teachers is made to say to the famous Yellow Emperor: "Cherish that which is within you, and shut off that which is without; for such knowledge is a curse. Then will I place you upon that abode of Great Light which is the source of the Positive Power, and escort you through the gate of Profound Mystery which is the source of the Negative Power. These Powers are the controllers of heaven and earth, and each contains the other" (11$_4$).

The positive and negative principles influence, act upon and regulate each other (25$_{11}$). If one were without the other the world-process would not be. The symbolism is mystical, for we read: "Heaven has no parturition, yet all things are evolved. Earth has no increment, yet all things are nourished" (13$_3$). The key passage is perhaps the following: "The perfect Negative Principle is majestically passive. The perfect Positive Principle is powerfully active. Passivity emanates from Heaven above; activity proceeds from Earth beneath. The interaction of the two results in that harmony by which all things are produced" (21$_4$). This harmony must be what Giles (p. 159) calls the scheme of the universe (*lit.* Virtue of Heaven and Earth); the clear understanding of it is called the Great Root or Origin, or the secret of Being (13$_2$).

There is motion that is rest and rest that is motion. For if we are told that passivity proceeds from Heaven and activity from Earth; it is also declared that the sky turns round and the earth stands still (14$_1$); and elsewhere (27$_1$) we read: "Round and round, like a wheel, no part of which

is more the starting point than any other. This is called the equilibrium of God (L. the Lathe of Heaven),"—reminding us of the Wheel of Necessity.

But if all separated things were produced by the union and interaction of the Great Extremes, it was never to be forgotten that their perpetual congress in time was determined by the transcendent and essential Unity of all things. Knowledge of this Great Unity—this is said to be perfection (24$_{14}$). "Whole, Entire, All, are three words which sound differently, but mean the same. Their purport is One" (22$_{6}$). How similar is this to the great saying ascribed to Heraclitus in the West: All and One—perhaps another indication of the same remote common origin. Indeed we are specifically told by our Taoists that the very art of preserving life is to keep "all in One" (23$_{5}$). Of a man who has attained to this unity, however, it is said: "All things are to him One, but he does not know that this is so" (25$_{2}$). 'Perfect knowledge' is thus something very different from a knowledge of abstract unity; he is presumably conscious of the many in one, and of the one in many. For we read of an ancient teacher of the Tao that he preserved the original One while resting in harmony with externals (11$_{4}$). It is a doctrine of resignation (6$_{12}$), but not of quiescence, for it is said that by converging to One all things may be accomplished (12$_{1}$). The consideration, however, of the nature and manner of the True Man according to Chwang Tzŭ is deserving of more detailed treatment.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRUE MAN IN ANCIENT CHINESE MYSTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

In the last sketch an attempt was made to outline some of the more general notions of the Way of the Spirit according to Chwang Tzŭ, the Chinese mystical philosopher of the latter half of the fourth and early part of the third century B.C. Of the individual, however, and the way of his going in hope of attaining to self-realisation comparatively little was said. We may now proceed to consider, at greater length man and the means of his perfectioning according to this remarkable and arresting view of life.

As with the other general notions of Chwang Tzŭ, there is no systematic exposition of the constitution of the individual. The philosophers of the Tao, or Way of the Spirit as I have ventured to phrase it, are very cautious in their psychology, they are content with very simple notions and eschew all detail.

The cause of the emotions in us, they declare, is hard to discover; it is not easy to say what it really is. The problem is set forth, however, in very modern fashion, as may be seen from the following reflection: "But for these emotions *I* should not be. But for *me*, they would have no

scope. So far we can go; but we do not know what it is that brings them into play. 'Twould seem to be a soul;[1] but the clue to its existence is wanting. That such a Power operates is credible enough, though we cannot see its form. It has functions without form" (2₂).[2]

The soul (the spiritual—L.) is born of Tao (22₅). A distinction seems to be drawn between mind and soul or spirit; as for instance when it is said of the 'fasting of the heart' as a means of reaching unity: "You hear not with the ears, but with the mind; not with the mind, but with your soul" (4₂). What the distinction is, however, I cannot discover precisely from the text (cp. 21₃). Tao is, moreover, said to give man his 'expression' (5₅). This can hardly be his 'personal appearance,' as Legge translates it, for in the very same sentence it is contrasted with the bodily form which is said to be given by Heaven. It is the union of Heaven and Earth which is said to produce shape or form (17₁, 19₁). The attainment of the human form is said to be a source of joy; but this achievement is far from the perfection of attaining to the universal body (6₆), and what that is we shall see later on (p. 44). That form means the physical body simply is clearly not the case, as it is elsewhere stated that body is born of the vital (seminal—L.) essence (22₅). Form is rather the

[1] Elsewhere the soul is freely spoken of.

[2] The quotations are from Giles (H. A.), *Chuang Tzŭ, Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer* (London, 1889), except when marked with an L., when they are from Legge (J.), *The Texts of Taoism* (*S. B. E.*, vols. xxxix. and xl., Oxford, 1891.) The inferior figures refer to the numbering of Legge's sub-divisions of the chapters.

manifold impression of the 'seal' or 'type' of Heaven and Earth vitally stamped on the psycho-physiological 'plasm,' as in the Sethite[1] tradition of the early heretical or rather syncretic Gnosis which throws back to a mixed Zoroastrian source, and so again puts us in contact with the suggested common Central Asian 'origin' for these very similar ideas in East and West to which reference was made in the last sketch (pp. 15, 17).

Though, then, there is little of precision in any of the psychological ideas of our Taoist philosophers, there are some high intuitions; as for instance: We have nothing of our own, it is all lent us. Bodily form is the delegated image of God (or of Heaven and Earth); our life is His delegated harmony; our individuality (or nature) His delegated adaptability (22$_4$). The soul is immortal and divine. Life and death are all powerful, but they cannot affect it (5$_1$); to know this constitutes the sage. The man who has reached union or the consciousness of the spiritual 'I' dares to say: The universe (or Heaven and Earth) and I came into being together (2$_6$). Nay further, it is declared of this greater 'I' by one who had attained union with it: "But I will lead you through the portals of Eternity into the domain of Infinity. My light is the light of sun and moon. My life is the life of heaven and earth. I know not who comes and who goes. Men may all die, but I endure for ever" (11$_4$). If such is the meaning of the original, it is difficult to avoid paralleling the opening sentences

[1] The equation Seth = Zoroaster has been successfully established by Bousset in his *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (1907).

with the declarations of the Johannine Christ, and with the 'I'-utterances of the new-found *Odes of Solomon*, in which Harnack recognises presuppositions of the Johannine mystical theology. In any case, conviction in the immortality of the mystic 'I' was unshakable for those who could reflect: "The Universe (Heaven and Earth—L.) is the smelting pot, and God (the Creator—L.) is the caster. I shall go whithersoever I am sent, to wake unconscious of the past, as man wakes from dreamless sleep" (6$_{10}$).

Nevertheless the followers of the Tao did not despise the body; indeed they seem to have been firmly convinced that without a *corpus sanum* there was little chance of a *mens sana*. Their discipline, however, may be said to have been primarily and finally spiritual, for we are told that to be complete in spirit is the way of the sage (L.) "Aiming at Tao he perfects his virtue. By perfecting his virtue he perfects his body, and by perfecting his body he perfects his spiritual part" (12$_{11}$). "Cleanse your heart and purge it of passion and betake yourself to the land where mortality is not" (20$_2$). Though our philosophers did not withdraw themselves from the practical life of the world, they were at the same time contemplatives in that they held that discursive knowledge and ratiocination were hindrances to spiritual intuition. The senses are to be used solely as senses and not allowed to stir the passions within. More than this; all 'wisdom' is to be shut out from the mind (4$_2$). "Wash your soul as white as snow. Discard your knowledge" (22$_5$). True knowledge could only

be attained by the intuition of the self in the stillness of peace (5$_{1}$). "See nothing; hear nothing; let your soul be wrapped in quiet, and your body will begin to take proper form. Let there be absolute repose and absolute purity" (11$_{4}$). Here 'body' is clearly referable to some subtle inward plasm, perchance a quintessence or prime substance, and not to the gross body; though the one would react on the other. There thus seems to have been a distinct 'yoga'-practice; but all this could be of none effect as a means of reaching Tao, unless it were accompanied with the moral discipline of removing the fetters, as a Buddhist would term them: Discard the (lower) stimuli of purpose (impulses of the will—L.)—honour, wealth, fame, etc.; repress the distortions of the mind—arguments, opinions, deportment, etc.; remove the entanglements to virtue—hate, longing, joy and anger, etc. This is all understandable enough, but we enter the *via negativa* indeed when we are bidden renounce the last obstructions to Tao, which are recited as: rejecting and adopting, receiving and giving, knowledge and ability (23$_{11}$). Occasionally we notice a sentence indicating that some more distinctively psychic practices were attempted. There is danger (or banefulness) in the outward turned senses and faculties for the inner self (24$_{13}$); they ought to be turned on themselves, on their own internal workings (24$_{12}$). There is thus allusion to the mystic state of seeing sight and hearing hearing, "from a lofty dais suspended in their very midst" (25$_{3}$).

But whatever disciplines and practices our

philosophers may have followed, it is quite evident that they thought little of the majority of the ways of psychic development of which we hear so much to-day, or of the practices of deep-breathing as it is now called, and of the purely physical stretchings and posturings which form a chief element in modern debased Taoism, for Chwang Tzŭ writes: "Exhaling and inhaling, getting rid of the old and assimilating the new, stretching like a bear and craning like a bird,—this is valetudinarianism, affected by professors of hygiene" (15₁), The way of the Tao started from within in the depths, not from the external and the superficial. "In self-esteem without self-conceit, in moral culture without charity and duty to one's neighbour, in government without rank and fame, in retirement without solitude, in health without hygiene,—there we have oblivion absolute coupled with possession of all things; an infinite calm which becomes an object to be attained by all" (15₁). Premonitions and dreams formed no part of their interest; for of the true man it is said that he is centred in the present alone: "Ignoring the future and the past he resigns himself to the laws of God. . . . His sleep is dreamless" (15₂).

The true man aims in all things at poise and balance; there must be no exaggeration, 'nothing too much' (4₃). "Outwardly you may adapt yourself, but inwardly you must keep up your own standard. . . . You must not let the outward adaptation penetrate within, nor the inward standard manifest itself without" (4₅). There is a certain mystic point of poise, a spiritual centre of

gravity, that must at all hazards be preserved: "Because men are made to rejoice and to sorrow and to displace their centre of gravity, they lose their steadiness, and are unsuccessful in thought and action" (11₁). The maintenance of calm in the midst of storm and stress is the chief safeguard in all dangers, physical and moral: "If a man can but be impervious to capsizings and accidents in general, whither shall he not be able comfortably to go?" (19₄). In this connection a graphic and humorous story is told of an old philosopher who entered a torrent and re-emerged a hundred yards lower down, and "with flowing hair went carolling along the bank"—to the great amazement of Confucius and his disciples, who thought he must be deranged and had intended to commit suicide. In answer to their astonished questionings as to what was the way by which he had learned thus to deal with water, he replied: "No, I have no way. There was my original condition to begin with; then habit growing into nature; and lastly acquiescence in destiny. Plunging in with the whirl, I come out with the swirl. I accommodate myself to the water, not the water to me" (19₉). The story is clearly intended to convey further and deeper meaning. Such men are said allegorically to be of the Middle State. "In the Middle Kingdom there are men who recognise neither positive nor negative. They abide between heaven and earth. They act their part as mortals and then return to the Cause (*sc.* God)" (22₅). Perfect adaptability was the great secret; to be absolutely rigid and stuck in one position was regarded as

the antipodes of wisdom. "Adopt no absolute position. Let externals take care of themselves. In motion, be like water. At rest, like a mirror. Respond, like the echo. Be subtle, as though non-existent. Be still, as though pure" (33$_5$).

This doctrine of natural and spontaneous adaptation to environment, but not of being swamped by it (for the spiritual centre, the inward standard, must ever be preserved), may be regarded as an ever cheerful and ready acquiescence in what is generally called fate, or the immediate present circumstances, by going forth as it were to meet them with joy, even as a bridegroom goes forth to meet his bride; for circumstances are the ever-changing moods of the man's true complement, and thus it is that the sting is at once taken out of the stress and the sorrows of life. This theory of willing and spontaneous self-adaptation to externals is called the 'doctrine of non-angularity' (14$_4$). "Only he who can adapt himself to the vicissitudes of fortune without being carried away, is fit to use the instruments of right" (14$_5$). "To recognise the inevitable and to quietly acquiesce in destiny, is the achievement of the virtuous man alone" (5$_2$); for "those who understand the conditions of destiny devote no attention to things over which knowledge has no control" (19$_1$). But this is not to be taken as the creed of pure fatalism. It is rather cheerful acquiescence with the 'little' so as to reach the 'great'; and 'great' here, as we learned in the last sketch, means 'whole.' For if "he who comprehends the Lesser Destiny" resigns himself to the inevitable, "he who com-

prehends the Greater Destiny *becomes himself part of it.*"

There are two sources of safety: Destiny and Duty. Duty is service; the highest duty is to be utterly oblivious of self. "To serve one's own heart so as to permit neither joy nor sorrow within, but to cultivate resignation to the inevitable,—this is the climax of virtue" (4$_3$). Such a man is said to be without personal passions and so "does not permit good and evil to disturb his internal economy" (5$_5$); he may thus be thought of as sharing in the great or pure passions of nature. To be ever in a state of accord with the exigencies of one's environment is characterised as 'tranquillity amid all disturbances' (L.), or as being 'battered but not bruised' (6$_8$). To reach such continuous perfection it is said that a man must become "first etherealised (with a mind as clear as the morning—L.), next possessed of perfect wisdom (or stand face to face with truth—L.), then without past or present, and finally able to enter there where life and death are no more,—where killing does not take away life, nor does prolongation of life add to the duration of existence" (6$_8$).

To understand, one must become like or in harmony with that which is to be understood or apprehended. Thus "to apprehend fully the scheme of the universe (*lit.* the Virtue of Heaven and Earth), this is called the great secret of being in accord with God" (13$_2$, cp. 13$_6$). To be equally happy under all circumstances (16$_4$) is the preliminary condition to such understanding; for the

happiness of the men of Tao has nothing to do with worldly success or failure (28₈).

These doctrines are for the most part founded upon the conviction that man can regain a state of 'natural integrity' (9₂), fabled as the possession of the people of a primitive paradisical period, a golden age of pure simplicity and perfect virtue (10₃); this natural virtue is now obscured by convention and the complexities of over-civilised life. The people of that ideal golden age, fictitiously transferred to the historical past, are said to have "loved one another without being conscious of charity. They were true without being conscious of loyalty. They were honest without being conscious of good faith. They acted freely in all things without recognising obligations to any one. Thus their deeds left no trace; their affairs were not handed down to posterity" (12₁₃). They acted with spontaneous impulse and without thought of self-interest. Thus their deeds left no trace; or, as a Buddhist would phrase it, they did not generate *karman*. A deliberate return to, or recapture of, this spontaneous state of natural harmony was the goal of the true man; for, as one of the sayings held in highest repute tells us: "The perfect man leaves no trace behind" (26₈). But we may ask, Why this glorification of the traceless past, when we are distinctly told that "to glorify the past and condemn the present is the way of the scholar" (26₈), and not of the sage? This contradiction, like so many others, Chwa[illegible] Tzŭ is at no pains to remove; indeed he intensi[illegible] it by adding that if the sages of yore were[illegible]

appear to-day, they would not talk about the past, but "accommodate themselves" to the present age and its necessities (26₈). This seems to mean that the true sage acts and does not talk; in any case our philosopher is in agreement with hosts of others in the belief that we have to regain the 'child state' we have supposedly lost—the complement if not the antithesis of the objective evolutionary theory. Thus the Taoists possessed an unshakable conviction that there is nothing like the 'light of nature' (2₃). This light of nature is also called the 'proper light of the mind' (L.), which is explained by Legge as the 'perfect mind or the principle of the Tao' (*ib.*). Elsewhere (2₇) it is defined by Chwang Tzŭ when he writes: "To be able to pour in without making full, and pour out without making empty, in ignorance of the power by which such results are accomplished,—this is accounted Light." This Light is called the 'Heavenly Treasure House,' the 'Store of Light' (L.). Further we are told: "What the true sage aims at is the Light which comes out of darkness. He does not view things as apprehended by himself, subjectively, but transfers himself into the position of the things viewed. This is called using the Light" (2₅). It is thus evident that what Chwang Tzŭ understood by simplicity and the light of nature and the rest, was nothing else but the spontaneous operation of Tao itself.

The whole of the ethics of Taoism, accordingly, [redacted]based on the idea of being naturally virtuous [redacted]ner than on striving to be intentionally good. [redacted] must first possess Tao yourself before you can

really help others (4₁). The true sage "never preaches at people, but puts himself in sympathy with them" (5₄); for "he who is naturally in sympathy with man, to him all men come" (23₈). This natural sharing of one's virtue with others is called true wisdom (24₇). But this true virtue begotten of sympathy must be that virtue which is 'without intention' (12₁); there must be no interfering with the self-initiation of another, no imposition of authority. For "there is nothing more fatal than intentional virtue, when the mind looks outward" (32₁₁). The soul in itself loves harmony and hates disorder (24₂); for harmony is virtue (16₁). Virtue abides in the natural. The natural (or heavenly—L.) abides within, the artificial (or human—L.) without (17₇). Thus ordinary moralists devote themselves to the obligations between man and man (24₄); they do not know the natural virtue of heaven. Natural virtue is 'divine virtue'; it is humorously described as "being joined with the universe without being more conscious of it than an idiot" (12₈). This divine virtue is likened unto pure water, as in the ancient saying: "Pure, without admixture; uniform, without change; negative, without action; moved, only at the will of God,—such would be the spirituality nourished according to Tao" (15₃).

Very different is the way of the world in attaining its ends either by force or the holding out of rewards. "Appeal to arms," Chwang Tzŭ teaches, "is the lowest form of virtue. Rewards and punishments are the lowest form of education. Ceremonies and laws are the worst form of govern-

ment" (13$_4$). For "ceremonial is the invention of man. Our original purity is given us by God" (31). Not only so, but "form and virtue, and charity and duty to one's neighbour,—these are the accidentals of the spiritual" (13$_9$); the essential spirit thinks not of such things. The end is neither honour nor knowledge, but goodness. "If the virtuous are honoured, emulation will ensue. If knowledge be fostered, the result will be theft. These things are no use to make people good" (23$_2$). That end, however, is but the same as the beginning, for the whole theory of ethics is, as we have repeatedly seen, based on the belief in the original or natural goodness of the heart of man. This should not be interfered with, for "man's heart (mind—L.) may be forced down or stirred up. In each case the issue is fatal. By gentleness the hardest heart may be softened. But try to cut and polish it—'twill glow like fire or freeze like ice. In the twinkling of an eye it will pass beyond the limits of the Four Seas. In repose, profoundly still; in motion, far away in the sky (like one of the bodies in the sky—L.). No bolt can bar, no bond can bind,—such is the human heart" (11$_3$). Confucius, on the contrary, was far less of an optimist with regard to the heart's natural goodness, for he is made to say: "The heart of man is more dangerous than mountains and rivers, more difficult to understand than Heaven itself" (32$_{10}$).

The way to regain the original purity of the inner nature was called the 'fasting of the heart' or of the mind. This is set forth in Legge's version as follows: "Maintain a perfect unity in every

movement of your will. You will not wait for the hearing of your ears about it, but for the hearing of your mind. You will not wait for the hearing of your mind, but for the hearing of your spirit (soul—G.). Let the hearing (of the ears) rest with the ears. Let the mind rest in the verification (of the rightness of what is in the will). But the spirit is free from all pre-occupation and so waits for (the appearance of) things. Where the proper course (*sc.* Tao) is, there is freedom from all pre-occupation; such freedom is the fasting of the mind" (4$_2$). This natural goodness is thus man's original integrity and not intentional goodness, which is said elsewhere (16$_2$) to lead man away from Tao. There are those who inflict injury by doing good (24$_{12}$). The subtlety of this ethic is amazing and shows a very high stage of moral culture. The hypocrisy of sham goodness is laid bare ruthlessly. "To employ goodness as a passport to influence through the gratification of others, is an everlasting shame" (26$_5$). But this ancient doctrine of the Tao, we fear, is too transcendent for struggling humanity to-day, which will only gape in amazement before such paradoxes as: "Put away goodness and you will be naturally good,"—a saying which follows immediately on the injunction: "Get rid of small wisdom and great wisdom will shine upon you" (26$_6$).

As we have already seen, Confucian ethic was based upon charity or benevolence and duty to one's neighbour or righteousness. This Chwang Tzŭ calls the Tao of Confucius (28$_8$). Now it is a most remarkable fact that already six centuries

B.C. not only was the attempt made to base the social polity of a great state upon these admirable virtues, but that contemporaneously, and with ever-growing vigour and conviction in the fourth century, it was pointed out that this over-busy attempt with its concomitant perpetual interference with others was giving rise to more harm than good. It was of course counterfeit charity and artificial duty to one's neighbour that were opposed and not the real virtues. In a presumably apocryphal conversation between the two greatest philosophers of Chinese antiquity, when Confucius had expatiated complacently on the doctrine of charity and duty to one's neighbour, Lao Tzŭ, the Old Philosopher, is represented as breaking out impatiently with: "The chaff from winnowing will blind a man's eyes so that he cannot tell the points of the compass. . . . And just in the same way this talk of charity and duty to one's neighbour drives me nearly crazy. Sir! strive to keep the world to its original simplicity. And as the wind bloweth where it listeth, so let virtue establish itself" (14$_6$). It must be confessed, moreover, that the Taoists did not shirk the issue, nor did they minimise the strength of their opponents, if at any rate we are to judge by the following:

"Tell me," said Lao Tzŭ, "in what consist charity and duty to one's neighbour?"

"They consist," answered Confucius, "in a capacity for rejoicing in all things; in universal love without the element of self. These are the characteristics of charity and duty to one's neighbour."

Most people would imagine that this ought to have settled Lao Tzŭ once for all. But by no means, the old man comes up smiling with:

"What stuff! Is not your elimination of self a positive manifestation of self?. . . . . Alas! Sir, you have brought much confusion into the mind of man" (13$_7$).

We fear, however, that this retort will be somewhat obscure for most, and all the more so when Chwang Tzŭ himself declares that "perfect charity does not admit of love of the individual," for it embraces all men equally (14$_2$). What seems to be meant is that the phrase 'universal love without the element of self' contains a contradiction in terms; such love to be truly universal should include and not exclude the love of one's self, while at the same time it transcends the love of a selected individual or individuals, as that connotes indifference or less love or even dislike for others. Begotten of such mystical notions, strange phrases meet us which at first sight appear manifestly absurd, and only yield a subtle truth when questioned patiently; as, for example, the startling pronouncements: "Love for the people is the root of all evil for the people. Cultivation of duty towards one's neighbour in order to put an end to war is the origin of all fighting" (24$_2$). The intentional exaggeration (we should never forget the humour of Chwang Tzŭ) puts us off at first, but when we ponder it deeply, we find we can fit the cap to many heads to-day.

There is a real and a false charity and duty (8$_1$); there is the natural and the artificial. "In-

tentional charity and intentional duty to one's neighbour are surely not included in our moral nature (or humanity—L.)" (8₃). Of a teacher of the Tao it is related that of his attendants "he dismissed those who were systematically clever and conventionally charitable" (23₁). Preaching of charity "before reaching the heart by the example of one's own disregard for name and fame" is accordingly deprecated (4₁). It is characterised as "but moral culture, affected by would-be pacificators and teachers of mankind" (15₁); for "perfect politeness is not artificial; perfect duty to one's neighbour is not a matter of calculation" (23₁₁). The perfect man benefits spontaneously and not from calculated love of his fellow man (6₃). In brief, perfection for the followers of the Tao was of another order from what is called charity and duty. The doctrine was: Be your best self, and do not fall into the fatal error of becoming someone else outside of yourself (8₅). The Taoist contention was that when the Confucian sages or scholars appeared, 'tripping people over charity and fettering with duty to one's neighbour,' doubt found its way into the world. "Annihilation of Tao (the natural integrity of things) in order to practise charity and duty to one's neighbour,—this is the error of the sages" (9₂). And so the Taoist anarchically urged: Utterly abolish all the restrictions of the sages (that is the artificiality of calculated rules), and the people will begin to be fit for the reception of Tao (or natural goodness) (10₃).

And if our present-day sages will assuredly

shake their heads, if not lose their tempers, over such 'nihilistic' notions, *à fortiori* from the modern point of view no tenet of the Tao is open to more objection than what is called the doctrine of inaction, which will be incontinently condemned on all sides in the West as involving a gospel of absolute quietism. But this does not seem to me by any means to be the soul of the matter, as may be seen from the following: "If you would attain peace, level down your emotional nature. If you desire spirituality, cultivate adaptation of the intelligence." And Legge's version continues: "When action is required of him, he wishes that it may be right; and it then is under an inevitable restraint. Those who act according to that inevitable constraint pursue the way (Tao) of the sage" (23$_{12}$). This inaction is an inner attitude, not an inhibition of external action: "By inaction we can become the centre of thought, the focus of responsibility, the arbiter of wisdom. Full allowance must be made for others, while remaining unmoved oneself. There must be a thorough compliance with divine principles, without any manifestation thereof." The last sentence is translated by Legge as: "He fulfils all that he has received from Heaven (= the heavenly or self-determining nature), but he does not see that he was the recipient of anything" (7$_6$); for his activities are all spontaneous and immediate. It is by means of this inner inaction that the true man is able to adapt himself to the natural conditions of existence. This inner inaction, however, is not will-less passivity; for on the contrary it supplies the condition for bringing about an enor-

mous expansion of sympathy, so that we find it written that he alone "who respects the state as his own body is fit to support it, and he who loves the state as his own body, is fit to govern it" (11$_2$). The secret of the whole matter is thus set forth: "The true sage looks up to God (Heaven—L.) but does not offer to aid (*sc.* Heaven). He perfects his virtue, but does not involve himself. He guides himself by Tao, but makes no plans. He identifies himself with charity, but does not rely on it. He extends his duty towards his neighbour, but does not store it up. He responds to ceremony, without tabooing it. He undertakes affairs, without declining them. He metes out law without confusion. He relies on his fellow-men and does not make light of them. He accommodates himself to matter and does not ignore it." Thus "while there should be no action, there should be also no inaction" (11$_7$)—a paradox, but yet a subtle truth for those who realise that it is God who works through the perfected man, and who can understand that God acts by means of inaction (12$_2$), or equally well rests in activity. Thus the true sages act according to nature and so rest in tranquillity; "resting therein they reach the unconditioned, from which springs the conditioned; and with the conditioned comes order. Again from the unconditioned comes repose and from repose comes movement, and from movement comes attainment. Further, from repose comes inaction, and from inaction comes potentiality of action" (13$_1$). On the last phrase Giles very rightly comments (p. 158): "When inaction has been achieved, action results spontaneously

and unconsciously to the organism." It is indeed the Way of the Spirit; but "unless there is a suitable endowment within, Tao will not abide. Unless there is outward correctness, Tao will not operate" (14₅); or as Legge phrases it: "If, within, there be not the presiding principle, it (Tao) will not remain there; and if, outwardly, there be not the correct obedience, it will not be carried out." And this 'suitable endowment' or 'presiding principle' is the right will in the heart (28₈).

Though, on the one hand, the Taoist philosophy is centred in the notion of an essentially changeless reality, on the other, it is permeated with the idea of the eternal flux of things and of perpetual transformations, and of the recurrent alternations of existence, the interplay between the opposites, as conditioned by the circle of necessity. Life and death, existence and non-existence, success and non-success, poverty and wealth, virtue and vice, good and evil report, hunger and thirst and repletion, warmth and cold —these all revolve upon the ever-changing Wheel of Destiny (5₄). Life and death belong to Destiny; their sequence, like day and night, is of God (from Heaven—L.), beyond the interference of man, an inevitable law (6₅). Equally, life follows upon death; death is the beginning of life (22₁). This life is a loan (18₃); death is a state of blessedness and union; for, as the skull is humorously made to say to Chwang Tzŭ: "In death there is no sovereign above, and no subject below. Our existences are bounded only by eternity (Heaven and Earth—L.). The happiness of a king among

men cannot exceed that which we enjoy" (18₄). Notice, however, that it is the skull who speaks and not the 'dead' man; still I can nowhere find mention of a purgatory or hell to be dreaded. And though there is a doctrine of metamorphosis I can find no trace of the notion of metempsychosis in the sense of reincarnation which usually accompanies the idea of the Wheel of Becoming. In fact, as also in Confucian agnosticism, all reference to the after-death state as a continuance of earth-conditions or in any other 'spiritistic' mode, is entirely omitted, for, "What should the dead know of the living or the living of the dead?" (6₁₂). It is enough to know that: "The bow-sheath is slipped off; the clothes-bag is dropped; and in the confusion the soul wings its flight (? to Heaven) and the body follows (? to Earth) on the Great Journey home" (22₅).

Their fearlessness and incurious views of what the world generally regards as the king of terrors, are well brought out in the words put into the mouth of one of their sages on his death-bed: "I obtained life because it was my time; I am now parting with it according to the same law. Content with the natural sequence of these states, joy and sorrow touch me not. I am simply, as the ancients expressed it, hanging in the air, unable to cut myself down, bound with the trammels of material existence. But man has ever given way before God. Why then should I be afraid?" (6₉)—the natural courage of a true over-man. So also Chwang Tzŭ tells us, in philosophising on the death of Lao Tzŭ, that the ancients spoke of death

as of God cutting down a man suspended in the air. "The fuel is consumed, but the fire may be transmitted, and we know not that it comes to an end" (3₄). This being 'suspended in the air' Legge translates as 'the loosening of the cord on which God (Tī) suspends the life' (i. 202),—the 'silver thread' of Koheleth. But the most remarkable passage of all contains the last fine words ascribed to Lao Tzŭ himself when refusing the splendid obsequies his disciples were proposing to give him: "With Heaven and Earth as my coffin and shell; with the sun, moon and stars as my burial regalia; and with all creation to escort me to the grave,—are not my funeral paraphernalia ready to hand?" (32₁₄.)

To such men, with their whole being centred on the transcendent and yet most immanent reality of Tao, life as we ordinarily live it was as it were a dream. Man's precious personality, to which we all in the West cling so desperately, was not the true man for them. "A man's personality is something of which he is subjectively conscious. It is impossible for him to say if he is really that of which he is conscious of being. You dream you are a bird, and soar to heaven. You dream you are a fish, and dive into the ocean's depth. And you cannot tell whether the man now speaking is awake or in a dream" (6₁₂). They looked to the Great Awakening not only out of all the dreams of dreaming life but also out of all the dreams of waking life. "Those who dream of the banquet, wake to lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream of lamentation and sorrow, wake to join the

hunt. While they dream, they do not know they dream. Some will even interpret the very dream they are dreaming; and only when they awake do they know it was a dream." So too in the great dream of life. "By and by comes the Great Awakening, and then we find out that this life is really a great dream. Fools think they are awake now, and flatter themselves they know if they are really princes or peasants. Confucius and you are both dreams; and I who say you are dreams,—I am a dream myself. This is a paradox. To-morrow a sage may arise to explain it; but that to-morrow will not be till ten thousand generations have gone by" (2$_9$). And yet though it could not be explained, there were those who had already awakened.

The ideal of the Taoist, as we have seen, was to become naturally the perfect or true or pure man or real sage, a man of spontaneous virtue. The perfect man is a spiritual being (2$_8$). Pure men alone can attain to pure knowledge. What, then, is a pure man? "The pure men of old acted without calculation, not seeking to secure results. They laid no plans. Therefore, failing, they had no cause for regret; succeeding, no cause for congratulation. . . . The pure men of old slept without dreams and waked without anxiety. They ate without discrimination, breathing deep breaths. For pure men draw breath from the uttermost depths" (6$_2$). The last sentence transparently does not refer to physical breathing; it signifies rather inspiring spiritually the great life of the universe. Indeed the Tao of the pure and simple

is said to consist in preserving this spirituality (15₃). Some of the characteristics of the spiritual or truly great man, the man who is whole and complete, are given as follows: "The truly great man, although he does not injure others, does not credit himself with charity and mercy. He seeks not gain, but does not despise his followers who do. He struggles not for wealth, but does not take credit for letting it alone. He asks help from no man, but takes no credit for his self-reliance, neither does he despise those who seek preferment through friends. He acts differently from the vulgar crowd, but takes no credit for his exceptionality; nor because others act with the majority does he despise them as hypocrites" (17₃). Surely we have here signs of a spiritual culture and a natural nobility and delicacy of character which few will appreciate even in our own days.

To be wise without wisdom (4₂) is to be oblivious of self as apart from others (4₃), or in other words to possess the instinctive and natural feeling of the solidarity of humanity. Nay, more than this: "The true sage folds the universe to his bosom" (24₁₀); for the love of the sage for his fellows is "without end, and mankind cease not to repose therein" (25₂); "he exults to see Tao diffused among his fellow men, while suffering no loss himself" (25₁). Such an one is called the man of complete virtue; without this he can never be a true ruler of men (6₃), least of all a saviour; for it is this natural virtue which "expands his heart," so that it "goes forth to all who come to take refuge therein" (12₃). Indeed the true man

becomes as it were a law of compensation or completion to all things (G. p. 139). "Men cling to him as children who have lost their mother; they rally round him as wayfarers who have missed their road. He has wealth and to spare; but he knows not whence it comes. He has food and drink more than sufficient, but he knows not who provides it. Such is a man of virtue" (12$_{12}$). Such a divine man is said to ride upon the sky (*ib.*); "he takes his stand upon the beauty of the universe" (22$_{2}$). "Charioted upon the universe, with all creation for his team, he passes along the highway of mortality" (13$_{3}$); for thus he is really "charioted upon Tao and floating far above mortality" (20$_{1}$). He is a chariot to himself (20$_{2}$); he is perfect, "in appearance a man, in reality God" (21$_{1}$).

But to achieve this the man must die to the world as he has previously regarded it, and become alive to a consciousness of its true nature. "By renouncing the world, one gets rid of the cares of the world. The result is a natural level which is equivalent to a rebirth. And he who is reborn is near" to Tao (19$_{1}$). Such men are reborn as the people of God. "Those who pay no attention to their artificial virtues and condition become oblivious of their own personality; and thus becoming oblivious of their own personality, they proceed to be people of God" (23$_{12}$). And again: "Those whose hearts are in a state of repose give forth divine radiance, by the light of which they see themselves as they are. And only by cultivating such repose can man attain to the constant.

Those who are constant are sought after by men and assisted by God. Those who are thus sought after by men are the people of God; those who are assisted by God are His chosen children" (23₉).

Chwang Tzŭ may be obscure; but for those who can penetrate his obscurity, he is an illuminate of the first order. Indeed it is not too much to say that he should be one of the great teachers of mankind; and yet how few in the West, or even in the East out of China, or even in China among the many, have heard so much as his name!

III.

SPIRITUAL REALITY IN PROGRESSIVE BUDDHISM.

I HAVE been struck somewhat by a certain similarity between the main trend of thought in a recent phase of Occidental philosophy and the outcome of a remarkable tendency of doctrine in the centuried development of one great form of an Oriental religion.

On the one hand, we have Bergson, in the West, leading the way with a series of important publications whose chief object is to establish the thesis that Reality must be sought for essentially in movement, life, spirit, regarded as a perpetual becoming, and that, too, by means of an insight or intuition superior to the range of the practical intellect. On the other, we have Suzuki, from the Far East, bringing his treatise on what he calls Progressive or Catholic Buddhism,[1] to an end in the remarkable formula 'Nirvāṇa is Saṁsāra,'—in other words 'Reality is the Ever-becoming.'

As Bergson's point of view will be dealt with at length later on in these sketches, I shall confine myself to some introductory remarks and a consideration of this striking formula, which so conveniently brings to focus a remarkable phase of the vast complex of doctrine lying within the

[1] Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (London, 1907).

area of Mahāyāna Buddhism,—that is of the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, which, originating and developing on Indian soil, subsequently spread far and wide to China, Japan and Tibet, where it has undergone a still more luxuriant development, constituting the Eastern and Northern expansions of the Dharma or Gospel of the Buddha.

It should, however, be noted that whereas Bergson has so far confined himself to the purely scientific and philosophical treatment of his thesis, the Eastern view is mainly based on religious and ethical considerations.

At first sight the declaration that Nirvāṇa is Saṁsāra seems to be a direct negation of every idea that we, in the West, have been popularly accustomed to associate with the nature of what is supposed to be the goal and consummation of all Buddhist effort. So far from Nirvāṇa being Saṁsāra, it is precisely the very thing, we have been generally given to believe, that stands in strictest contradiction over against it, as freedom to bondage. Saṁsāra[1] is the perpetual Flux of Existence, the Ocean of Ever-becoming, or Stream of ceaseless transmigration or transformation; it is the Greek Genesis or Generation, or state of Birth-and-death, to which the Hellenistic religio-philosophers opposed Regeneration or the entrance into the state of Spiritual Life or Immortality.

As to Nirvāṇa, however, we have been asked

S. (from *saṁ·sṛi*, to revolve, go round) is the Buddhist technical term for the perpetual round or circuit of existence, including all worlds and states of existence other than Nirvāṇa.

by most of our Western authorities carefully to refrain from associating with it any positive notion; when some small protest was raised against the first reports of the Pāliists, who insisted that it meant nothing but complete extinction, we were reluctantly permitted to believe that at best it was the stirless calm of utter absorption into the 'changeless' Absolute. In any case, whatever it might be in itself, Nirvāṇa was certainly *not* Saṁsāra, for the whole effort of the striver for emancipation was to free himself absolutely from this Saṁsāra and so to bring existence therein utterly to an end.

Indeed, in the West, the vast majority have been only too pleased to avail themselves of the permission of the hair-splitting intellectualism of the speculative schools of the Buddhists themselves, to characterise Nirvāṇa as utter Voidness, or at best to follow the Abstractionists and equate it with what they presume to be the solitary, contentless and purely transcendent Absolute of the most extreme form of the later systematised Vedānta of Brāhmanism. In any case we have been asked to take it as a certainty that Nirvāṇa cannot possibly be a consummation in any way comparable with any notion of desirable Reality we may possess in the West, where the doctrine of illusionism is abhorred of all but a handful of theorists who are generally regarded as completely out of touch with the warm, palpitating life of the world of concrete reality, and where every notion of Deity that passes beyond the concept of a Personal Being, is looked on instinctively with the

gravest suspicion by religionists, when not angrily rejected as an empty conceit of the pride of intellect divorced from all understanding of the nature of moral needs.

The formula we are to consider, therefore, is a direct challenge to our ingrained prejudices on the subject of Nirvāṇa. And the interest in the enquiry is all the greater, when we find that this view has not been forced out in the East as a reaction to the stimulus of Occidental criticism; for Buddhism seems to be as insensible to external pressure of this kind as is any other great religion (once it has passed its formative stage) to what it regards as the onslaughts of the enemy. On the contrary, it is a natural development within its own soil from an original seed of doctrine that has always been the most admirable feature of Buddhist propaganda,—namely, the moral element of universal love or compassion.

Even if we were competent to do so, limitations of space would preclude any attempt to outline the historical evolution of the doctrine of Nirvāṇa; for it is bound up with the whole question of the origin and development of Buddhism itself,—in other words, with a subject as vast and complex as the history of the beginnings and evolution of Christianity; and not only so, but whereas in the case of the latter we have had and have hosts of admirably equipped scholars minutely inspecting every document and scrap of evidence, in the case of the former we have only a very small band of competent workers who are endeavouring to find their way and set up

standards of value in a vast literature, of many periods and in many languages, of which no small portion is still unknown in the West, and only a comparatively small part of the known is translated.

From the earliest times on Indian soil, and as it spread far and wide to many lands throughout the centuries, Buddhism gave birth to endless schools and sub-schools; indeed, so strongly marked are the developments and divergencies, especially in the centuries of its later expansion, that we might almost say we had to deal with different religions instead of with a single faith. As to the history of its origins and early expansion moreover, we should never forget that we are far worse off in the matter of internal documents and external evidence than is the case with Christianity (for we have to allow for some three centuries of oral tradition on the one hand and of a complete lack of epigraphic monuments prior to Asoka on the other), and therefore we are left in great uncertainty as to whether later developments may not be traceable to earlier features than the extant documents can enable us to discover with chronological precision.

The view of Buddhist origins and early development that has hitherto dominated Western research, is based on the extant Pāli sources, which are held to represent the most authentic tradition; but this somewhat too exclusive view has been called into question of late chiefly by the valuable work done by Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin, of Brussels, on the Sanskrit tradition, which he contends is by no means so lightly to be set aside.

Buddhist propaganda on the soil of India was carried on in two languages; in the Pāli vernacular, which Professor T. W. Rhys Davids claims to have been a popular 'literary' language as well, and in Sanskrit, the language of culture and religion. Though we cannot be certain, it is highly probable that Sanskrit, the language of learning and theology, was used almost at once as a potent medium for spreading the doctrine of the Dharma among the learned in India, and that in such circles the development of doctrine was most active.

Whatever the historical facts may be with regard to the initial stages of development, we find later on that the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions are broadly characterised by divergent tendencies. Generally speaking, the Pāli tradition in its various schools presents us with a form of Buddhism of a soberer complexion, with a predominating tendency to present the doctrine somewhat in the form of a rationalistic ethic; whereas the Sanskrit, with its still more numerous divisions, is far more adaptable and more catholic in its sympathies; it is of a more syncretic and gnostic nature so to speak, eagerly embracing and transforming and developing the rich religious heritage of the past in its environment.

On the one hand, we have in the Pāli tradition, though it also shows every sign of considerable development of doctrine, a view that looked back to Gotama as a wise and holy teacher, a sage who discovered the cause of sorrow and taught the simplest moral means whereby freedom from sorrow could be won; on the other hand, while there are

indications of the tendency also in the Pāli, the Sanskrit tradition from the beginning regarded the Buddha not only as a heavenly being, but as the manifestation of a Wisdom which transcended that of the highest gods,—as indeed the consummation of the promise of the ages and the most perfect incarnation of the all-embracing Principle of Salvation.

It is hardly necessary to point out that we have here somewhat similar tendencies to those we find in the development of Christian doctrine. On the one hand, we have the 'Liberal,' largely rationalising view that concentrates itself on what it regards as the historic Jesus and his original teachings, and the 'Catholic,' supernatural view that is absorbed in the contemplation of the birth of a world-religion which summed up the best in the past and transformed it, under the abiding Presence of the Christ, the Living Logos, the Illuminating Power and Saving Spirit of Supremest Deity.

It is somewhat generally believed that these two tendencies are the main characteristics of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism respectively—that is of the Little and the Great Vehicles. No really satisfactory explanation, however, has as yet been given of the origin of these terms; if the apparently less worthy has been assigned to the followers of the Pāli tradition, it is of course not with their consent, for they boast themselves to be the handers-on of the purer tradition. The Mahāyānists, however, contend that, so far from this being the case, the Pāli traditionalists are the

followers of the letter and not of the spirit of the Dharma, and that they are rightly to be stigmatised as falling away from the true original which was ever and always the Great Vehicle of Salvation. In any case the claim of the most distinguished representatives of the Mahāyāna doctrine to-day is that their tradition and development represent Catholic and Progressive Buddhism, whereas Hīnayānism is stagnant and reactionary.

Like Christianity, Buddhism did not suddenly appear from heaven in the midst of a totally unprepared world; it was in part the outcome of forces already in existence, which had indeed been working in various modes of expression for centuries previously. The essence of its spirit and doctrine was a blend of two elements that required to be kept in perfect balance if its progress was not to become 'extra-vagant' from the middle path of safety, and its development fail of its promised fruitage. These two elements were the mutually complementary energies of the whole spirit of the religion which was characterised as the Bodhi-dharma, or the Truth (Dharma) that bestows the omniscience of Enlightenment (Bodhi). This supreme spiritual illumination could be realised only through the perfect union of Wisdom (Pra-jñā) and Love (Karuṇā)—Wisdom, not knowledge of phenomenal things and secondary causes; Love or Compassion for all that lives and breathes, and not of chosen individuals as apart from the rest, or of the brethren only.

In very similar fashion, if not in similar circumstances, but with very different outcome, we

have the two elements of Gnōsis and Agapē inworking in Christianity in the beginnings.

But what was the nature of this Pṛa-jñā or Gnōsis? Here we must dismiss the prejudice (as we must also in the case of the Christianised Gnōsis, once we have excepted certain extravagances) that it was nothing but intellectualism blending and systematising pre-existing traditions, or even rationalising the data of religion, or that it was simply a knowledge of magical processes or recipes for overcoming the terrors of the invisible world, or obtaining control over animate nature. It was essentially a *gnōsis sotērías*, or a moral and spiritual wisdom that ensures salvation.

Gotama lived in an age when the highest religious culture centred itself in the practice of profound meditation and of perfecting the powers of the contemplative mind; it was by means of the practice of *yoga*, that is of union of the individual with the universal Spirit, that Gotama is said to have reached that supreme illumination in which he realised the nature of the causes of existence and obtained the certainty of the means whereby true freedom could be won.

From the start, therefore, Buddhism was a religion which looked to right contemplation as a sure means of attaining certitude as to the ultimate nature of things. For this it had the authority of Gotama himself; it formed an integral part of the original teaching. It is somewhat otherwise in Christianity, which fixes its chief hopes on prayer as the highest means, owing to its fundamental belief that Deity is Personal Being. In all the

great crises of the 'Life,' as handed on in the Gospels, Jesus is said to have prayed; nowhere in the N.T. canon do we meet with any authority for contemplation, and thus we find ourselves here on a preponderatingly Semitic rather than on an Aryan basis. Nevertheless there were many schools of contemplatives in those days, and contemplation and prayer have been subsequently accommodated in many forms of Christian mysticism.

In this respect the method of the Buddha carried on the practice of the seers of the Upaniṣhads, those marvellous products of the early schools of Indian contemplatives, who taught that the highest end was the realisation of the identity of the individual with the supreme Self. It was a firm conviction of the followers of this stern self-discipline and profound self-realisation that man was essentially higher than the gods, and that he could reach to a degree of union that transcended all separate existence.

Rightly considered, it is a doctrine of magnificent hope, and on Indian soil was carried out to its logical consequence in the domain of theology, in a way that is without parallel in the West, except to a certain extent in certain forms of religio-philosophy and of gnōsis in the early centuries.

To take one of these parallels; it is well known that some of the syncretic gnostic schools placed the demiurgic or formative Power of the phenomenal world in subordination to the supreme omniscient Deity. The saving Power, it was further taught, proceeded from the Supreme to free mankind from the dominion of this world-fabricating

Power (the fashioner of bodies and source of egoism) by inspiration of the vital spiritual gnōsis which they conceived of as a gnōsis of salvation. This was of course regarded by the orthodox, under the influence of Jewish monotheism, as the extreme of heresy. The idea is presumably a transformation of certain elements in Babylonian sidereal religion blended with later developments of Irāno-Persian tradition, to the Old Aryan source of which the later and more highly developed conceptions in Indo-Aryan tradition may also in some fashion ultimately go back.

Some forms of this Gnosticism hand on the elements of an ancient myth in which the Demiurge is represented as in ignorance boasting himself to be the Supreme. But when once man appears in the world-process, he refuses to admit this boasted supremacy, and immediately turns to his own true spiritual source and origin and worships the Supreme. Thereon the Demiurge and his subordinates, who are all regarded as the sons of the universal Mother, that is of Nature alone, are informed of their error by their Mother, who now assumes the form of Divine Wisdom. In a more developed phase of the doctrine, it is the Saviour himself who teaches the gods the gnōsis of the Supreme and mystery of the Divine Love.

In Buddhism also we find ourselves moving within a somewhat similar circle of ideas. There is abundance of evidence of all kinds, but the two quotations[1] that follow, from books of the Pāli

[1] See L. de la Vallée Poussin's art. 'Atheism (Buddhist),' in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion*, vol. ii. (Edinburgh, 1909).

canon, may help to make the idea clearer for readers who are unacquainted with Buddhist literature.

In Indian tradition Brahmā as distinguished from Brahman, the universal Supreme Deity, is the demiurgic Power of a world-phase. In one of the suttas, or discourses, the Buddha, the supremely Enlightened One, explains:

"How Brahmā, being born at the beginning of a world-age, in the midst of the heaven prepared for him by his *karma*, unconscious of his previous existences, and witnessing the birth of the other gods whom he wished to have as companions, imagines that he is in truth 'The Supreme One, the Lord of all, the Creator, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be.' 'These other beings are of my creation. And why is that so? Awhile ago I thought, Would that they might come! And on my mental aspiration behold the beings came.'"[1]

Here the Buddhist view must be accorded a somewhat higher degree of development than the Western Gnostic; the root-idea, however, is very similar.

Brahmā is great, reverenced by all the gods, but he is inferior to the Buddha. Men may become gods, but gods cannot become Buddhas without first becoming men. Not only may man rise to the dignity and enjoy the blissful state of a Brahmā, and become the demiurgic thinker of a world-phase, but he may also transcend this loftiest height in phenomenal existence and become a

[1] *Brahmajālasutta*, ch. ii. (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, London, 1899, p. 30).

Buddha or rather Buddha, and so be consciously at-one with the supreme Truth and Reality.

The following popular story from another of the suttas will further illustrate the topic. A certain monk, being disturbed over a cosmological problem, is said to have traversed in thought the celestial spaces, in order to consult their denizens on this knotty point. The gods refer him to Brahmā.

"He is more potent and more glorious than we. He will know it."

"Where then is that great Brahmā now?"

"We know not where great Brahmā is, nor why Brahmā is, nor whence. But when the signs of his coming appear, when the light ariseth, and the glory shineth, then will he be manifest."

Soon after this Brahmā became manifest, and the monk drew near and put his question:

"Where do the four great elements cease, leaving no trace behind?"

Thereon Brahmā took the questioner apart and answered:

"These gods, my retinue, hold me to be such that there is nothing I cannot see, I have not realised. Therefore I gave no answer in their presence. But I do not know where the four elements cease. Therefore return to the Buddha, and accept the answer according as he shall make reply."[1]

The answer is perhaps that they cease in the presumed substrate of Nirvāṇic consciousness.

[1] *Kevaddhasutta* (*ib.*, p. 280).

As is well known, one of the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism is that the fundamentally false notion of the separated 'I' is the root of all sorrow and the last limit that shuts man away from Reality. It is on this ground mainly that Buddhism, which by no means denies the sublimity of states of existence in which the 'I' notion is retained, nevertheless refuses to believe in the possibility of absolute freedom from every taint of sorrow and ignorance until this final fetter is utterly removed. It therefore refuses to admit that personal being, in the sense of egoity or even self-hood, is the ultimate Reality, and accordingly denies the reality of the self (ātman) in any form of separation. As we shall have to deal with this doctrine at length on several occasions later on, it is enough here to note that there already existed in the days of the Buddha a doctrine of the self that, for all practical purposes and in all essentials, covered the same ground; in those days, however, it was stated in positive terms of great simplicity free from all the subsequent refinements that gave rise to the age-long controversy of the scholastics.

This doctrine may be conveniently illustrated by the quotation of a wisdom-story from one of the oldest Upaniṣhads, which hands on the fabled teaching of Prajāpati, the All-father, concerning the Supreme.

"The Self (Ātman) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose counsels are true,—That is to be investigated, That is to be understood."

These words of All-father were heard by the gods and demons, who sent their respective monarchs to Prajāpati to learn the wisdom of the true Self. He first told them to look at themselves as mirrored in the surface of the water, where they behold themselves exactly reproduced. "We see this our entire self" they said. The 'venerable master' replied: "Well, that is the Self." They went away satisfied. The chief of the demons remained satisfied; but after a time Indra, the chief of the gods, returned in doubt:

"O venerable master, just as this Self is well adorned when the body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, well cleaned when the body is well cleaned, even so the Self will be blind when the body is blind, lame when the body is lame, crippled when the body is crippled, and, in fact, will perish as soon as the body perishes; therefore I see no consolation in this doctrine."

Then Prajāpati told Indra that "he who moves about happy in dreams is the Self." The king of the gods went away, but soon returned again:

"Venerable master, it is true that the Self is not blind when the body is blind, nor lame when it is lame, it is true that it is not affected by the infirmities of the body; it is not killed when the body is murdered, it is not lamed when it is lamed, but it is as if it were killed, as if it were vexed, as if it suffered pain, as if it wept—in this I see no consolation."

Thereupon Prajāpati took him on to the next stage: "When a man is in deep sleep, at perfect

rest, seeing no dreams, that is the Self." But Indra was not satisfied even with this:

"Venerable master, in that way he does not know himself, does not know 'I am this,' nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to annihilation, I see no consolation in this."

Thereon the teacher, after leading the pupil from the bodily Self, to the conscious individual Self in dreams, and then to the unconscious individual Self in deep sleep, is constrained to reveal the truth:

"O mighty Indra, this body indeed is possessed by Death. It is the abode of that immortal incorporeal Self. Possessed is the incorporated Self by pleasure and pain; for, because it is incorporated, there is no escape from pleasure and pain. But the incorporeal Self is touched neither by pleasure nor by pain. Bodiless are winds, clouds, lightning and thunder; and as these, being hidden in the heavenly ether, rise from it, and approaching the highest light, appear in their own form, thus does that serene being, arising from this body, approaching the highest light (the knowledge of Self), appear in its own form."[1]

In connection with the subsequent strenuous denial of the Self or Ātman (the *anattā*[2] theory) by Buddhist controversialists, it is of interest to record that in their own tradition, the four attributes of Nirvāṇa are given as: (1) eternal, (2) blissful, (3) self-acting (ātman), (4) pure.[3] Here it

[1] *Chhāndogya Upaniṣhad*, viii. 7. Deussen's Trans., as quoted in his art. 'Ātman,' in Hastings' *Dict. of Relig.*, vol. ii.

[2] (Sk.) *Ātmā=attā* (Pāli); *an-attā*=non-self.

[3] Suzuki, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

is to be noted that supreme Reality itself is characterised by the very attribute (ātman[1]) which is elsewhere said to be the deepest root of all illusion. It is all a quarrel over the meanings of words. The Ātman of the Upaniṣhads is *not* the I-making faculty, Ahaṁ-kāra, as the Buddhists insist, perhaps mainly from *odium theologicum;* it is fundamentally the Self, the true wholeness of the being.

In any case the Gnōsis (Pra-jñā) of Buddhism, precisely as the Highest Knowledge (Parā Vidyā) of Brāhmanism, aims at the realisation of the Supreme Reality, whether that Reality be called Nirvāṇa or Brahman.[2]

The chief objection, however, which is brought against both doctrines in the West, is that this Reality is conceived of as at best an abstract Absolute, set over against the swirling complex or flux of existence which constitutes the phenomenal world; and it must be admitted that some schools of both these great traditions of the East give us reason to come to this conclusion. The life-process is not the real, they contend. This contention is presumably fundamentally based upon a fact of experience familiar to all contemplatives who are capable of transcending the normal limitations of physical sense. The concrete physical for them in such states becomes as the unsubstantial fabric of dreams.

It is, however, by no means certain that we

[1] Ātman is the crude form; ātmā, the nominative case.

[2] In the *Bhagavad Gītā* it is repeatedly referred to as Brahma-nirvāṇa.

can so easily dispose of the conception of Reality of these two great religio-philosophies. Both contend that there *is* Reality, and that if it be attained to, all is real. The nature of it, however, they say, cannot be described; for once one with it, it needs no description, and any attempt to describe it at once takes us out of it. In it all oppositions and all categories cease as such—time and space and causality and the rest, as we know them. These are all due to our clinging to separate existence.

It would certainly be denied by the best representatives of both traditions that this Real is the monotonous sameness of pure oneness or anything of the kind. Nor would they admit that it was a state in which all is eternally determined; for to all such objections the Vedāntist would answer, as of yore, 'No, No!' and refuse to prolong the controversy. His sole postulate is that *his* Reality is the supremely desirable Reality, in that when you get there every possible need is utterly satisfied. The Buddhist also, in spite of the endless controversies as to the nature of Nirvāṇa, would probably fall back on the simple statement that Nirvāṇa *is;* that is, that it is the Reality which even the Buddha found to be completely satisfactory.

Now we have already seen that the Pra-jñā or Gnōsis of Buddhism, sublime as is its ideal of perfect spiritual knowledge, was but one wing, so to say, of the great bird or vehicle of the Bodhi, or supreme Enlightenment,—the heavenly dove of Buddhism. The other wing of the holy spirit, of the Law of Truth, or Vital Reality, is Love

(Karuṇā). Without the unceasing pouring forth of unstinted Compassion on all creatures, there can be no true realisation of Bodhi. To preach this doctrine, the All-embracing Spirit of Compassion (Mahā-Karuṇā), incarnates on earth in the person of a Buddha. There is no necessity, it is said, for such an incarnation other than the self-motive of Immeasurable Love. One who has freed himself from the necessity of rebirth or transmigration into any possible state of existence, is no longer called upon by any law of necessity to return to earth, or indeed to stay in any heaven; he is free; he has entered into the Reality.

But here there crept into the deepest heart of Buddhism a doubt: Is he thus *really* free? Is he truly noble (ariya)? Does he not thus enter merely what has been called the Nirvāṇa 'of the eye'—the only seeming Real after all? For the Nirvāṇa 'of the heart' imperatively demands the renunciation of all bliss for self so long as a single sentient creature suffers; bliss unshared is no true bliss. Hence arose the doctrine of the Great Vow[1]—the Supreme Renunciation of the true Buddha,—that he will never enter Nirvāṇa till every sentient creature has been saved from ignorance and sorrow.

Here the empty logomachies of the unilluminated intellect concerning the nature of Nirvāṇa in the abstract come, or ought to come one would

[1] The developments of this grandiose doctrine among the Japanese sects have been most ably dealt with by Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter in the two parts of his paper, 'Religion in the Far East, or Salvation by Faith: A Study in Japanese Buddhism,' in the April and July numbers of *The Quest* for 1910.

think, to an ignominious end. We have no further need of the hair-splitting negationism of scholasticism; we are no longer interested in the formula that infinity equals naught, that Saṁsāra is the unreality of existence and Nirvāṇa the reality of non-existence, and that both are thus unreal and therefore identical, and all the rest of it. The unsatisfying dualism that sets Nirvāṇa over against Saṁsāra, the selfish absorption that bids good-bye for ever to existence, fall like withered leaves to the ground; they have no longer any part or lot on the tree of spiritual life,—the ever-living bodhi-tree that is said to overshadow the birth of every Buddha.

Once even the faintest echo of this transcendently sublime ideal of utter renunciation of what had previously been regarded as the highest possible prize that could be won, has been heard in the heart, the value of the prize drops to zero, and the striver for it becomes contemptible. True satisfaction, the only genuine fulfilment (Nirvāṇa-sukha), is the perpetual renunciation of every state of bliss, even the bliss of 'unity' (for indeed, paradoxically enough, the higher such states are the more exclusive do they become), and the throwing in of one's lot with Saṁsāra and its ignorant, sinning, suffering, struggling multitudes; true satisfaction is to descend to the lowest hell to preach in deeds the good law of compassion, by the power of a saving presence, pure of the slightest tinge of self-interest, and to ascend to the loftiest heaven to impart to its highest denizens a moral wisdom that transcends the subtlest bliss of the

most refined and exalted senses, and the keenest intellect of the clearest self-centred mind.

For the contention of the most progressive followers of the Mahāyāna is that the Buddha taught first and foremost a moral doctrine, which was summoned up in the most transcendent, and yet most immanent, of the virtues,—Love for all that lives and breathes. The Buddha, they declare, did not put forward the idea of the Nirvāṇa of escape or the fatuous notion of bringing existence to an end; such an absurdity could never have been the goal of his teaching. On the contrary, he taught that Nirvāṇa consisted in the practice of the noble Eight-fold Path,—*i.e.* of right views, right thoughts, right speech, right action, right living, right exertion, right recollection, and right contemplation. It is by this moral practice alone that the bliss of Nirvāṇa is realised as the proper fulfilment or unfolding of human life. And so we find it laid down in the latest summary of the most essential doctrines of the Great Vehicle, as put forward by a believer for the information of the West, that:

"Nirvāṇa is not the annihilation of the world and the putting an end to life; but it is to live in the whirlpool of birth-and-death (Saṁsāra) and yet be above it. . . .

"Nirvāṇa, briefly speaking, is a realisation in this life of the all-embracing love and all-knowing intelligence of Dharmakāya. It is the unfolding of the reason of existence, which in the ordinary human life remains more or less eclipsed by the shadow of ignorance and egoism. It does not

consist in the mere observance of the moral precepts laid down by Buddha, nor in the blind following of the Eight-fold Path, nor in retirement from the world and absorption in abstract meditation. The Mahāyānistic Nirvāṇa is full of energy and activity which issues from the all-embracing love of the Dharmakāya. There is no passivity in it, nor a keeping aloof from the hurly-burly of worldliness. He who is in this Nirvāṇa does not seek rest in the annihilation of human aspirations, does not flinch in the face of endless transmigration. On the contrary, he plunges himself into the ever-rushing current of Saṁsāra and sacrifices himself to save his fellow creatures from being eternally drowned in it."[1]

And what is Dharmakāya? It is a synonym of the absolute Reality of Being of the Buddha, as the That in which all things live and move and have their being. Thus Professor M. Anesaki, in an article on Ashvaghoṣha, who flourished [most probably in the first century A.D. and is thought to have been the first to systematise the doctrine of the three modes of being (*trikāya*) of the Buddha, writes:

"The final end of Buddhist enlightenment consists in the full realisation of this absolute reality [of Tathā-tā, *i.e.* the 'That-ness'],[2] which is the true and highest condition of Buddha-hood. That is the eternal substance of the Truth revealed by Buddha, and is, therefore, the true doctrine

[1] Suzuki, *op. cit.*, pp. 341, 349, 350.

[2] The Buddha is called Tathā-gata as one who has attained unto union with this Reality.

and, at the same time, the true body or entity of Buddha, *i.e.* the Dharmakāya. But this absolute, which is unique in its substance, does not remain without manifestation. When it appears to us in its state of bliss, it is the Buddha in enjoyment (Sambhoga). When it is manifested in this world in order to save us personally, it is the Buddha incarnate or in *kenōsis* (Nirmāṇa),[1] as, for example, Shākyamuni. In order for us to attain the ideal of Enlightenment, it is necessary for us to believe in any of these three aspects of the Buddha's personality, and [so] be saved by his grace."[2]

The flower of Buddha-hood thus grows in the mire of passion and suffering. Not only so, but the man who has transmuted his own personal passion and suffering into virtue and bliss, has not by any means arrived at supreme Enlightenment. Here comes in the doctrine of 'vicarious atonement' proper; for it is only by the transmutation of the *impersonal* evil, ignorance and suffering, of

[1] That is to say, as limited by earthly conditions, and therefore said by some, though very improperly, to be 'emptied' (Gk. *kenos*) of the marvellous glory of his manifestation in the subjective states. The 'emptying' (*kenōsis*) is really only an appearance us-wards; it is owing to our blindness of vision. Here we have precisely the same difficulty as has arisen in Christianity and formed the subject of infinite controversy. The term is of course taken over by Prof. Anesaki from Western theology. In it inhere all the subtleties of 'docetism,' or of the doctrine of illusory embodiment, the body of transformation (Nirmāṇa-kāya). Is the physical body of the Buddha, or of the Christ, just like the bodies of normal mankind?—it is asked. The answer is: Yes and no; to us yes, to Him no; for the Buddha or the Christ can assume any body at will and for any time, for the purpose of His manifestation and ministry. The body is as real as any other body; but it is not a body of bondage. The Buddha and the Christ have absolute control over the whole orders of embodiment.

[2] Art. 'Aśvaghoṣa,' in Hastings' *Dict. of Relig.*

the world that the true Buddha-body grows. Therefore it is said:

"All sins transformed into the constituents of Enlightenment! The vicissitudes of Saṁsāra transformed into the bliss of Nirvāṇa!

"All these come from the exercise of the great religious discipline;

"Beyond our understanding, indeed, is the mystery of all Buddhas."[1]

This brings us to the remarkable formula with which we set forth at the beginning of this paper:

"*Yas Kleshas so Bodhi; yas Saṁsāras tad Nirvāṇam.*"

"What is Sin (or Passion) that is Intelligence (or Enlightenment); what is Birth-and-death (or Transmigration) that is Nirvāṇa."

In illustration of this vital doctrine Suzuki brings forward, in chap. xiii. of his instructive work, a number of quotations from Mahāyāna documents, from which we may select the following:

"Saṁsāra is Nirvāṇa, because there is, when viewed from the ultimate nature of the Dharma-kāya [the eternal self-realisation of Reality], nothing going out of, or coming into, existence; Nirvāṇa is Saṁsāra, when it is coveted and adhered to. . . .

"We know that what is the essence of Birth-and-death that is the essence of Nirvāṇa, and that what is the essence of Nirvāṇa is the essence of Birth-and-death (Saṁsāra). In other words, Nirvāṇa

[1] Quoted from *The Sūtra on the Incomprehensible* by Vasubandha in his *Discourse on Buddha-Essence*. (Japanese Tripiṭaka, ed. of 1881, fas. II., p. 81). See Suzuki, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

is not to be sought outside of this world, which, though transient, is in reality no more [? other] than Nirvāṇa itself. Because it is contrary to our reason to imagine that there is Nirvāṇa and there is Birth-and-death (Saṁsāra) and that the one lies outside the pale of the other, and, therefore, that we can attain Nirvāṇa only after we have annihilated or escaped the world of Birth-and-death. If we are not hampered by our confused subjectivity,[1] this our worldly life is an activity of Nirvāṇa itself."[2]

So also we find the great Buddhist sage Nāgārjuna, in the *Mādhyamika Shāstra*, declaring:

"Saṁsāra is in no way to be distinguished from Nirvāṇa;

"Nirvāṇa is in no way to be distinguished from Saṁsāra.

. . . . . .

"The sphere of Nirvāṇa is the sphere of Saṁsāra.

"Not the slightest distinction exists between them."

Above all things the Dharma of the Buddha is

[1] This is Suzuki's rendering of *smṛiti*. In a note to his translation of Ashvaghosha's *Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (London, Kegan Paul, 1900), he writes (p. 56): "The term is usually rendered by recollection or memory, but Aśvaghosha uses it apparently in a different sense. It must mean subjectivity, or the perception of particularity, or that mental activity which is not in accordance with the suchness [tathā-tā] of things; if otherwise, the whole drift of the present Discourse [Sutta] becomes totally unintelligible. *Smṛti* is in some degree obviously synonymous with *avidyā* (ignorance) which is more general and more primordial than the former. Ignorance appears first, and when it starts the world-process, 'subjectivity' is evolved, which in its turn causes particularisation to take place. Particularisation does not annihilate suchness, but it overshadows the light of its perfect spiritual wisdom."

[2] *Visheṣhachinta-brahma-paripṛichchha Sūtra*, ch. ii. (Chinese trans.).

the Doctrine of the Middle Path (Mādhya-Mārga), which steers a safe course between all extremes and all opposites, in a balanced union of the constituents of duality whereby everything is made whole by its natural complement. Thus, in *The Shrimala Sūtra*, we read:

"Those who see only the transitoriness of existence are called Nihilists; and those who see only the eternality of Nirvāṇa are called Eternalists. Both views are incorrect."

And on this Vasubandha, in his *Discourse on Buddha-Essence*, comments:

"Therefore, the Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata is free from both extremes, and on that account it is called the Great Eternal Perfection. When viewed from the absolute standpoint of Suchness [or Thatness, Tathā-tā], the logical distinction between Nirvāṇa and Saṁsāra cannot in reality be maintained, and hereby we enter upon the realm of Non-duality."

And hence Wisdom and Compassion, Knowledge and Love, must work together for Perfection. Therefore Devala, the author of *The Discourse on the Great Person* (Mahā Puruṣha), writes:

"The wise do not approve loving-kindness without intelligence, nor do they approve intelligence without loving-kindness; because one without the other prevents us from reaching the highest path. . . .

"Those who are afraid of transmigration and seek their own benefits and happiness in final emancipation, are not at all comparable to those Bodhi-sattvas who rejoice when they come to

assume a material existence once again, for it affords them another opportunity to benefit others. . . .

"Nirvāṇa in truth consists in rejoicing at others' being made happy, and Saṁsāra in not so feeling. He who feels a universal love for his fellow creatures will rejoice in distributing blessings among them and find Nirvāṇa in so doing."

Such quotations could be multiplied; but enough have been given to illustrate the chief topic of this paper.

It is utterly impossible that a popular religion, or any religion for that matter, can be founded on negativism; it must give positive satisfaction in some way to spiritual and moral needs, or cease to exist. It is quite true that negationist views are rampant in many speculative forms of Buddhistic intellectualism; but, as we have seen, they leave the living spirit of the faith untouched, which at its best teaches that Reality is truly realisable only in the world of becoming, in that there is no true satisfaction save in the bliss of rejoicing at others being benefited.

IV.

THE IDEAL LIFE IN PROGRESSIVE BUDDHISM.

In the last study I have tried to give some idea of the nature of spiritual reality in progressive Buddhism,—in other words, of the meaning of Nirvāṇa according to the most highly developed doctrine of the Mahāyāna or Great Vehicle. In the present I propose to make a few notes on the ideal life as conceived of in this more 'catholic' form of the Dharma or Buddhist Truth.

The spiritual Buddhist Church, in its highest significance, is believed to be composed of the Bodhisattvas. It is they who constitute the Saṁgha, or Order, the Communion of Buddhist Saints. What, then, is a Bodhisattva?[1]

"Bodhi-sat-tva' means literally 'Enlightenment-ess-ence,' hence loosely an enlightened being. Bodhi, as we have already seen in the last study, is the Buddhist technical term for spiritual enlightenment; Buddha in its simplest meaning signifies the Enlightened One, and the Gospel or Truth taught by the Buddha is known as the Bodhi-dharma. Bodhi does not mean intellectual knowledge, though it does not exclude it; it is to be conceived of chiefly as an immediate and vital

[1] See Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin's Art. 'Bodhisattva,' in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii. (1909), pp. 739-753. This in many ways admirable essay contains the amplest collection of material so far available.

apprehension of truth operated by the moral energy of being true oneself. It may in a way be described as sympathetic insight, or intuition, or spiritual understanding. Or again, it may be thought of as wisdom in its deepest meaning; not a perception of externals or an intellectual grasp of things as apart from ourselves in separation, but rather a vital comprehension of the nature and purpose of all existences as sympathetically embraced in our own being—in other words, self-realisation.

A Bodhisattva, however, is not possessed of Bodhi in its fulness; such transcendent perfection is reserved for the Buddha alone. To the latter, as possessor of perfect Bodhi, the superlatively honorific title Samyak Sam-buddha is given,—a term which may be literally rendered as the 'Supremely Perfectly-enlightened.' A Bodhisattva is thus a potential Buddha, a Buddha in the making, or a future Buddha. Though 'Bodhisattva' has come to mean, in its more general sense, one who is essentially *of the nature of* a Buddha, he is not yet fully enlightened, has not yet realised Bodhi in its perfection.[1] To use the more familiar Christian terms, he is not a Christ, the fully Anointed of the Divine Spirit, but one in whose 'heart' the Christ is being 'born'—where 'heart' means the mystic 'heart,' as in Ṣūfism, the 'essence,' to which reference has already been made, though the Buddhist psychologists refuse to give it a substantial mean-

[1] Cp. the saying in the Naassene Document of the Christianised Gnosis: "The beginning of Perfection is Gnosis of Man, but Gnosis of God is perfected Perfection" (Hippol., *Ref.* v. 1; cp. *Thrice-Greatest Hermes* i. 147).

ing. This *sat-tva*, 'heart' or 'essence,' may nevertheless be taken to suggest the spiritual depth or deep of the man, his true 'wholeness' or 'monad'; a meaning confirmed by the synonym 'own-being' (*sva-bhāva*), which is perhaps the equivalent of divine nature.

If Bodhi, then, connotes enlightenment or spiritual consciousness, we must be careful not to confound it with the 'subliminal' or 'sub-conscious,' which is by no means an explanation, but rather simply a label for what is at present little better than the common dumping ground of our psychological ignorance. The 'sub-conscious' conveys to us little meaning save that of a submerged and bafflingly heterogeneous mass of sense-impressions interblended with a tangled complex of feelings of every sort and description, and that, too, more frequently of a low than of a high order. The spiritual consciousness of Bodhi suggests, on the contrary, the bringing into activity of as it were the purified essence of our being, so that it becomes a spiritual sensory, the vehicle of the unitary sense or immediate apprehension or sympathetic understanding. It is, so to speak, self-effacing insight clear of all personal prejudices. The differentiated organs of sense can become the means of immediate understanding only when every stain and tinge of personal desire and every taint of selfishness has been purged away. On the one hand, the attainment of this transcendent consciousness seems to be dependent on the most strenuous purification of the moral nature, on the other it may be regarded as the immediate energising of Bodhi itself, which

is characterised by its aseity,[1] or self-origination, and hence its self-sufficiency.

The first awareness of the dawn of this spiritual consciousness is called Bodhi-chitta. The conscious entrance into the Way of Bodhi, or what may be called the Path of Light and Life and Love, is said to take place when the aspiration or hope or thought (*chitta*) of becoming a Buddha for the sake of saving all sentient creatures arises in the 'heart.' The will thus begins to be purified of every selfish stain, and the transformation of the whole nature is gradually achieved by persistent effort. It is a process of spiritual alchemy that transmutes the base into the pure.

As still preserved in the Little Vehicle even, the legend runs that the Being, who as Shākyamuni reached to Buddhahood, had already in one of his long previous births made the Great Vow[2] of the Bodhisattva. In that far distant birth, it is said, the future Buddha Shākyamuni was the Arhat Sumedha. Sumedha had already discovered the way to the Nirvāṇa of the Arhat, which is supposed to connote salvation for the individual. But once he had seen in vision the glory of the then reigning Buddha, known to tradition as Dīpaṅkara, Sumedha renounced this false freedom, the 'Nirvāṇa of the eye' as it is sometimes called, and became a Bodhisattva in the hope of eventually attaining the supreme reality of the Samyak Sambodhi state, or of the wholly and perfectly

[1] This which arises *from itself* (*a se*).

[2] This is known either as the Vow (*praṇidhāna* or *saṁvāra*) or Supplication (*prārthanā* or *abhinirhāra*).

Enlightened One, whose salvation consists in the saving of others. Sumedha thus became a Buddha-seed or seed of Buddha,[1] or a sprout or shoot of Buddhahood.[2]

The difference was this, and it was fundamental, according to the doctrine of the Great Vehicle: the Arhat strove to bring suffering for self to an end, while the Bodhisattva vowed himself to unceasing suffering in the service of others. Henceforth his task is to 'mature' or 'ripen' beings. Just as in some traditions in the West, and notably in the Trismegistic doctrine, it is said that the special duty of man is to tend, develop and raise the animal creation, and the peculiar office of the gods and good daimones to take care of men, so among the followers of the Great Vehicle, it is believed that the appropriate service of the Bodhisattva is to elevate, purify and save,[3] not only mankind, but also all sentient creatures of every kind in all states. Thus the Bodhi to which the Bodhisattva aspires, is not the enlightenment which enables the believer to apprehend the doctrine of the causes of personal suffering and the means to bring them to an end, as laid down in the traditional teaching of Gautama Shākya-muni, but the transcendent ideal of Samyak Sambodhi, the 'perfectly perfect enlightenment.'

[1] *Buddha-bīja.* [2] *Buddhāṅkura.*

[3] Perhaps, however, it would be more correct, according to Buddhist views, to say "be the means of purification and salvation being wrought in all creatures." For the strict doctrine seems to be that nothing short of the Eternal can achieve this really. Only the Perfect Buddha can save; all that can be done is to help others to save themselves.

This Wisdom goes far beyond the acquisition of the truth necessary for personal salvation, that is, according to Buddhist dogmatics, the conviction of the possibility of freeing oneself from egoism or even of transcending egoity in the sense of a separated or shut-off existence. Samyak Sambodhi is said not only to confer omniscience[1] in the sense of intuitive apprehension of all things and their causes, and so that immediate comprehension which is perfect understanding, but also to bestow creative faculty and executive ability, the power of a will that instantly accomplishes itself. It is thus to be thought of as the practical science of spiritual Wisdom, for it is said to be that Gnosis which bestows omnipotence.[2]

The heights of this perfection are to be scaled by ascending the degrees of the ladder of the 'transcendental virtues,' to the foot of which the path of institutional discipline leads. The first step of the ascent is marked by the taking of the Vow; and in the instituted rites there is a solemn ceremony of reception. It goes without saying, however, that before this Vow can be legitimately taken externally, there must have already been a 'calling' of the spirit within—a true 'vocation,' just as in Christian devotion, and also in some forms of Pagan personal religion before it in the West. In the inner discipline of some of the Hellenistic mystery-cults, for instance, the candidate had to be 'called' by the patron God or

[1] *Sarva-jñā-tva* (= *omni-sci-ence*).

[2] *Jñā-tva* = *Gnō-sis*; *sarva-kāra-jñā-tva* thus = the Gnosis that bestows omni-potence.

Goddess before he could be duly initiated.[1] The nature of the Vow of the Bodhisattva may be seen from the well-known formulas—well-known, that is to say, to instructed Buddhists of the Great Vehicle, for very few naturally have heard of them in the West. Shāntideva (seventh century), in his *Bodhi-chary-āvatāra* (or *Introduction to the Practice of the Bodhi*), gives them in elaboration as follows:

"(1) The sin accumulated in my former existences, accumulated in all creatures, is infinite and omnipotent. By what power can it be conquered, if not by the thought of Bodhi, by the desire to become Buddha for the salvation of all men? This totally disinterested desire is infinitely sacred. It covers a multitude of sins. It ensures happiness during the round of existences. It is a pledge of the supreme happiness of the Buddhas for one's self and one's neighbour. All honour to the Buddhas whom everybody quite naturally loves, and who have as their sole aim the salvation of men!

"(2) I worship the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas in view of undertaking the Vow of Bodhi. Possessing nothing, by reason of my sins, how can I render unto them the worship which is due? I beg them to accept this whole universe which I offer them in thought. But I am wrong, I do possess something; I give myself unreservedly, by pure affection to the Buddhas and to their sons,

[1] The neophyte was 'called' in dream or vision, which had to be confirmed, however, by a similar vision on the part of the initiated priests who transmitted the rite. See Reitzenstein (R.), *Die hellenistischen Mysterien-religionen: ihre Grundgedanke und Wirkungen* (Leipzig, 1910).

the divine Bodhisattvas. I am their slave[1] and as such, have no more danger to fear. Of all dangers the greatest is that which comes from my sins. I know how harmful these things are, I deplore them, I acknowledge them. I see and you see them as they are, pardon them![2]

"(3) But enough of myself. Let me belong entirely to the Buddhas and their creatures. I rejoice in the good actions which, among ordinary men, for a time prevent evil rebirths. I rejoice in the deliverance gained by the Arhats. I delight in the state of Buddha and Bodhisattva, possessed by the Protectors of the world. I entreat the Buddhas to preach the Law for the salvation of the world, I entreat them to delay their entrance into Nirvāṇa.[3] All the merit acquired by my worship of the Buddhas, my taking of refuge, my confession of sins, etc., I apply to the good of creatures and to the attainment of the Bodhi. I wish to be bread for those who are hungry, drink for those who are thirsty. I give myself, all that I am and shall be in my future existences, to creatures. In the same dispositions as those in which the former Buddhas were when they undertook the Vow of Bodhi, just as they carried out the obligations of future Buddhas, practising in their order the perfect vir-

[1] Precisely the same term as is used in some Hellenistic mystery-religions and in the writings of Paul.

[2] Cp. the recently found 'Confession of the Manichæan Hearers.' There was of course a Buddhist tincture in the Religion of Mānī.

[3] This is a somewhat strange supplication to find in such a connection, seeing that the perpetual preaching of the Law and the renunciation of Nirvāṇa are the essential characteristics of the Buddhas, at any rate according to the doctrines of the Great Vehicle; and Shāntideva was a Mahāyānist.

tues, in these dispositions I conceive the thought of Bodhi for the salvation of the world, so also I shall practise in their order my obligations."[1]

But the Vow does not make the Bodhisattva. To arrive at the goal of 'perfect Perfection,' which at the long last unites or harmonises, as we should say in the West, the will of the man with the Divine Will, and so makes him a fully conscious co-operator with the Divine Purpose and the Divine Process, the new-born Bodhisattva must not only practise the virtues of ordinary morality incumbent on the laity, or even the stricter discipline required of the monk, but he must become such a proficient in the perfect or transcendental virtues that they become spontaneous powers in him,—that is to say, spiritual qualities that express themselves naturally in every thought and word and deed; they operate through his purified nature as untrammelled, immediate, divine energies. At the beginning the manifestation of these spiritual virtues is of course intermittent; they appear as occasional excellencies at best. Their unimpeded operation is assured only, we might venture to phrase it, when the man's whole being is so set in love of the Divine, so dynamic in compassion for all creatures, that he becomes at every moment an ever-ready servant and minister of the Truth, that is of the Eternal Will.

These 'transcendental' (*pāramitā*) virtues are so called, it is said, because they pertain to the Bodhisattva who has truly reached the 'further

[1] See Poussin's art., *loc. cit.*, p. 749.

shore' (*parā*), that is to the Buddha. Such a one is called Parā-gata,[1] in that he has 'arrived at' (*gata*) the 'further shore' or 'other side' of Saṁsāra, the stream, or course, or circuit (*sāra*), of phenomenal existence or transmigration; that is to say, he has reached Nirvāṇa or transcended the necessity of being reborn into any state whatever of separated existence. But he has reached this end with a motive very different from that of the Arhat. According to the Mahāyāna, the matured Bodhisattva has transcended the necessity of being compelled against his will to re-enter the stream of birth-and-death, in this sense he has reached the other shore; but in so far as he is Bodhisattva and not Arhat, it is his own good pleasure, his joyful will, to remain in that ocean of perpetual stress and change; he is still to be *in* the world, though not *of* it. The reality to which the Bodhisattva attains thus differs fundamentally from the ideal of the Arhat, in that the former learns, as we saw in our study of 'Spiritual Reality in Progressive Buddhism,' that Nirvāṇa is really not a state of absolute severance from the turmoil of the world, not a state of withdrawal into some carefully protected elysium of what in last analysis is but a selfish condition of serenity, rest and bliss, but on the contrary that true self-realisation is to be found only in the actualities of the life of Saṁsāra or concrete existence. These 'transcendental' powers[2] are thus to be regarded as 'imma-

[1] Cp. the Buddha-title Tathā-gata=He-who-has-reached-the-Thus-state, meaning the state of supreme Perfection.

[2] These transcendencies are known specifically as *pra-jñā-pāramitā* or gnostic perfections, where *pra-jñā* stands for that vital

nent' virtues; and 'transcendental' therefore becomes equivalent to 'nirvāṇic' in the dynamic sense of the term, that is to say operative at every moment and in every phase of the Ever-becoming.

These virtues in their perfection are thus conceived of as pure or impersonal or utter; and the 'practice' which leads up to their spontaneous manifestation consists of the strenuous elimination from the whole nature of personal desire for the benefit of self. Indeed, the original significance of the term '*nirvāṇa*' was simply the 'extinction' or 'blowing out' of the flame of this selfish longing. It did not mean 'extinction' in the sense of annihilation of being, as is so often asserted in the West, for such an absurdity is unthinkable; but, at any rate for the follower of the Bodhisattva ideal, the transmutation of the whole nature or will from the inevitable 'death'-bringing grasping at possessions and powers for self to the divine self-sacrificing love which gives of all to all, and converts the separated individual into a free channel of eternal life.

The conventional equivalents of some of these transcendental virtues—such as charity, renunciation, energy, patience, wisdom, truth—can convey but little of the real sense and power of such excellencies to those who, either in the East or the West, have not deliberately and whole-heartedly practised them, in brief, who have not 'lived'[1] them. For these virtues to be actualised into

essential understanding which connotes being as well as thought and feeling.

[1] The German *erleben* and not simply *erfahren*.

powers, thought, word and deed must agree together, or their efficacy and efficiency will be non-existent, or at best unbalanced, diverted, weakened.

The basis of all these virtues is said to be sympathy. With that exactitude which is so beloved of the theorist, but so little in the mind of the practitioner, we are told that there are four 'means of sympathy,' or in more clumsy rendering 'elements of popularity' or 'of conciliating creatures': giving, kindly address, practising the rule of altruism, and doing oneself what we recommend to our neighbours; or, more generally, liberality, affability and obligingness, and sharing the joys and the sorrows of others.

Though all the orders and grades of the virtues are set forth with that pseudo-precision in which scholastic and monkish artificiality so greatly delights, they are practically all one of another, and cannot be, or at any rate have not been, so far, either in the East or the West, distinguished with real scientific exactitude. A vague notion, however, of some of them, may perhaps be gleaned from the following indications.

The virtue of giving or charity (*dāna*) or compassion (*karuṇā*) is said to arise when the disciple reflects:

"My neighbour suffers his pain just as I suffer mine; why should I be anxious about myself and not about him?"[1]

To be of real effect, however, this virtue must not be exercised to excess, otherwise the striver for

[1] *Bodhicharyāv.* vii. 90.

Bodhi declines from the virtue of perfect balance. The virtue of impersonal morality (*shīla*) must be practised; and genuine impersonal morality includes self-preservation, though of course solely with the motive of benefiting others. The Bodhisattva must always so act as to be revered by his fellow-men; but again not for the sake of personal satisfaction or the gratification of spiritual pride, but in order that he may be thus a more potent means of helping others. He must further be possessed of unending patience (*kṣhānti*), which includes endurance of all personal suffering and injuries, and thus developes insight into the Law. Anger, even righteous anger so-called, must never stir him, for the Bodhisattva should be as he is by definition a 'being of goodness.' Thus the practiser of patience, it is said, will argue:

"My enemy takes a stick to beat me, and I have assumed this body, liable to be wounded, and destined to be beaten. Far from being angry with my enemy, I ought to consider him almost as beneficial as the Buddhas, for he affords me the opportunity of practising patience, and forgiveness of wrongs, which blots out my sins. Am I to make this principle of salvation the cause of my condemnation? Let us rather pity our enemies who ruin themselves by their anger, and let us think of means of saving them in spite of themselves, as the Buddhas do. As to anger provoked by slander, loss of property, etc., it is particularly absurd; so also is anger against the enemies of our religion, iconoclasts, etc."[1]

[1] *Ibid.*

The ascent of the Bodhisattva is by no means a *via negativa;* it is distinctly not quietism, at any rate in the vulgar and perhaps prejudiced sense of the term. It has throughout to be effected by positive effort for good, by energy (*vīrya*). There is to be no putting off, no saying 'there is time,' one of the besetting sins of the reincarnationist faith. Every nerve must be strained to shake oneself free from the bonds that bind to selfish desire. Thus the practiser of energy, the liver of the strenuous spiritual life, it is said, reflects:

"I am in the power of the passions, like a fish in the hands of the fisherman, for I am in the net of rebirths threatened by death and by the guardians of the hells. Thou hast boarded this vessel which is the human state; cross the river of suffering; thou fool, this is no time for sleep; when and at what cost wilt thou find this vessel again?"[1]

The discipline of Buddhism in all its forms insists upon the practice of meditation as one of the virtues, but, according to Shāntideva, from whose treatise we have been quoting, this should be entirely subordinated to the active virtues of charity, humility and patience. As to the subject of such meditation again, far from counselling the vacant contemplation of the nothingness of the ego and such mental abstractions, Shāntideva insists on the moral and practical discipline of dwelling on the equality of self and neighbour and on the substitution of neighbour for self. Thus

[1] *Ibid.*

the disciple meditates on the 'enmity' of the selfish 'self,' or 'thought' as follows:

"Renounce, O my thought, the foolish hope that I have still a special interest in you. I have given you to my neighbour, thinking nothing of your sufferings . . . . I remember your long enmity, and I crush you, O self, the slave of your own interests. If I really love myself, I must not love myself. If I wish to preserve myself, I must not preserve myself."[1]

The supreme virtue is wisdom (*pra-jñā*), the acquiring of the certitude of truth, of what really is (*tat-tva*). Only Buddhas, however, enjoy its fruit in fulness; Bodhisattvas cultivate its germ.

The unremitting practice of these transcendental virtues results in the spiritual energising of the whole man. It bears fruit in the Bodhisattva, however, as has been previously said, in no 'transcendental' fashion, if by this is meant something purely subjective and outside concrete reality. It bears fruit, it is taught, by gradually bringing to birth in the saint the so-called 'body'[2] of a Buddha. This essential entity, rather than body in the vulgar meaning of the term, though in its fundamental reality one with the Buddha as the Embodiment of Truth,[3] has two modes of existence: (1) as underlying the body of manifestation of a Buddha in the world of men, and (2) as revealed to saints in vision and to the gods in the (to us) subjective worlds.

[1] *Ibid.* With such a passage before us, what becomes of the doctrine that there is no real 'I' in Buddhism? What is the 'I' that here speaks?

[2] *Kāya.* [3] *Dharma-kāya.*

Though the body of an incarnated Buddha is to all seeming the same as the bodies of all men, in its inner constitution it is said to be the most perfect means or vehicle of physical embodiment. By the unremitting practice of the transcendental virtues the nature of the Bodhisattva is gradually purified of all selfish accretions, and therewith he becomes capable of transmitting the powers of the spiritual life with ever less impediment; till finally he wins to conscious Buddhahood in a 'body of transformation,'[1] as it is called.

This transmutation or transformation is, apparently, the outcome of a natural process wrought within the physical body; and therefore the physical body of a Buddha is not, as is often supposed, a 'body of transformation' in the sense of a miraculously or magically produced body in appearance only, an illusory body,[2] a 'docetic' figment or confection. The 'body of transformation' proper presumably belongs to a somewhat similar range of ideas to that of the 'perfect body' of Alexandrian psychology, the 'seed' of which lies latent in all men. The development of this potentiality into actuality is proportionate to the reality of the purification of the passions. Thus while the body remains, the inner nature is transmuted or enlivened and enlightened.

As far as outer observation is concerned no change has taken place, but within it is very different; a new 'light' has arisen in the inner worlds.

[1] *Nir-māṇa-kāya.*

[2] *Mano-maya* or *māyāvi-rūpa*, mind-made or illusion-formed body (Ger. *Schein-körper*).

Misunderstood rumours of such spiritual transformation have produced a monstrous crop of myth and legend of all kinds. Thus not only the Buddhas but also the Bodhisattvas are held to be in no way born from father and mother; they are said to be produced by their own powers or begotten of their own substance,[1] or to be self-generated,[2] or brought forth by the spirit alone; their mothers and their wives are virgins—all of which is very familiar to the student of comparative mythology and the mystery-religions. But though this is a grave scandal to the rationalist it is by no means incapable of a credible psychological interpretation, if the virgin-born is regarded as the spiritual man re-born from his own purified nature.

While then on earth the external form of the body of a Buddha remains the same, the nature within may be transformed infinitely. It is thus said that in the subtle states, while the essence retains the same glory the forms of manifestation of that glory may be infinitely varied. It is this glory in its infinite manifestation which is known to the saints in vision, and to the gods as the 'body of bliss'[3] of the Buddha.

The teaching activity of the Buddha is thus not to be confined to the ordinary means of instruction. It is, on the contrary, essentially spiritual, an immediate vital quickening by the means of a divine 'presence' which can teach on earth and in all the many heavens and hells as

[1] *Sva-guṇa-nirvṛitta.* [2] *Awpa-pādaka.* [3] *Sam-bhoga-kāya.*

well, that is to say in every state of existence. This quickening is of the essence or 'heart' of the 'hearer' or 'hearers,' who thus become aware each in his own fashion; they hear and see in their own way, according to their several limitations. It thus seems to connote the power of speaking to all in their own 'language,' the power of universal sympathy that can become all things for all men, and gods and demons as well, for their salvation. Of the exercise of this transcendent power there are many strange legends incomprehensible to the inexperienced and wholly incredible to those who deny such spiritual possibilities. It may, however, be possible to recognise far-off echoes of this power of the presence and way of the spirit even in the naïve popular recitals, as, for instance, when we find it related of the Buddha:

"When I used to enter into an assembly . . . before I seated myself there . . . I used to become in colour like unto their colour, and in voice like unto their voice . . . But they knew me not when I spoke, and would say, 'Who may this be who thus speaks? a man or a god?' Then, having instructed them, . . . I would vanish away."[1]

From the standpoint of the auditors there may have been a teacher teaching, or a group of disciples and one of them spoke in 'ecstasy' or 'with

[1] Rhys Davids, *S.B.E.* xi. 8. We find ourselves in a very similar atmosphere when reading in the 'Hymn of Jesus' in *The Acts of John*: "Who I am, that shalt thou know when I depart. What now I am seen to be, that I am not. [But what I am,] thou shalt see when thou comest"—that is, thou shalt know when thou comest to be, or becomest as I am.

authority.' The hearers recognised the power of the spirit, but did not know what or who the presence really was.

Instruction by means of set words is not spiritual enlightenment; it is information, it is not immediate truth. This was known to the 'saints' by experience, but the 'doctors' are at sixes and sevens about the matter. Thus the later 'supernaturalists' among the Buddhists pushed their speculations to an extreme in a theory of apparent descents (*avatāras*) of the eternal Buddha. They distinguished reality by degrees of states or even by special grades, not sufficiently realising that truth must be free of all places and states, and therefore can manifest in every state and place. We can see the difficulties in which the earlier doctors of theology or buddhology found themselves when we read that the view of the 'supernaturalists' was that when Shākyamuni attained Nirvāṇa, he no longer preached the Law; the preaching thereafter was carried on by Ānanda, the Buddha's favourite disciple. According to Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin, they taught:

"That Shākyamuni, although he was a real man, flesh and bones, nevertheless remained, since the enlightenment, in a definite state of concentration or trance (*samādhi, dhyāna*); and can a being in *dhyāna*-state speak? We know from *Kathāvatthu* and from Bhavya that schools were at a loss to settle the question. Doctors who deny the power of speaking to the 'concentrated' states, assume that Buddha caused Ānanda or even the walls of the preaching-room to preach the Law. . .

. . . Elsewhere Shākyamuni is credited with having uttered a few words: each disciple heard them with the developments his own development allowed."[1]

These difficulties seem to have arisen from the conception that Enlightenment is a static and not a dynamic condition. As we have already seen, the spiritual perfection of a Buddha is not a state of passive *samādhi*, but is based on active universal sympathy; it is no shut-off condition. If a Buddha is spoken of as 'concentrated,' it accordingly can only be in the sense of being unceasingly centred in that sympathy and love. So far then from the 'power of speaking' being inhibited in that state,[2] the gift of speaking to every man 'in his own tongue' is acquired. Other doctors again, even among the Buddhists themselves, have made great merriment over the idea that the very walls of the preaching-hall could become means of teaching. Animism, as we know from the anthropology of the hour, is a primitive superstition, quite below the threshold of any respectable modern intelligence. But are there not extended or intenser states of consciousness in which the crude notions of the lower stages of culture re-present themselves in subtler forms and clearer light? It is a fact of highly cultured experience that what we call inanimate nature may at times become animate, expressive, vocal, through the inspiration of a spiritual presence. It is, therefore, not so very

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 743a.

[2] Even in the case of an ordinary spiritistic medium we have the common phenomenon of trance-speaking.

ridiculous to believe that there may be some truth in the idea that the very walls of the preaching-hall could be used as a means of conveying immediate spiritual instruction, that the outermost could be used as readily as the innermost by the Presence which we are told is ever there when two or three are gathered together in the 'Name'; for to the spirit there is neither high nor low, neither external nor internal. Though, then, it may be said that it is through the purified nature of the Bodhisattva that the Buddha power can operate most easily on earth; yet the spiritual reality of Buddhahood, being a universal presence, may be considered as independent of any particular vehicle and can use as means of communication not only all creatures but also all things.

Finally, it is to be insisted on that whatever heights of bliss and power may be attained by the purified being and illuminated 'heart' of the Bodhisattva, it is not for this that he strives, his will is not primarily set on such attainment. The spring of all his effort, the source of all his energy, is his boundless compassion for all creatures. Far, then, from seeking to escape the cramping conditions and ceaseless pain of earth-life, the Bodhisattva volunteers to enter even the most wretched conditions of existence for the sake of helping to free all passion- and misery-bound creatures. In Buddhism the lowest abyss of hell or most grievous state of torment is called Avīchi; and yet we hear of Bodhisattvas "rushing into the Avīchi like swans into a lotus pond."[1] This is said to be

[1] *Shīkṣhāsamuchchhaya*, p. 360, 8.

owing to the superhuman fervour of the love of the future Buddhas, who joyfully aspire to take upon themselves "the whole burden of the suffering of all creatures." This ideal of 'vicarious atonement' seems to be part of the Vow, for we read:

"I am taking upon my body the heap of sorrows which their deeds have accumulated, in order to bear it in the regions of hell. Would that all creatures who dwell there might escape!"[1]

Such extremes of aspiration induced by this transcendent doctrine of utter self-sacrifice, however, seem to fall short of the balanced wisdom of the fully enlightened Buddha; they may rather be ascribed to the inexperienced over-enthusiasm of the new-born Bodhisattva, who still commits what are called 'sins of love.' But these 'sins' are of love and not of selfishness, and therefore make for the fulfilling of the Law.

In any case, if such is really the nature of the Ideal Life in Progressive Buddhism, it seems to be essentially indistinguishable from the highest Ideal preached in the West.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

V.

SOME FEATURES OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY.

We may look in vain for reference to any psychological system of the Orient in modern text-books of psychology. And yet this is precisely the field of experience that Eastern minds have tilled with the greatest assiduity and with no little success. Of all the systems built up by the acute self-analysis of the Oriental mind, the most thorough-going is that of the Buddhist contemplatives and thinkers. Its origins go back some two millennia and a half, and it is still a virile living tradition with a very extensive literature, of which we as yet know hardly anything. If it is to be classed as scholastic, it is a scholasticism that has sought to found itself and confirm itself in experience, at any rate in the past; and if we are to speak of what is to follow as Buddhist mediævalism, it must be confessed that it is a mediævalism which, in some respects, is not yet out of date. If, to use the hackneyed phrase, the proper study of mankind is man, then the most elaborate study of man which the East has ever produced cannot be without interest to us in the West; unfortunately, however, Buddhist psychology is so overladen with technicalities as to deter all but the most stout-hearted, unless they are linguistic specialists, and even then the difficulty of finding correct

equivalents in modern terms is very great, indeed well-nigh insuperable, were it not that there is a still living tradition to help them.

The greatest authority on Buddhist psychology in the West is undoubtedly Mrs. Rhys Davids, whose pioneer version and commentary of the only book of that portion of the canon dealing specifically with the subject, that has yet been translated, stands out by itself as a monument of patient industry. But Mrs. Rhys Davids has now still further increased our debt of gratitude by collaborating with a Burmese scholar of high attainments, who is also well read in Western philosophy and psychology, in the production of a version of the most authoritative compendium of Buddhist psychological ethics and philosophy, which has been for upwards of eight centuries the text-book or manual of the priestly schools in Burma.[1] The work, it may be added, has been entirely a labour of love, and the ridiculously small price is sufficient to cover the bare cost of production only.

It is a pity that so valuable a volume should remain unknown to practically all but the select circle who follow Pāli studies; and I therefore propose, not to summarise what has already been made as compact as possible for mnemonic purposes, but to select a few points of special importance, chiefly from Mr. Aung's valuable introduction of 76 pages.

[1] *Compendium of Philosophy.* Being a Translation now made for the First Time from the Original Pāli of the *Abhidhammatha-Sangaha*, with Introductory Essay and Notes, by Shwe Zan Aung, B.A. Revised and edited by Mrs. Rhys Davids, M.A., Special Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester University. Published by the Pāli Text Society (London, Frowde), 1910, pp. xxiv., 298, price 5s. net.

Mr. Aung tells us that he has no theories of his own, and is acting solely as the mouthpiece of his country's teachers. He writes:

"Albeit I am but an interpreter of Burmese views based on the Ceylon Commentary and the works of Buddhaghosa. You may take my essay as mediæval Buddhism presented through modern Burmese glasses."

The great advantage of this collaboration between an Eastern and Western scholar is that we have a more correct rendering of many technical terms than has hitherto been possible. Mr. Aung again and again insists that philology will not help us to the living meanings of terms which have long departed from their original significance, and points out many fundamental inaccuracies in current Occidental translations.

The title of the treatise, literally translated, means 'Compendium of the Subject-matter of the *Abhidhamma*,'—*i.e.* of the seven books of the third 'basket,' or collection, of Buddhist scripture. We have no exact equivalent for *abhi-dhamma;* it is almost 'meta-physic,' but is, perhaps, preferably to be rendered as 'philosophy,' as embracing philosophy of mind and philosophy of conduct. The scope of the treatise is well indicated in the Editor's Preface.

This philosophy begins, almost like modern empiricism, with an analysis of (1) what we find (*a*) within us, and (*b*) around us, but it goes further in dealing with (2) what we aspire to find.

"(1) Mind is analysed and catalogued. The visible world, and that which we associate there-

with, is similarly treated. This includes things invisible, but conceived as analogously existing: worlds beyond our ken, beings infra-human, superhuman. . . .

"(2) Then the Ideal [*Nibbāna*, Sk. *Nirvāṇa*], and thereunder chiefly the way thereto; for under this head the subject is no more things as they are, but work that has to be done, travail of thought and will to lift the whole being to a higher plane of existence, if so be it lie in him to experience moments of ecstasy which may transform and purify all his earthly vision."

The way to the realisation of this ideal is marked out in stages of moral purification and stern mental discipline and the approach to it is accompanied by mystic experience. But the type of mysticism in what we may call Pāli Buddhism differs from the general root-form of Western religious mystical experience. Not only, as in all highest forms of mysticism, does the Buddhist not seek union with *a* deity, but, owing to his fundamental dogma of the impermanence of the ego, he regards the consummation, not as the union of the human and divine in even the sublimest and most spiritual sense of personality, but solely as the transcendency of personality in every conceivable way. I do not think myself that genuinely experienced mystics, who have transcended the opposites, who are 'both—and' people, would quarrel over the matter fundamentally, for personality and impersonality are mutually complementary; but for 'either—or' people the distinction is radical. In any case the Buddhist, like the Indian philo-

sopher in general, believes that the human mind and will are 'potentially god-like'—I use Mrs. Rhys Davids' own phrase—and that the powers of mind and will can by right training be actualised here and now, in "a supernormal evolution of faculties combined with, not to say resulting from, ethical purity."

As to the elusive question of the Buddhist conception of personal identity, we are told, as we have previously been taught, that it is to be thought of under the famous Heraclitean figure of the ever-flowing river—the same yet never the same. Mrs. Rhys Davids very aptly compares this further with the modern conception of the great physical forces "in which identities are series of *informed* or *charged sequels*." We are not to speak of a trans-migrating 'essence' or 'substance,' but of a life-stream or continuum; though why 'essence,' in an immaterial and spiritual sense, should not very conveniently complement or determine a stream of becoming is not easy to understand. It would be a further convenience if we could have some satisfactory term to distinguish the transcendental or spiritual 'self' (what is sometimes called the 'mystical I'), the fundamental being or life beyond subject and object, from the ever-changing 'me' which Buddhism insists quite rightly on regarding as the impermanent ego. By all means let us attempt to envisage reality in terms of life, but in doing so let us not forget that the analogies of an ever-flowing stream and of physical forces are only analogies, that a stream is thinkable only by means of its complementary notion, and that

neither is without the other, and that in life the many and the one are inseparable; not only so, but the many in life are not external to one another as in the material universe.

For the Buddhist life is infinite, and 'my life' is essentially infinite though momentarily evanescent. To this statement no mystic need object. Man dies to live every moment, and yet he is immortal. It is the eternal riddle of man, happy and wretched, immortal mortal. To give this point I will quote a line or two from a mediæval mystical gryphus:

"Nor man nor woman, but both.
O'er all things in the world he rules, yet unto all he's subject.
He measureth immensities, he who hath not power to add a single cubit to his stature.
Daily he lives, and dies, he waxes and he wanes.
One with himself, yet many, same yet other."

If there were not, however, some principle of spiritual identity of its own proper order and nature, the whole scheme of Buddhist ethical causality would manifestly collapse. And, therefore, though we have not the remotest desire to cling to the momentary 'me' or even the 'me' of any particular life-continuum, and have every sympathy with the most strenuous endeavours to remove, not the 'false notion of an I,' as we find the phrase so often in Buddhist books, in the sense that there is no reality at all underlying the principle of personality, but rather to get rid of the 'notion of the false I,' in the sense of a self separated from the

universal life,—we cannot believe that the extreme no-ego dogma is nearer to reality than the ego notion in the sense of an evolving moral or spiritual personality; both are necessary for a complete understanding of reality we venture to think.

If there is no spiritual principle of identity, no genuine continuity, no true entity, it seems but empty words to speak of moral responsibility, and vainer still to write of Buddhist belief in "expansion of memory down the long past, the supernormal range of vision and hearing, telepathic, or rather telenoëtic power, the mastery of will over the body and beyond that." We have every belief in the spiritual reality that transcends ever-changing subject and ever-changing object, and have not the slightest wish to misconceive that reality as a static essence, but we cannot see how it is more philosophical to insist on the ever-changing nature of the relativity of subject and object, to the exclusion of any principle of spiritual self-identity which fundamentally embraces all relativity. The great interest in this theme, however, is that Buddhist tradition believes it is in possession of a discipline, known as 'purity of transcending doubt,' by which its theories can be verified. It is the cultivation of a faculty of the nature of insight or intuition or gnosis. Now, though this is precisely the claim made by disciplined mystics of other schools who theorise differently as to the nature of the self, we have much to learn from the Buddhist point of view, provided we remember that in the spiritual life theories of the intellect in apparently the

sharpest antagonism may be found to be mutually complementary and necessary.

We now pass to Mr. Aung's highly instructive Introductory Essay, which is a succinct exposition of Buddhist philosophy from the psychological standpoint.

We all know that consciousness has never been satisfactorily defined. As Dr. Iverach says, in his admirable article on the subject in a recent volume of Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics:* "Like all ultimates, we must simply accept it as the condition of the explanation of all else, itself remaining unexplained." Mr. Aung, however, tentatively defines consciousness as the relation between subject and object, and adds that therefore the philosophy of Buddhism is essentially a philosophy of relations. The object is the relating thing and the subject is the related thing, neither can exist without the other. Here it will be noticed that the greater stress is laid on the object.

The object of consciousness is either object of sense or object of thought.

The object of sense, or 'five-door' consciousness, is classified according to the senses. Of these sight and hearing are classed together, because their objective sources do not come into immediate physical contact with the organism, whereas smell and taste are modifications of touch. Touch consists of any or all of the three essentials or primary qualities of body—namely, extension, heat and motion, corresponding to the senses of locality, temperature and pressure.

The object of thought is also five-fold: (1) mind, or 'mind-door' consciousness, (2) mental properties, (3) sensitive and subtle properties of body, (4) concept (idea, notion, 'name'), and (5) the ideal (*nibbāna*).

Mind is not to be regarded as that which is conscious of an object, but rather as thought in the sense of thinking of an object, and, therefore, as consciousness. It is, however, distinguished from its concomitants, the mental properties, factors or elements, distinguishable in the fact of consciousness or subjective experience, that is to say, factors which combine to constitute a state of consciousness, or distinguishable units in the continuance of consciousness. Of these mental properties no less than fifty-two are catalogued. Their nature may be seen from the following instances: the common sense-properties (*i.e.* properties common to every act of consciousness) range from contact to attention; the particular properties, from application to the desire to do; the immoral, from dulness to perplexity; the morally beautiful, from faith to rectitude of mind; thereafter right speech, right action and right livelihood; then pity and benevolence, and finally reason, or perhaps wisdom.

Under the object of thought are also shown the gross and subtle divisions of non-mental 'forms' or material qualities or properties of matter. Under the former (the gross) are comprised all sense-organs and sense-objects; and under the latter (the subtle), the material qualities of vital force, nutrition and sex, the two media of commu-

nication—namely, movements of body and vocal organs to indicate purpose and meaning—together with space and certain other properties which are set forth very obscurely. As to space and time we are told:

"Space (*ākāsa*) is a permanent concept by which the mind is enabled to distinguish objects in external perception. What space is to matter time is to mind. Time is the concept by which, first and foremost, mental states are distinguished in internal intuition."

The object of sense is always present—that is, it is intuited as something present. The ideal (*nibbāna*) and concepts are said to be out of time; while the rest of the objects of mind are either present, or past, or future. It is here to be noted that the ideal is classed as an object of thought; but if *nibbāna* is *the* reality *par excellence*, the 'ideal' here should stand for the *concept* of reality rather than for reality itself.

It is thus seen that a thorough analysis of the object as above set forth is intended to exhaust the whole universe.

We now pass to the subject, and therewith once more to the no-ego theory which forms the central doctrine of Buddhist philsophy. Mr. Aung states this as follows:

"In Buddhism there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception. In other words, there is no conscious subject behind consciousness."

Mind is thus held to be simply the consciousness of an object; and when subject is spoken of

it must be understood to mean "not the self-same permanent conscious subject, but merely a transitory *state* of consciousness."

It need hardly be remarked, for those familiar with Bergson's philosophy, that 'states' of any kind are not of life itself, they are so to say snap-shots at it from outside. A summation of states of consciousness, or a state of consciousness of any kind, we agree, is no true permanent self; the first half of Mr. Aung's statement may thus be accepted without admitting the second half. The main object, however, of the profound analysis known as *abhidamma*, we are told, is:

"To show generally that such state of consciousness is no simple modification of a mind-stuff, and, above all, that there is no soul or ego which is apart from the state of consciousness; but that each seemingly simple state is in reality a highly complex compound, constantly changing and giving rise to new combinations."

Life is like the current of a river, and though we term the source and mouth of this 'river of life' birth and death, they are still composed of the same water of life. What, then, is this life-stream or water of life? It is of the nature of being and thought, which are opposed yet similar. Existence in such a state as dreamless sleep, when mind is inoperative, is termed being; it is a state of obscure perception not amounting to consciousness. The dividing line between being and thought is termed the 'door of consciousness,' and is practically the threshold between the so-called 'subliminal' and 'supraliminal.' And when we

learn further that there are nineteen classes of subliminal consciousness according to Buddhist analysis, the thought occurs that it might be worth the while of those of our psychologists who are also familiar with psychical research, to give the matter some consideration; the subject, however, is too abstruse for the present short summary of salient features.

What, then, again we ask, is this stream of being? And we are told that "a flow of the momentary states of subliminal consciousness of a particular class" constitutes the stream of being bounded by birth and decease. "And as decease is but a prelude to another birth, the continued flow of the stream of being from life to life, from existence to existence," constitutes the 'continual going,' or 'ocean of existence' (*saṁsāra*) which is set over against the reality of *nibbāna*.

Now the momentary states of subliminal consciousness of what Mr. Aung himself calls an 'individual being,' are like one another in certain respects. And, he continues:

"Because of the continuity of such similar states of temporary selves, men, under the blinding influence of ignorance, mistake similarity for identity, and are apt to think of all this 'river of life' as one enduring, abiding soul or ego, even as they think the river of yesterday identical with that of to-day. It is this constancy of relation, which according to definition is consciousness itself, which gives rise to the erroneous idea of personal identity. The phenomenon of self-con-

sciousness is, like any other object, variable, but regarded as identical."

It is this stream of being that is the life-continuum; it is as it were "the background on which thought-pictures are drawn." If undisturbed, the stream flows smoothly on; but "when that current is opposed by any obstacle of thought from the world within, or perturbed by tributary streams of the senses from the world without," then thoughts arise. And thus, according to the Buddhist view:

"Life is like an ever-changing river, having its source in birth, its goal in death, receiving from the tributary stream of sense constant accretions to its flood, and ever dispensing to the world around it the thought-stuff it has gathered by the way."

According to Buddhism, there are three worlds or 'planes' of existence, for which we must retain the original terms as we have no exact equivalents: (1) *kāma-loka*, the world of desire, or state of material existence in which desire prevails; (2) *rūpa-loka*, the world or plane of existence in which a subtle residue of matter is said to be still met with; and (3) *arūpa-loka*, the world in which, we are told, no trace of matter is to be found.

If it is asked how this is known, the reply probably will be that it results from the analysis of supernormal consciousness in meditation. In matters passing the possibility of verification in normal consciousness, Mr. Aung says that the nearest approach to proof is 'to show the likelihoọd' of anything. He tells us that the Buddhists

who are not possessed of supernormal consciousness, accept in faith the traditional teaching on such matters. And continues:

"For instance, our assertions about grades of superhuman beings will be laughed at in the West (*i.e.* by those who have relinquished their own traditional beliefs of like nature). Such beings cannot be proved to exist. Nevertheless, comparative anatomy has done a little service toward showing the *likelihood* of a regular gradation of beings, which does not necessarily stop at man. Again, we who have been accustomed to associate mind with brain, may scoff at the idea of the *arūpa* world. And yet modern hypnotism, in a small way, shows *likelihood* of the existence of a world with thought minus brain-activity."

Kāma-loka is not simply the visible physical universe, it is invisible as well as visible. It is further divided into (*a*) the plane or state of misery and (*b*) that of fortunate sense-experience. The former (*a*) is said to include: purgatory, the animal world and the state of unhappy shades and of demons; while the latter (*b*) embraces the realm of human beings and of the lower gods.

Kāma-loka is material and, though of grades of grossness and subtlety, is to be sharply distinguished from the *rūpa* world, into which, it is said, no human consciousness can rise that is not trained in the discipline of meditation, whereby a new form of existence is opened up in which there is, however, still a slight residuum of matter as a basis. The 'sublime' states, of *rūpa* consciousness, correspond with the realms of non-human

beings of celestial lineage, of which there are said to be various grades. It may help somewhat to distinguish *rūpa-loka* from *kāma-loka* when we learn that sight and hearing alone are operative in the former; while all five senses, including touch, taste and smell, gross or subtle, may be active in the latter.

Beyond *rūpa-loka* again are still sublimer grades in states which are entirely immaterial (*a-rūpa*).

Now it is to be noted that even in the higher *kāma-loka* states, the life-term of beings may, according to Buddhist belief, last for millions of years. If this is so, and if such states in the still higher grades are indefinitely extendible in time, and if the human being can pass into such states of existence, then the possibility of survival, in its higher sense of the perdurance of the life-continuum as an evolving moral person, seems in Buddhism to be sufficiently provided for to suit all tastes; and consequently the no-ego theory means practically nothing more than that the limited egoity which we normally know, is indefinitely transcendable. It is true that eternity is of a different order from any time-series, and that ultimate reality transcends egoity in every sense in which we can understand the term; but about such ultimates it would be absurd to quarrel, until the 'three worlds' are transcended, and then it will probably be found not worth while.

But to return to the subject of consciousness. 'Supraliminal' consciousness is treated of as normal, supernormal and transcendental, though not

in the limited senses in which we use the terms. Normal consciousness is *generally* connected with the desire-world, though probably we in the West should speak of any consciousness of the invisible, other than dreaming, as extra-normal; super-normal consciousness pertains to the *rūpa-* and *arūpa*-states of existence; while transcendental consciousness is held to be entirely 'beyond the three worlds'—it is immediacy itself.

Consciousness is said to be primarily composed of seven mental properties. These seven are called 'universals' because they are common to every class or state of consciousness and every separate act of mind and thought. These are: (1) contact, (2) feeling, (3) perception, (4) will or volition, (5) one-ness of object, (6) psychic life, and (7) attention.

(1) The simplest awareness of the presence of an object of sense, or awareness of an objective presentation, is called 'contact,' or more correctly 'tact.'

(2) Next, the subject or consciousness is aware of itself as being affected as an animated organism. This further awareness of subjective affection—either pleasant, painful or indifferent—is termed 'feeling born of contact.'

(3) The sensation or feeling is then referred to a sense-organ, and there thus emerges awareness of the physical basis of sensation, that is, it is extended so as to receive contact, or so as to occupy space. This recognition of the localisation of sensation proper is called 'perception born of contact.'

(4) Volition may be regarded under two

aspects: psychologically it simply determines the activities of its concomitant properties; ethically it determines its own consequences subject to conditions.

(5) The mental property by which "the object of consciousness is *necessarily* regarded as an individual, occupying a definite position in space or time, or in both," is called 'individuality of object'; when this mental property of 'objective delineation' is cultivated and developed, it is termed 'concentration of thought.'

(6) The activities of will and the rest are due to the 'psychic life'; it is this which infuses mental life into one and all of the properties, and constitutes the whole into a 'psychosis or psychical state.'

(7) Finally, we have the '*alpha* and *omega*' of an act of consciousness in the selective or co-ordinating activity of 'attention.'

This is a subtle enough beginning, but it is nothing in comparison with the microscopic analysis displayed in the duration-theory of a single process of consciousness. The normal procedure of a single process of cognition is said to consist of a series or sequence of mental moments. A thought-moment is computed to last between a billionth and two billionth part of what is called in pre-scientific metaphor a finger-snap or eye-wink or shortest lightning flash. Moreover, each thought-moment is further sub-divided into three instants, in which it becomes, exists and disappears. A thought-moment is thus the infinitesimal period occupied by any single state of conscious-

ness, or by any separate act of mind or thought. For a complete process of consciousness it is supposed that seventeen thought-moments are required, from the moment an objective thought emerges above the threshold of subjective consciousness to the moment when it sinks again into the subliminal. As mind is thought to produce matter, the Buddhists have come to reckon the duration of a material phenomenon, or to speak of matter, as lasting seventeen thought-moments. Some of the stages of process may be mentioned so as to give an idea of the sequence; it ought, however, to be remembered that the whole process in normal time appears to be instantaneous. Some of the phases are: turning-to, sensation, reception, examination, determining, apperception (*i.e.* full cognition), and registering.

The above will give the reader some slight notion of the subtlety of Buddhist psychological analysis, and when we add that this is but the merest beginning of the enquiry, it will be seen that the subject is well worth the serious attention of Western psychology.

The treatise proceeds, next, to consider the claims of what are called the 'specific' or accidental mental properties (as distinguished from the universals), which are also seven in number; while the final analysis results in no less than eighty-nine classes of consciousness that have to be studied. Some of them function as causes, some as results, and some are non-causal or 'static.'

"Causal classes of consciousness are either good or moral, or bad or immoral, and are there-

fore determinate; while resultant and non-moral classes are neither moral nor immoral, and therefore neutral, unmoral or indeterminate."

Non-causal consciousness characterises only the Buddha and the Arahants; with them *karma* is said to be inoperative.

Before passing to a brief consideration of higher or supernormal or sublime states of consciousness, known generally as 'great,' mention must be made of the 'way of the beginner' tending thereto, that is the process of thought-transition from normal (*kāma*) to supernormal (*rūpa*) consciousness. Purity of morals is an essential qualification in the beginner, who must belong to one of the four classes of beings known as the 'thrice conditioned,' that is to say those attended by three good conditions—namely, disinterestedness, love and reason. He must also repair to a teacher qualified for giving instruction in the art of meditation.

First of all an object of meditation suited to the character of the beginner is chosen. The object chosen for this transitional state of concentration may be the after-image of any one of the ten 'circles,' as they are called, or again of one of the foul things, or of the living body, or simply of the breath. The 'circles' are those of earth, water, fire or air, blue, yellow, red or white, of space or of light. The ten impurities or foul things are the images of a corpse in different stages of decomposition, down to the skeleton; this object is of course contrasted with the living body.

The preliminary concentration is practised on the image of the object, which is first depicted to the imagination as an exact copy of the original with all its original imperfection. Concentration is the power of individualising an object. By this preliminary concentration the image is gradually divested of its imperfections and conceptualised, becoming a sublimated copy, an abstract or after-image.

This preliminary phase of initial application is followed by an intermediate phase of sustained concentration, in which what are called the 'five hindrances' have to be inhibited. These hindrances are: sloth-and-torpor, doubt, aversion, distraction-and-worry, and ignorance.

When these hindrances are removed, the consciousness pertains to that of the 'great' types of moral consciousness 'accompanied with joy and connected with knowledge.' It is now that normal thought approximates to the supernormal. There are four phases of such consciousness known as 'preparation,' 'access,' 'adaptation,' and 'adoption.' The last is so called because the meditator then becomes 'one of the race'—*sc.* of the Worthy or Arahants—corresponding with the idea of spiritual regeneration or re-birth in Western tradition. At the last moment of 'adoption,' normal consciousness is cut off by supernormal. In other words, "the subject, as adopted or regenerated, cuts off the heritage of *kāma*-consciousness, and evolves the lineage of the *rūpa*-class of exalted consciousness."

The transitional stage is thus succeeded by

the first stage of supernormal consciousness known as the first *rūpa jhāna* or rapture.

It should, however, be remembered that *jhāna* of this nature is said not to be necessary for arahantship or saintship, and that there are saints known as 'dry-visioned.' The practice for the attainment of *jhāna with ecstasy* is generally attended with the greatest difficulties and is known as the 'distressful path.' Above all it is liable to the greatest abuse in the hands of the unscrupulous, for *jhāna*, in the sense of rapture, can be attained without moral qualifications.

Corresponding with the inhibition of the five hindrances of the transitional stage, there is now, we are told, a steady development of positive and pleasurable interest, growing keener and keener, up to thrilling emotion and rapture.

"The indescribable pleasure derived from intense interest developes the element of individualisation [*i.e.* concentration on a single object] into ecstatic concentration, or state of being *en rapport* with the after-image, by which sensuous desire is inhibited."

It is mind penetrating into the inwardness or import of its object. This higher concentration, which as it were lulls to sleep the five hindrances for the time being, is called 'tranquillisation' or 'calm,' and also 'purity of mind,' as the mind is now free from the hindrances.

He who has experienced this state, it is said, realises himself as a completely changed person; he lives for the time a higher life, 'the life of a god of the heavens called *rūpa*.' If this is so, surely

there is no loss of personality in a philosophical sense, but rather a metamorphosis into a higher person.

In these *rūpa* states, of which there are said to be five, certain activities are gradually dispensed with or transcended—*e.g.* the direction of the mind towards the object, the grades of interest, etc.—and finally the happy feeling of ecstasy is replaced by a neutrality or balance of emotion.

Beyond this there is a further course of mental training to enable the contemplative to attain mastery of the intellect as well as of feeling, so that what are called the super-intellectual powers may be acquired. This brings us to the four *arūpa* states of *jhānā*, which are entirely immaterial in every way. Little is said about them beyond giving the traditional objects of meditation, which are said to lead towards these states. They are: (1) the concept of the infinity of space as divested of all material objects; (2) the conception of this concept as infinite consciousness; (3) the conception of this deeper consciousness again as 'nothingness'; and (4) finally the conception of this 'absence' as utter calm and serenity of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. This last, however, we may add, is not *nibbāna*, as is generally supposed.

It is hardly necessary to note that though mental training is generally spoken of, the higher discipline connotes the strictest moral purification, the evolution of supernormal powers of will in the development of purpose, effort, knowledge and wisdom. The higher powers or virtues of the path

are of a spiritual nature; the lower powers are psychic and intellectual.

Thus we find mentioned in the list of the lower powers: power exercised by men in ordinary walks of life; power acquired by knowledge (science, art, hypnotism, etc.); power of extended action and locomotion; power of looking on agreeable objects as disagreeable and *vice versa;* power of resisting pain, death, etc.; power of creating phenomena outside one's body; of transforming one's body into different personalities; power of creating one's own double.

Some of these 'powers' are evidently similar to those exercised unconsciously by spiritistic mediums. Among other kinds of secular or worldly (*i.e.* pertaining to the 'three worlds') supernormal thought-powers we find mentioned:

(1) Clairvoyance, or what Mr. Aung (or is it the Editor?) calls hyperæsthesia or telepathy of sight, where:

"The adept in the willing process wills to see the desired thing beyond the sensory range. It is, said that light has to be created where darkness is, in order to enable the celestial eye to observe and discern things in the dark."

One knows so many clairvoyants who have not the remotest notion of creating light in darkness, that this seems to be valuing these extensions of sense at too high a figure.

(2) The power of the 'celestial ear' or what we more prosaically term clairaudience, or hearing sounds beyond the normal range, the various phases of which parallel the modes of extended sight.

(3) Discerning the thoughts of another, or thought-reading. The lower grades, however, it is said, cannot read the thoughts of the higher.

(4) The insight known as remembrance of previous circumstances, by which the past history of one's self or of another can be read. This is said to extend to past existences as well as to the present.

Under clairvoyance come the general phenomena of what we should call psychometry, and of the seeing of past events in the life of an individual, which latter is called 'supernormal insight concerning event according to deed.' There is also the seeing of the future, by which some particular event in the life of an individual may be foreseen. But the power of prophecy of general events is reserved for the Buddha alone, seeing that every possible condition would have to be taken into account.

All of the above 'powers' seem to accompany the lower *rūpa* states of *jhāna;* we should ourselves, however, say that most of it had to do with *kāma* consciousness.

But the way of the Path would seem to be other; at any rate the acquirement of powers of the above order seem to form no part of the moral aspiration of the neophyte. Of the Path itself we have no space to speak, but may fitly conclude this paper by setting down some of the chief moments of approach to it.

He who would transcend the experience of this conditioned world must, first of all, concentrate on 'purity of views'—that is, he must attain to a

correct view of the universe, which, according to the Buddhist, is a view free from the idea of 'an identical *substance* of mind or matter.'

Next, he must cultivate the 'purity of transcending doubt' by a study of the Buddhist doctrine of evolution.

Following this, he must cultivate the modes of insight. The first of these is the insight (lit. 'handling'[1]) by which he contemplates the three salient marks of things—or, in other words, the conditioned as impermanent, evil[2] and unsubstantial. The second is the insight into flux (or rising and waning), by which he observes 'the growth and the decay of things, or being and non-being in the process of becoming,' and so is said to attain the purity of insight by which the true Path is distinguished from that which is not the Path.

There follow other modes of insight known generally as 'purity of insight during the practice of discernment,' or more simply 'purity of intellectual culture,' or again 'Path-insight,' by which the meditator fits himself to acquire the mental qualifications for the Path, and so attains the insight of 'adaptation.' It is the insight of equanimity acquired in this discipline that leads to the arising of the Path, and it is thus called the 'mouth or gate of emancipation'; for the Path itself is reached immediately after one moment of 'adoption,' or birth into the higher consciousness of the Path itself. Adoption, which follows on

[1] Cp. Plotinus' 'touch.'

[2] Why evil? It is rather our clinging to it that is the evil?

adaptation, "cuts off the heritage of the ordinary average person, and evolves the heritage of the Transcendental."

The text says:

"Immediately after that consciousness [of noble kinship], the Path, namely [consciousness] discerning the fact of Ill, expelling the fact of its Cause, realising the fact of its Cessation, cultivating the fact of the Way [to Cessation of Ill], descends into the avenue of ecstatic thought."

And here we may leave the subject, as the nature of the Transcendental or of Spiritual Reality, to which the Manual, however, devotes little attention, has been already discussed at some length, if not from the Pāli point of view, at any rate from the standpoint of progressive Mahāyānist speculation.

VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION ETHICALLY CONSIDERED.

It is a somewhat saddening reflection that in spite of the presumable millions of years of human life on this planet, there is no general belief as to whence we come or whither we go, or indeed as to why there is any coming or going at all. The meaning and purpose of life are still beyond the scope of our science; they are matters of faith at best and not infrequently of despair. The pain of the world, the transparent ruthlessness of nature, the amazing inequalities of human existence, the seeming grave injustice in the lives of the majority, are, as far as our reason goes, as great enigmas to us to-day in the twentieth century as they have ever been so long as we have any trace of human history. In such a state of affairs we cannot afford to cast aside without a hearing any theory that attempts seriously to throw light on the darkness.

The general hypothesis of preëxistence (under which the special doctrine of reincarnation falls) does not, it is true, solve the fundamental problems, but it pushes back some of the initial difficulties. It furnishes an ampler ground for the development of the individual than the cribbed, cabined, and confined area of one short earth-life, and by providing a stage or series of stages for the acts

and scenes of the age-long drama of man-soul prior to its present existence, permits us to entertain the notion of a law of moral causation conditioning our present relation to circumstance in a way that does not clash with our innate sense of justice.

This general hypothesis of preëxistence connotes the idea of metempsychosis in prior states of existence, but by no means necessarily includes the special doctrine of reincarnation or transcorporation proper, that of repeated incarnations in physical bodies on this earth. It is somewhat necessary to insist on this distinction at the outset, for the two theories are not infrequently confused in the popular treatment of the transmigration-doctrine, especially in the manipulation of Biblical texts and in invoking the authority of Patristic writers. A number of Bible texts require the presupposition of a belief in preëxistence, but very few, and these open to question, permit us to entertain a belief in reincarnation. Some of the Fathers again, it is true, are open advocates of preëxistence, but all without exception reject reincarnation, which was in great favour with some of the subsequently declared heretical schools of the early Christian Gnosis, as well, of course, as with the Orphics, Pythagoræans, Platonists, and Hermeticists. Origen, for instance, who is philosophically the greatest of all the Fathers, but whose views were subsequently condemned, while strenuously rejecting the reincarnation interpretation of even the Elias-John the Baptist saying, enthusiastically champions the cause of

preëxistence in a theory the main features of which may be outlined as follows:

Souls were originally spiritual, equal, free, the first creations of God whose sole cause of creation was his own goodness. In the beginning there was no ground of difference between them; it was the gift of moral freedom, which included personal self-determination, that gave occasion to difference. The souls had thus bestowed on them the choice either of becoming like unto God by imitation of him, or of declining from their original purity and blessedness in neglect of him. Here the supposition is that the original conditions of all were equal, and thus there can be no question of favouritism or injustice. The declension of the pure spiritual existences into the state of separated souls is supposed to have been due solely to their own self-will. Why, however, they should have preferred to fall away; why they should have chosen something other than God, when nothing other than God's goodness is supposed to have existed to choose from; why the exercise of the liberty of choice which was presumably given them to use, and was the creative gift of a provident all-seeing deity, should have been immediately attended with the constraints of an ever-growing necessity, operated by the same will of God, who is thus represented as taking away with one hand what he gave with the other,—all this is in no way explained, and we are left with the root-problem as far from solution as ever.

The world-process, according to this theory, is regarded as a series of states of cooling and con-

densation, corresponding with the cooling of the ardour of the primal spirits for the divine goodness, who thus became separated souls falling into ever greater and greater distinction and remoteness from the Divine. We have accordingly the notion of a series of phases of existence from spiritual to material states, the latter of which verge gradually downwards or condense from the extremest subtlety to the gross materiality of our present world, in which the persistently self-willed souls are finally incarnated. This last most narrowly constrained form of embodiment Origen regards as a final beneficent provision of divine wisdom to enable the souls, under the direst necessities of the sternest facts, to move more rapidly toward the accomplishment of their fore-ordained final destiny, which is the regaining of the pure spiritual state of their origin, in which alone they can ever find lasting peace.

It is evident that such a theory leaves out of account all notion of a positive purpose in the world-process in and for itself. The world-process is conceived of solely as a means of rectification; it is brought into operation owing to the mischoice of the souls. The whole process is for the correction of a fault, and not for the divinely purposed production of a positive or novel good. This much, however, is gained, that there is no imputation to deity of starting souls in unequal conditions, as far at any rate as their nature and environment are concerned. Nevertheless, we are asked to believe that our present conditions are self-caused and morally determined by our own original free-choice

of the worse steadily persisted in, and we cannot help asking in return in self-defence: What can possibly be the nature of the choice which determines the proclivity of souls in the very beginning; and how can there be, on this hypothesis, any real moral responsibility except for the creator of the power of choosing? The created soul itself cannot of itself be the creator of evil, for that would constitute it a second God. We are thus forced to conclude that, in spite of Origen's optimistic belief that all would eventually be saved, his essentially pessimistic view of the cause of the declension of the souls and of the ever-deteriorating conditions of their preëxistence deprives the world-process of all adequate motive and purpose, and leaves us with the problem of justice as far from solution as ever.

But this theory of Origen's and other theories involved in similar theological presuppositions by no means dispose of the doctrine of preëxistence. Coming down to our own days we find that there are those who, while they frankly abandon all questions of ontology as insoluble, and prefer to begin where they find themselves in the world-process, still hold to the idea of preëxistence as the most hopeful hypothesis. Convinced of the fact of evolution, they reject the pessimistic doctrine of a fall, and regard the past of the soul optimistically as a scale of ascent, and the present life as a stage leading to ever superior states of existence either on other planets or in other conditions of life higher than are possible on this earth. This view, however, as far as I am aware, has never been

worked out systematically; it is rather an alternative hazarded by those who dislike the idea of repeated incarnation on earth, when brought face to face with traditional views of the theory of transcorporation.

We may then proceed to consider the doctrine of reincarnation proper, in which there has been a remarkable renascence of interest in the West of recent years. Omitting for the moment all reference to the crudest forms of the belief as found among widely scattered primitive folk of the past and of the present, it may be of interest to note that the historic problem of its simultaneous occurrence in systematic form in the comparatively highly cultured nations of India and Greece, in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., has recently been submitted to a thoroughgoing methodical investigation in Germany. In a recent work[1] and in a series of subordinate studies, Dr. Robert Eisler has argued, at great length and with an amazing wealth of literary and archæological testimony, that the sources of Hellenic mystical cosmology are not to be sought in Greek folklore; on the contrary, they are to be traced to a quite unmistakable high cult of a supreme deity of a pantheistic and henotheistic nature (the 'All and One' as the famous *logos* of Heraclitus has it), the philosophical and mystic concept of Endless Time and Boundless Space, with the allied notion of a world-embracing Necessity or Inevitable Law, very distinct traces

[1] *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt: Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Urgeschichte des antiken Weltbildes.* München (Beck), 1910, 2 vols.

of which are to be found in all the Ionic philosophers from Pherecydes and Thales onwards. This cult of Chronos-Adrasteia (or of the Æon) of Ionian Asia Minor is from the very beginnings of philosophy found in closest connection with the cult of the Orphic mysteries, which on their side are found to show clear signs of the remains of the Prehellenic religion of archaic Asia Minor and of Crete. Moreover, the essentially fatalistic and pessimistic mood of Orphic-Pythagoræan doctrine, with its belief in a ceaselessly revolving wheel of Becoming, and an endless series of transcorporations of the World-Soul in ever new world-formations, together with the consequent dogma, essentially interwoven with it, of individual metempsychosis with its mystical, psychological, and moral doctrines,—is shown to be entirely in keeping with the root-notion of this high cult of the God of Eternity. It is accordingly claimed, as a corollary to this demonstration, that the professors of this creed, which was based on the conviction that the whole course of nature was governed by the circular motion of the heavens under the supreme ordering of eternal law, were the first to formulate the indispensable and fundamental presupposition of all research into the laws of nature.

Moreover, Dr. Eisler has traced back the Zervanistic form of the æon-cult, which was so dominant an element in the religion of Mithras, to an early period of Iranian tradition prior to the Persian expansion. It may very probably have been this expansion, with the subsequent conquest

of Northern India under the Achæmenidæ, that led to the introduction of this systematised body of doctrine into Indian thought; for it is precisely at this period that we there meet with the Time-cosmogonies together with the allied tenets of the wheel of Becoming and of metempsychosis,—ideas which can no more satisfactorily be derived from the native elements of Vedic folk-faith than they can in the West from Greek folk-religion. A further advantage is that this general thesis is the only one that provides a satisfactory explanation of the admittedly close resemblance between Orphic and Pythagoræan and Indian thought. All the indications of origin thus seem to point in a Central Asian direction. And if this should prove to be really the case, we should be able to link up from the Far Eastern side the in some ways similar conceptions of the early Taoist thinkers, contemporaneous with the beginnings of philosophy in China, with their notions of a deity beyond space and time, of a universe of order and law, and of perpetual transformations of the soul in a flux of becoming, which have been hitherto generally supposed to be genetically derivable from India.

It would thus appear that the general notions bound up with the conception of reincarnation came into clear and systematic definition with the simultaneous rise of the philosophical spirit in East and West in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. Philosophically considered, the doctrine requires the presupposition of inevitable law in the universe, based on the observation of the natural

phenomena of alternation and recurrence, exemplified in times and seasons. The apparent revolution of the heaven with all its host of fixed stars was thought of as a perpetually turning wheel or celestial lathe or circle of necessity, while the sun and moon and planets were heavenly types of other modes of the same inevitable law. If day and night, summer and winter, follow each other and recur with invariable iteration, so must it be, they thought, with life and death. As the sun, the giver of light and life, set and rose again, passing below the fixed, flat earth, on its journey through the invisible spaces beneath, to come forth renewed each morning, so was it thought the soul of man at death journeyed through invisible spaces and returned again to live on earth. To-day we know that this is but the apparent motion of the sun, and that it does none of these things; helpful analogies, however, may very well be based on the naïve observations of the senses as well as on the correction of sense by reason.

Though Plato and Aristotle and their followers refused to adopt the Pythagoræan view of the planetary system which in some respects anticipated the results of modern research, they advanced to very lofty conceptions of the nature of the soul, and the psychology of the Alexandrians especially became highly developed. Thus, for instance, among the later Platonists we find Plotinus and Porphyry and their successors arguing that to speak of the soul's 'going to Hades' (or to the 'Invisible') was a complete misunderstanding of its nature, for the soul itself was not a body or

something that could go or be moved, but was on the contrary the cause of motion. The apparent going to Hades or dwelling in the Invisible of the soul was referred to a change of embodiment into subtler media than the elements of the physical body, and the soul was thought of not as being *in* a body, but conceived of rather as a principle of vitality, activity, and mentality, energising through the intermediary of a subtle substance or essence which surrounded every body it might use as a sense-instrument, as it were in an encompassing sphere. The transformations of embodiment were all referred to and thought to take place in this simple continuing essence, which constituted as it were the *seminarium* or psychic matrix of all bodies of the individual soul. This vital formative essence was regarded as the principle of embodiment by which every body of the soul was determined and into which the powers and characteristics and experience of the life of every body were refunded on the dissolution of its elements. Just as in modern times, on the borderland of physics, we have broken up the atom into a system of electrons which are regarded rather as 'charges of electricity' than as purely material units, so with the ancient speculations attempts were made to bridge the gap between soul and body, mind and matter, life and substance, between potentiality and actuality, latency and operation, noumenon and phenomenon, idealism and realism.

The idea of a vital substantial continuum, or primal or causal 'vehicle' of the soul (if that which is contained within can be called the 'vehicle' of

that which contains it), which at the same time is the treasury of the result of all the activities and sensations of the many bodies derivable from it as secondary vehicles, is found in a highly developed form in India as well as in Alexandrian psychology. It is this 'causal' or 'spiritual' unitary nature which in conjunction with the subtle and gross elements of the universe develops, from within, the successive bodies of the soul both subtle and gross. The physical body is furnished with its appropriate organs of sense and action, but activity and sense are to be referred ultimately to the soul in its primal substantial nature, which is regarded as the true unitary sensory. This primal origin of all embodiments and substantial means of all sensation and experience, is often spoken of as the soul itself, and forms the subject of many a legend, myth and mystery-rite in East and West. It seems to be a necessary presupposition in any theory of reincarnation; nevertheless, the most numerous believers in the doctrine reject it.

The reference is, of course, to Buddhism which, as we have already seen, has verged to the extreme of negation in its psychology, either in its efforts to formulate a purely dynamic theory, or more probably as the outcome of its intransigent polemic with Brāhmanic views, which admitted a substantial continuum between reincarnations, though maintaining at the same time the non-reality of all things as set over against the absolute reality of the Supreme. From the start Buddhism with contemporaneous Brāhmanism assumed reincarna-

tion as a fundamental fact. The one object of the Buddha was to teach the means of freedom from the necessity of transmigration, the ceaseless round of birth and death, due to the inevitable concatenation of cause and effect. From the start Buddhism, like Brāhmanism, assumed states of existence in invisible worlds. Existence in such states, as well as on earth, was conditioned by the law of karma, the law of the deed. At death every human being (and every other sentient being for that matter) is immediately born into another state of existence, and what that state is, and the nature of his birth in that state, depend absolutely on his karma or actions (deeds, words, and thoughts) in the past life on earth. Nevertheless, we are at the same time asked to believe that the most characteristic doctrine of the Buddha was that of the non-existence of a self whether individual or universal. Put crudely, this non-self notion (*anattā*) asserts dogmatically: There is no soul; there is no God.

Now if the soul has no true being, and if there is no personal continuum between the phases of embodiment in various states of existence and between two earth-lives, no string, as it were, on which to thread the beads of experience, no substrate of any kind, no ground of persistence, no immortal life to make possible the sequence of mortal existences, it seems somewhat preposterous to speak of karma as a law of moral causation as the Buddhist strenuously insists on doing. It is difficult to attach the idea of moral responsibility to a simple chain of causation, to a 'stream' of

activity, or to speak of such a 'stream' incarnating. According to Buddhist notions, an entirely new personality is born, a different person altogether, the 'soul' being as new as the elements brought together to form the body, and as perishable as the assoeiation of these elements and the rest of the constituents of a non-physical nature combined by karma to form a human life. There is really no entity, no self, no soul, no person of a continuing nature. All that comes over is a complex of activities conditioning a form of existence characterised by the false notion of an 'I.' It is, however, to be doubted whether even the traditionally authentic teaching of the Buddha can be legitimately interpreted in this absolutely negative sense. The answers to the questionings of the disciples on this point seem to leave the matter open, and suggest that the Buddha was averse from being pinned down to a simple yes or no on a matter of such great metaphysical difficulty, seeing that both subject and object can both be regarded as ever-changing phases of a unitary self that in final analysis and in its deepest being is one with the universal reality. In other respects, however, and contradictorily enough if the negation of self is persisted in, Buddhist teaching very securely fixes the responsibility on the shoulders of this 'false notion of an "I,"' so that for all practical purposes, as far as the ordinary unsophisticated man is concerned, the metaphysical subtleties of the doctrine fall well into the background, and the popular teaching directly refers the responsibility for all his deeds to the living agent.

The defenders of the Buddhist doctrine of absolute negation must thus be left to extricate themselves from the dilemma as best they may, and the battle of the absolute illusionists and comparative illusionists may be left to the lovers of Buddhistic and Brāhmanistic metaphysics.

In the West a far more positive view has obtained in the past and holds the ground to-day. This western positive view, however, also agrees that the basic storage of experience should be eventually referred to a deeper and less personal or restricted self than the comparatively ephemeral and superficial 'I' of one stage of existence only; it asserts a spiritual 'I' of practically immeasurable possibilities, but it holds that to deny self utterly is to turn the whole scheme of binding and loosing into the absurdity of an essentially purposeless process, and asserts that liberation regarded in any sense as the escape of an illusory self from illusory conditions equally robs the consummation of all idea of a positively purposed design. Perfect freedom, on the contrary, it holds, should connote the idea not only of removing or escaping from any or all limitations at will, but also the notion of the power to assume all or any limitations at will. And, indeed, contradictorily enough, that is precisely the supreme ideal set forth in some of the schools of the Great Vehicle, as we have already seen. In contradiction to the negative freedom preached by the southern tradition, in the schools of the Little Vehicle, the northern doctrine teaches the grandiose and superb ideal of the Great Vow,—the renunciation of the

bliss of freedom so long as one single sentient creature remains in a state of bondage. The consummation of this utter self-sacrifice for the love of all creatures can hardly, one would imagine, be ascribed to a soulless stream of activity or chain of causation; it surely demands the presupposition not only of a supreme reality, but also of subordinate realities actualising themselves in ascending stages of moral perfectioning; thus giving full satisfaction to the deepest needs of the heart, that look in vain for any comfort to the cold abstractions of the head. Such a sublime ideal, or indeed any lofty ideal of a moral nature, requires the postulate of an immortal progressively responsible entity, though we may all differ as to how the nature and manner of being of that entity should be defined. Responsibility connotes a self-conscious will, and a self-conscious will connotes a personal being; but the idea of personality of a being endowed with the possibility of developing through every grade of self-realisation carries us far beyond man, and both christology and buddhology, from different standpoints, have exhausted themselves in trying to grapple with the mystery of the superhuman person. It is in man that personal self-consciousness begins; in man that the change from the animal self of exclusion to the moral self of inclusion is gradually wrought; and in man that this evolving moral self-consciousness wins to ever deeper and deeper self-realisation until human becomes consciously superhuman, and finally divine. According to this expectation, it can only be when man reaches to a divine state of

consciousness that there is any true understanding of beginning and end. For it is the divine spirit alone, which is both the producer and product of evolution, that can reveal the secret of its own being and at the same time be the reason of its own becoming.

Here, in the midst of process, we are forced to begin with ourselves, as did the greatest of the teachers of reincarnation when he contemplated the process and sought to solve the riddle of sorrow and suffering. The ultimate reason he could not give, but its immediate origin he believed was to be found in the persistent clinging to the state of separated existence, which he conceived of as conditioned by a ceaseless concatenation of cause and effect, as it were an endless chain of causation, of which every link was the inevitable sequence of the one before it, and the last of the series the equally inevitable coupling with the first. To this wheel or circuit of separate existence, this necessity of ever-becoming, man was bound so long as he thirsted for this life of separation and persisted in referring all things to himself as apart from the rest of being.

But this theory was the outcome of deep philosophical reflection and strenuous moral purification; the simple idea of reincarnation did not arise in this way. In its simplest form the notion of the return of the soul to this earth is found far apart from all philosophical consideration or over-beliefs in widely scattered primitive tribes, and must, it is reasonable to conclude, be due to elementary experience of some sort. It seems improbable that

it could have been simply guessed at in so many widely separated cases; to refer it to pure coincidence in this way is to abandon its origin to chance pure and simple. Seeing, however, that dream and vision and contacts with the invisible of all kinds, low and high, are responsible for so may other religious beliefs, not only among primitive folk, but also among civilised mankind, the origin of the belief in reincarnation also may very well be referred to so familiar a cause. The spirits of the ancestors, it was believed, waited to be born again into the tribe. In dream and vision they were seen waiting, and it then required little effort of the imagination to recognise the individual characteristics of departed worthies or chiefs reappearing in the lives of descendants. The great could be recognised, the little passed again without recognition into the mass. But though it is probable that the germ of the belief is to be sought in this direction, it leaves unexplained why some tribes should have interpreted dream-experience in this manner and not others.

Among believers in reincarnation, however, we find innumerable instances of those who claim to remember incidents in previous existences on earth. Indeed, in the highly elaborated psychology of both Brāhmans and Buddhists, the power of recollecting past births at will is postulated as one of the definite acquirements of man in his gradual perfectioning on earth, and many saints are said to have attained to this power. The case of Pythagoras in the West will also recur to everyone. In the present renascence of interest in the Occi-

dent, also, similar claims, not only to sporadic memories of this nature, but also in a few cases to recollection of series of past incarnations are being made. Many are inclined to believe that the truth of the doctrine will gradually be established on this basis. But so far such assertions have been submitted to no competent investigation. They have not yet reached the dignity of being included even among the obscurer phenomena of abnormal psychology as recognised material for psychical research. Truth to tell, many of these claims are transparently absurd, and may be safely referred to a mild species of megalomania. But apart from these pretensions on the part of obscure individuals to the heritage of the past greatness of others, there is an abundance of material that requires collection and unprejudiced investigation. One thing, however, is clear, without any further investigation, from the fact that the claimants are of every sort and kind, that memories of this nature, even if some of them are what they purport to be, have nothing whatever necessarily to do with moral character.

Meantime the normal mind being manifestly without such memories, normal opinion in the West at any rate considers that the whole question of reincarnation is entirely disposed of on the ground of lack of memory; and, of course, this is the first objection that must occur to the mind of even a child, and is constantly confronting the believer in reincarnation. Even if by chance an adherent of the normal opinion is forced to consider a case of reminiscence of this kind, he prefers

to describe it as an instance of 'ancestral memory,' rather than accept the hypothesis of a popularly so discredited notion as metempsychosis; and this, too, though some famous names in the West in the last two centuries have been associated with belief in the doctrine.

But as to this patent general lack of memory, we must not forget that the normal power of recollecting the impressions made on normal consciousness even in a single life-time, is exceedingly imperfect, and that too, with the best of memories, and that we cannot be altogether sure that imperfection of memory or even regular lapses of memory are an evil. Every night we experience an enormous loss of memory of our physical selves, though we are most probably by no means unconscious in some other part of our being; and it is precisely because of this lapse of physical consciousness that our bodies are generally refreshed and invigorated. How very feeble, comparatively, the power of recollecting the experiences of waking consciousness is even when the attention has been fixed upon them, needs no labouring, while the vast majority of sensible impressions pass us by unnoticed and are entirely beyond the power of even the best normal memory to recall. The most recent researches of psychology have demonstrated that in highest probability every single sensible impression, whether attended to or not, is stored somewhere and somehow in the subconscious, and that complexes of such unnoticed impressions can, under abnormal conditions, be reproduced with such vividness that they seem to be the experiences of

a totally different personality. We may thus be persuaded that even in our present life we possess vast stores of latent 'memories' that are immeasurably beyond all our powers of normal recollection. Why, then, should we expect to recollect, except under very extraordinary circumstances and in abnormal or extranormal states, deposits of memory that are *ex hypothesi* stored far deeper than the records of the experiences of our present life?

The lack of power to recall the pictures of detailed incidents of past experience, however, leaves us still in possession of the result of that experience, in the form of increased ability and faculty. The trained musician, for instance, plays with mind free from all recollection of the memory-details of the past labour of learning notes and exercises; his fingers remember, his subconscious mind has stored the experience, practice has given birth to facility, to instinctual capacity. His deeper self has stored away every single detail of his former training; but what advantage is it to have these in his practical mind, when detailed experience is summed up in the now instinctual capacity of his trained body? The recollection of detail by the practical mind would mar the power of execution, if indeed it did not entirely inhibit it. *Mutatis mutandis*, some such process may be thought to take place in the still greater being of the reincarnating entity; the activities of a single life may be regarded as the practice days of the immortal player for the gaining of experience of life and the development of ever increasing ability. Here the recollection that really counts is the

power to awaken latent faculty and to bring into play the previously acquired powers of understanding. It is not, however, to be supposed that all the detailed faculties, capacities, and powers that lie stored away in the whole man can be brought into play again in a single life on earth: there is not time enough for that. But they are all there latent and can be called into play with far less training of the body than would otherwise be the case if present circumstances should demand their exercise.

But man is not only a fabricative, intellectual and artistic life, he is also a social and moral being. The arrangements of human society, its sanctions and prohibitions, are presumably gradually evolving toward some clearer reflection of a far more vital economy and of a spiritual estate to which the soul is native. Within this general notion, believers in reincarnation are at one with believers in the one-life theory in holding that the regulative principle of the moral order is summed up in the inspired utterance that man inevitably reaps what he sows. Now this is evidently not the case in a single life on earth, or only to a very limited extent. The reincarnationist then might rest his case solely on the necessity of rebirth into similar conditions, that is, on earth where alone the sowing has taken place, in order to make this law an absolutely effective truth. He, however, holds, together with the adherents of the one-life theory, that human existence is continued in other states of existence than that of earth-life, and that these states are states of immediate result in

which the harvest of the past life is fully gathered, the grain threshed out and winnowed from the chaff, and stored in the treasury of moral experience. And this presumably can be only by means of some searching process of internal transformation, in immediate vital personal experience, in which the great lesson is learned of how intimately the life of the individual is bound up with the life of his fellow-creatures, with the life of the universe, and with the divine life. This theory then, as well as the one-life point of view in many religious minds, assigns to the human soul states of purificatory processes and of bliss and refreshment in after-death conditions, but it knows nothing of the dogma of eternal punishment.

We may, however, on the one hand, dispense with any consideration of the traditional mythological settings and symbolical picturings of such states, which still in both East and West stand as the age-long legacy of prior popular crudities, nor need we, on the other, stay to discuss the conceptions of modern spiritism which for the most part secularise the old views. It is enough to suggest that, presumably in modes appropriate to the nature of the operations of the soul of things, clothed upon with the personal reminiscences of the past life, the soul undergoes, as it were, the psychical process of digesting the intake of its recent experience of earth-life. And so in a state of extended and enhanced sensitivity, in which any or every past deed or word or even thought can be represented in vivid consciousness, with the added experience of sympathetically realising

its effects on others, in a way that is quite impossible on earth with a body limited by the normal sense-modes, the soul learns the moral lesson of the inevitable nature of the law of action and reaction. The various stages and modes of this internal process of self-analysis and moral purification presumably differ very considerably, as they must be *ex hypothesi* of an intensely personal nature; but the main idea seems to be the expansion of the nature so as to include a consciousness of the complement or result of the deeds of the past life. These stages of moral schooling traverse states both of suffering and of bliss, and finally give place, it is believed, to an open-eyed realisation of the value of both orders of experience, when the soul 'returns to itself.' What necessitates the further return of the soul into earth-life from this state of illumination is by no means clear; renewed life on earth can hardly be regarded as a continuation of the personal punishment-and-reward process, as is generally supposed, for that has already been experienced. The soul itself most probably must in some way consent to this return, knows perchance that there is a positive purpose in the process, and longs for a renewed opportunity of taking part in that process. For the soul in itself, in its divine nature, is a free agent and not a creature of fate. Such, at any rate, is the persuasion of all Christians and of many another saving cult; and such was the teaching in the past, of some schools of religio-philosophy in the West, and notably among the Alexandrian believers in reincarnation. The latter

held accordingly that purification in the after-death states was no real credit to the soul, for there it was purified by the compulsion of necessity and not from choice. True and lasting purification, they held, must be self-wrought, for the soul is a divine self-motive essence. It is only in earth-life that this self-initiated purification can be effected, and the soul win to realisation of its divine nature on the most strenuous battlefield of actuality. The soul, therefore, we may conclude, according to this theory, willingly submits to reincarnation on earth to carry out the divine purpose which is innate in its inmost essence, and of which it is accordingly fully aware only in its deepest self, free from all limitations of time and space, as a conscious member of the divine family. And indeed the famous Platonic 'reminiscence' of the soul is precisely this recalling to mind or bringing into consciousness on earth the memory of this divine state, and not the recollection of past phases of existence on earth.

According to this line of thought, then, it is the life on earth that really counts, for here is the meeting-place of the above and the below, of the within and the without, the ground of really vital struggle, in which the world-process is most intensely engaged in realising the world-purpose. It is therefore the state in which the individual soul can best win to ever greater realisation of the divine purpose, for it is here in the very midst of the divine process. The soul in earth-life might thus be thought of, not as a criminal or a child of fortune, but as a warrior or divine adventurer, and

the wounds which it suffers in one life might be regarded as the powers that it wields in the next; and so it would grow in strength, and beauty, and virtue, until it is finally perfected and passes from the man-stage into that which is greater than man. It is thus said in one of the great myths of the soul, that the stature of the angel in heaven—the one who is elsewhere declared perpetually to behold the Face of the Father, that is, presumably, who is in the immediacy of the Divine Presence—grows with the struggles of its twin on earth, of the man who fights the good fight in the state of existence in time and space; until at last earth is raised to heaven and heaven is brought down to earth, and necessity and freedom embrace in the consummation of the divine purpose.

According to this high over-belief the main lessons that life has to teach seem to be the essential non-separability of the life of the individual soul from the life of the whole, and therewith the power of the individual life to enjoy communion with the divine life. The soul's greater destiny includes both necessity and freedom. Freedom resides in the power of the soul to change its individual attitude with regard to the circumstances of life, which are the necessary expressions of the greater life of the whole. If instead of looking on circumstances as vexatious and inimical limitations, we regarded them as ever-fresh opportunities, and indeed the most immediate means of bringing us to ourselves, we might embrace them gladly as the ever-changing moods of our destined complement and fulfilment.

For with this change of attitude our personal separative love and will would unite with the all-embracing will and love, and we should be at one with our own greater destiny and with that of the rest, and so find ourselves in conscious coöperation with the divine purpose.

However this may be, the doctrine of reincarnation in its most highly developed form holds out the hope of our realising some day in the midst of the conditions of greatest struggle the meaning of that struggle. To have the life-conflict explained theoretically in some shut-off and preserved heaven-state where the struggle itself is no longer present, would be a solution of an academic rather than of a practical nature. To leave this life for ever with all or most of its problems unsolved has all the appearance of abandoning the struggle in irretrievable defeat, and this can hardly be a satisfactory outlook for a noble soul. On the contrary, the idea of the possibility of returning to do better another time, and yet again and again to learn the whole lesson, and above all to help others more easily to learn it, is a conception that should appeal very strongly to the practical instincts of the strenuous labourers for improving the present conditions of human existence on earth.

The doctrine of reincarnation thus provides many with considerations that give satisfaction to their sense of justice and their conception of orderly progress, and holds out the promise of eventual conscious coöperation with the world-process on the most practical plane of life. It

cannot, however, be said that this theory has produced any higher types of humanity than the one-life theory. Both forms of belief have their long lists of saints and geniuses, of accomplished souls and heroes of all kinds, and also their endless records of ordinary and of quite undeveloped folk. It is also true that in the past, and even in the West, the reincarnation-doctrine has not been made to yield so practical an outlook as has recently been given it, and as has been insisted on in this paper; while in the East it has been the favourite doctrine of peoples for the most part naturally inclined to fatalism and *laisser faire*. On the contrary, the one-life theory has been the favourite doctrine with races who are naturally exuberant in activity, and who have thus found an additional incentive to moral effort in the belief that all is staked on a single throw. We boast ourselves to be more practical in the West; and after all, we say, that is what really counts in arriving at any judgment of value. But are we so sure of what is the most truly practical? Modern civilisation increases our needs and diminishes our contentment; year by year we get further away from nature; culture does not keep pace with material progress, and moral and spiritual advance, if anything, lags still farther behind it. This is hardly practical, at any rate if the true happiness of man is dependent upon harmonious development, and if the teaching of the greatest of mankind in East and West is held to be practical.

The doctrine of reincarnation, in its highest aspect, looks to a social end and not to the con-

summation of an isolated perfection. It is not to be thought that the individual soul has to acquire all arts and sciences, capacities and abilities, or pass through all experiences; the part cannot possibly perform the function of the whole. But what the wise soul can do is to develop that all-attractive power of 'harmlessness,' and that positive power of fellow-feeling, of sympathy and compassion for all other souls and the whole creation, which are the passports to the adytum of every separated life and of life itself; till finally all separation is removed and the treasures of experience and capacity, knowledge and attainment, of all separated souls and of the soul of life itself are laid at the feet of the eternal victor who is also the perpetual self-sacrifice.

VII.

SOME MYSTICAL EXPERIMENTS ON THE FRONTIERS OF EARLY CHRISTENDOM.

IT is with some hesitation that I venture to invite attention for a brief space to the consideration of certain experiments of a mystical or quasi-mystical nature which are so foreign to the general temper and practical interests of our own day that few have the patience to give them a hearing, much less to bestow upon them any serious thought.

The illustrations of these experiments are drawn from the distant past, from documents of the earliest centuries of our era, from fragments of traditions of schools or movements which have long ceased to be. These documents and fragments are now generally regarded as possessing a historical or rather religio-historical interest at best. I would venture to think, however, that they need not necessarily be disposed of in so summary a fashion.

For to-day in the East there exist somewhat similar practices—in method if not in form—among the numerous phases there of ecstatic religion and mystical and psychical experimentation and training. In the West also of late widespread interest has been aroused, not only in the commoner phenomena of extra-normal psychology and the lower phases of psychical research, but also in the far more important subject of the

psychology of the higher phases of religious experience. Not only so, but endeavours are being made by many deliberately to induce in themselves extra-normal psychical and psycho-physiological states by adopting or adapting some of the mystical practices of the ancients of the West or of the still living tradition of such disciplines in the East.

Indeed, one of the most remarkable phenomena of our day is the rising flood of psychism which is inundating us on all sides, as we shall see in a subsequent study devoted to the subject; and it has been well said that to-day it is no longer the old-fashioned crude materialism of a quarter of a century ago but the new-fashioned subtler materialism of no little in psychism with which the Churches have now chiefly to reckon.

We are all aware of the dangers and delusions of such psychical and psycho-physiological states, and how these are to be kept distinct from the true spiritual content of mysticism at its best. It is, however, very difficult to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between some of the higher psychical and the genuinely beneficent religious mystical states, regarded as degrees of immediate revelation of the Divine Presence, the source of all blessing and certitude.

The illustrations are, with one important exception, taken from purely Pagan sources, but all are from circles of a deeply religious nature. The end of all the experiments is the same—namely, union or fellowship in some measure with what the worshippers believed to be truly divine and beneficent.

I.

The first illustration is taken from the tradition that bears the honorific name of Thrice-greatest Hermes. From a careful study of the extant tractates and fragments of this Trismegistic literature, I venture to suggest that when we read of Hermes and of Tat, of Asclepius and of Ammon, we are not dealing with the names of historical individuals, but with the general titles of types or degrees of mystical knowledge.

When, for instance, we find Tat, Asclepius and Ammon gathered together to listen to the discourse or instruction of Hermes, we are assisting at a typical meeting, and not reading the record of an historical gathering. Ammon seems to stand for the ruler, the magistrate, the man of affairs; Asclepius for the thinker, the philosopher, the man of science; and Tat (who is always represented as the youngest) for the one who has in him naturally the greatest promise of the development of seership and of the mystical faculty. It is Tat who, when he has had this faculty properly developed in him, succeeds to the *kathedra* as a full Hermes.

Hermes (Eg. Ṭeḥuti, Thoth), as we learn from Jamblichus, or whoever was the writer of the treatise *De Mysteriis*, was a name common to all priests. But in the Trismegistic tradition we are not dealing with the rank and file of priests, but with a special order of contemplatives. In these

withdrawn circles devoted to contemplation and stern moral discipline, the specially distinguished title Thrice-greatest Hermes thus came to mean one who was believed to have reached the privilege of immediate contact with the Divine Mind, the Mind of all Masterhood, or Shepherd of men (Poimandrēs), by whom the purified will or spiritual nature of the striver for perfection was thought to be enlivened and enlightened and finally made wholly good.

Even the more general instruction was imparted under conditions of secrecy and in a withdrawn, mystical and religious atmosphere. We remember how, in his treatise *On the Contemplative Life*, Philo tells us with what rapt attention the Therapeuts listened to the instruction and exegesis of their president, how they hung on his words in religious silence in their meeting-hall. So too with the Pœmandrists. But plain and simple as were the ceremonies of the Therapeuts, those of the Hermetists seem to have been still more so. They met for instruction in a sacred place, an adytum or shrine, which was apparently set apart solely for this purpose, and where they believed they could create conditions suitable for the reception of the inspiration of the Divine Mind by the instructor, and for the handing of it on to the pupils—a common harmonious atmosphere of thought, goodwill and aspiration, in which the speaker and the hearers could be respectively the transmitter and recipients of a Divine influence. The presiding Hermes, who had enjoyed communion with the Greatness in solitary ecstasy,

believed that in such moments of common aspiration he could be overshadowed by the Divine Mind; and the lesser Hermeses, who had never attained to such immediate union, hoped in this way to be made partakers mediately of the holy influence. This at any rate is what I conceive to be the idea of the writer of the preface to *The Perfect Sermon*, who assembles the three with the Trismegistos in the adytum, and adds:

"And when the sacred group of four was now complete with piety and with God's goodly presence —to them, sunk in fit silence reverently, their souls and minds pendent on Hermes' lips, thus Love Divine began to speak."

All I contend for here is, not that the extant *Perfect Sermon* was actually delivered historically under such circumstances, but that the writer is handing on a tradition of how such instruction was imparted in the inner circles of the school.

Now, if I am right in concluding that in the adyta a Trismegistos was not made by election or by the conferring of outward degrees by his fellows, but, just as with the 'prophet' in the early Christian churches, was chosen of the Spirit; if I am not mistaken in thinking that a teacher of this way was called Thrice-greatest, not only because he was capable of receiving some measure of illumination, but as being one who was believed to have reached a very definite stage of union, so that he was regarded as a theodidact, and that a Tat was one who had the mystical faculty as it were in embryo—the chief point of interest is that through-

out the whole range of the literature we can find no psychic recipes for forcing the development of this faculty, but only the soberest directions for moral and intellectual purification. It must, however, be noted that in one of the oldest deposits of the literature, the *Virgin of the World* (Κόρη Κόσμου) treatise, where the narrative is put in the mouth of Isis, there is reference to a stage of mystic instruction or perfecting 'in the dark,' which seems to mean the reception of the face-to-face tradition of the school in a state of trance. This is closely connected with the seeing of the 'mystic spectacle' which is elsewhere referred to in the words: "But when the Sun did rise for me, and with all-seeing eyes I gazed upon the hidden mysteries of that New Dawn and contemplated them" (cp. §§ 19 and 4). It may be that in the beginnings, when the Trismegistic tradition was in closest touch with Egyptian 'wisdom,' as it was called, there were many modes of forcing on psychic states, but in the later developments of this tradition all traces of them have disappeared. There is, however, one tractate of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, which now bears the title 'The Secret Sermon on the Mountain,' that purports to give the means whereby the 'Tat,' or initiand, after he has made himself a 'stranger to the world,' has for the first time imparted to him the inner instruction concerning the nature of spiritual Rebirth or Regeneration—which was regarded as one of the chief secrets, if not the chief secret, of the school. Hermes and Tat are alone, presumably in the adytum. To Tat's repeated prayer that Hermes

will at last, after so many trials and proofs of serious purpose, explain to him the manner of Rebirth, the Trismegistos, the spiritual 'father,' or god-father, gives the following striking and compassionate answer to his spiritual 'son':

"What may I say, my son? I can but tell thee *this*. Whene'er I see within myself the Simple Vision brought to birth out of God's mercy, I have passed *through* myself into a Body that can never die. And now I am not what I was before; but I am born in Mind. The way to do this is not taught" (§ 3).

They who are thus born are children of a Divine race, Sons of Mind. "This race, my son, is never taught; but when He willeth it, its memory is restored by God" (§ 2). It is the 'Way of Birth in God' (§ 6).

Tat is in despair that he can ever attain to such a Birth; he fears he is incapable of so marvellous a transmutation. But Hermes encourages him, not by giving him any detailed directions, but by the confident assertion of the fact based on his own experience, and present in him at that moment:

"Nay, God forbid, my son! Withdraw into thyself and it will come. *Will*, and it comes to pass. Throw out of work the body's senses, and thy Divinity shall come to birth" (§ 6).

Thereon follows a solemn rite of invocation on the part of Hermes. By reason of the state of power in which he holds himself, by help of the Presence with which he is now consciously united,

he invokes the Virtues that they may come and drive out the Vices in Tat. So potent is this invocation that for the moment Tat shares in the purified and expanded consciousness of Hermes, and realises the nature of the spiritual Rebirth, and receives the 'tradition' of the mystery which he had prayed Hermes at the beginning to set forth either 'in speech' or 'in the secret way' (§ 1).

Here again I do not hold that there is anything of an historical nature in this recital; except in so far that a true mystical narrative is historical for all time. I prefer to believe that it records the belief or tradition of the school that one who had the mystic consciousness properly developed could by some such solemn rite, under appropriate conditions, impart to one who had the faculty latent and had fitly prepared himself, a 'beginning' or 'start' or 'initiation,' that would induce at least momentary insight into the mystery of the Divine Presence, or at any rate establish conscious contact of some kind with that Presence.

We may to-day talk learnedly about 'suggestion,' and imagine that we have thus dismissed the 'hallucinations' of the ecstatic into the limbo of the inconsiderable; but 'suggestion' seems to be a very inadequate label for a tremendous power of which as yet we know next to nothing. I would myself believe that one of the manifestations of this power is what may be termed spiritual or mystical contagion; and though I hold that there is no absolute need of any human intermediary, I equally believe that such beginnings may be greatly

facilitated by human transmission, though always under Divine benediction.

I need hardly say that I have in the above rough note but touched the fringe of the matter even within the confines of the Trismegistic literature alone; but I must hasten on to my next illustration. Before doing so, however, I cannot refrain from pointing out that though the general standpoint of the Hermetic contemplatives (as was and is the case with so many other schools of mystics) was that of an ascetic dualism, the consummation for which they strove was not imagined as some remote state high up in the sky, or in the incurious realms of the purely intelligible, or in some other phase of abstraction, but was conceived rather as capable of fulfilment here and now on earth, as the realisation of an abiding Presence, and the constant revelation of a purpose and of a good purpose in all things. At any rate, this is how I would venture to interpret the following passage, one of the most beautiful and suggestive, to my mind, that has ever been written:

"The greatest bad there is, is not to know God's Good; but to be able to know Good, to will, to hope, is a Straight Way, the Good's own Path, both leading there and easy.

"If thou but sett'st thy foot thereon, 'twill meet thee everywhere, 'twill everywhere be seen, both where and when thou dost expect it not—waking, sleeping, sailing, journeying, by night, by day, speaking, and saying naught. For there is naught that is not image of the Good" (*C. H.* xi. 21).

II.

We now pass to the consideration of a mystical experiment that the modern mind regards with much disfavour and as at best a magnificent delusion or illusion, at any rate in the form or forms in which it was anciently conceived.

It is well known that the mystics of this age, and for long previously and long after, believed firmly in the reality of a very definite world-order, a cosmic scheme of worlds or spheres, with which they felt themselves intimately related in their own constitutions as microcosms of this macrocosm.

To-day the marvellous advance made by physical science in the observation of astral phenomena and the mapping-out of the celestial bodies and spaces, has apparently for ever dismissed this fond notion, at any rate in any form in which it has been hitherto conceived. But I have never been able to persuade myself that the fundamental notion or general idea at the back of this belief of the ancients can be altogether disposed of. It is of course certain that the various schemes of the cosmic organism or world-machine imagined by the philosophers and mystics of antiquity are very far indeed from the facts revealed by our modern instruments; nevertheless, their speculations may in some way have contained faint adumbrations or symbolisms of the inner nature of the world-order that could serve the purpose of the Divine Wisdom, and be made use of by Providence as means of

education for the human race and of intensification of the spiritual life. I would even go so far as to believe that God is so ungrudging of Himself that He pours out His spiritual blessings on the devout worshipper by means of whatever forms the worshipper's poor intellect can construct, quite irrespective of his correct knowledge of physical science.

(*a*) My first illustration of the mode of this mystical experiment of what may be called the 'cosmifying' of the consciousness is taken from Philo (*De Vit. Mos.* iii. 14).

Philo is treating of the symbolism of the sacred vestments and ornaments, and especially of the 'logion' (the breastplate), of the High Priest. This symbolic clothing and adornment typified that the true priest was vitally invested with the cosmic robe, or consciously possessed of a celestial and immortal body, being 'clothed upon' with a vital surround of glory and power like unto the glories and powers of the great body of all things. Philo tells us that the explanation of the way of putting on this spiritual vesture constituted the whole 'preliminary instruction' of the Therapeut or Servant of God, and continues:

"If he cannot be worthy of Him who made the cosmos, he should nevertheless without ceasing strive to be worthy of that cosmos; for when he has been clothed with its likeness, he is bound forthwith, by carrying about the image of the model in his head [we should say in his 'heart' rather], of his own self to change himself as though it were from man into the nature of the cosmos—

nay, he who speaks on truth ought to speak truth! —be himself a little cosmos."

The idea that man is a potential universe is common to many mystic circles in both East and West, and much has been written on the subject. Doubtless much that has been written is in its details foolishness. I would nevertheless hold to it that there is some truth in the main idea. But however this may be, it is a fact that some of the greatest intellects of antiquity have not only held this view but have deliberately set to work to realise themselves in this 'cosmic' mode.

(*b*) Take, for example, Plotinus. We have all read of his 'ecstasis,' and have been somewhat puzzled as to the precise methods he pursued to attain to what he considered the consummation of mystic consciousness. He may have tried many methods, or have been content simply to strive in every way to purify himself, waiting for the gift of grace which is said to have been bestowed upon him on four occasions during Porphyry's discipleship. I, however, cannot help thinking that there was at least one method which he recommended, and which he had therefore presumably experimented with himself; for in treating of the nature of 'Intelligible Beauty' he writes as follows (V. viii. cap. ix., 550A-D):

"Let us, then, form a mental image of this cosmos with each of its parts remaining what it is, and yet interpenetrating one another, [imagining] them altogether into one as much as we possibly can—so that whatever one comes first into the mind as the 'one' (as, for instance, the outer

[most] sphere [of fixed stars]), there immediately follows also the sight of the semblance of the sun, and together with it that of the other stars [or planetary spheres], and the earth and sea, and all things living, as though in one transparent sphere —in fine, as though all things could be seen in it.

"Let there, then, be in the soul some semblance of a sphere of light [transparent], having all things in it, whether moving or still, or some of them moving and others still.

"And holding this [sphere] in the mind, conceive in thyself another [sphere], removing [from it all idea of] mass; take from it also [the idea of] space, and the phantom of matter in thy mind; and try not to imagine [merely] another sphere less massive than the former.

"Then invoking God who hath made [the reality] of which thou holdest the phantom [in thy mind], pray that He may come.

"And may He come with His own cosmos, with all the gods therein—He being one and all, and each one all, united into one, yet different in their powers, and yet in that one manifold all one.

"Nay, rather, the One God in all [the gods], for that He never falleth short [of His own Self], though all of them are [from Him]. And they are all together, yet each again apart, being in a state transcending all extension, and possessed of forms that no sense can perceive.

"For otherwise, one would be in one place, another in another, and [each] be 'each,' and not 'all' in itself, without parts other from the others and [other] from itself.

"Nor is each whole a power divided and proportioned according to a measurement of parts; but each whole is the all, all power, extending infinitely and infinitely powerful—nay, so vast is that [Divine world-order], that its very 'parts' are infinite."

Here it is to be noticed that the mental experiment of imagining the 'phantom' of the sensible cosmos, as conceived of by the best 'science' of the day, is but the preliminary to a purely religious act, without which the experiment will fail. Plotinus does not say that even then ecstasis will necessarily follow; that consummation is still dependent upon the good pleasure of the Deity. He prays that the Divine Presence may manifest itself; then, and only then, will there be any realisation of the Divine or intelligible world-order, the nature of which he tries to suggest on the basis of his own experience.

III.

(*a*) If, on the one hand, the Later Platonic school was in contact with the Trismegistic tradition, as we are definitely informed by the writer of the treatise *On the Mysteries*, we know that on the other hand these mystical philosophers were deeply interested in the religion of Mithras and its mysteries.

It has always seemed to me that men who were saturated with the high philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, and who were acquainted

with the lofty teaching of the Hermetic discipline, could not have taken part in the Mithriaca if these mysteries had possessed no deeper content than what we can gather from the very fragmentary literary references, inscriptions, and figured monuments that have come down to us. This impression has been strengthened, to some extent, at any rate, by the allied Liturgy which Dieterich, in 1903, disinterred from the great Paris Magic Papyrus 574 (*Suppl. grec de la Bibl. Nat.*). If it is not a genuine Mithraic document, as the best authorities hold, then there must have been a somewhat similar private rite in Mithraism, otherwise the introduction is quite inexplicable.

It is true that even when Dieterich has removed from the text what he considers to be the overworkings and elaborations of the Egyptian magical school, there still remains a number of elements of a theurgical and magical nature, breathings and mutterings and invocations replete with *barbara nomina* and vowel-chants, which are very distasteful to the modern religious mind. It is, however, the *fond* of the liturgy solely that concerns our immediate interest and purpose. This liturgy, or rather ritual, plainly forms no part of a general rite for a congregation of *mystæ*. Two individuals only take part in it, of whom the one simply hands it on to the other, and leaves that other alone to celebrate it. It is thus essentially a solitary experiment of personal religion, a private *sacramentum*, or *dynamis*, as it is called; that is to say, a 'craft' or art, whereby it was believed the initiand could be brought into personal contact

with the Saviour-god, whether called Mithra or by any other name, who first transforms the mortal fateful nature of the purified suppliant into a glorious body of freedom and immortality, and finally unites him to himself.

The highest degree of the Mithriaca was that of the Fathers or Eagles, sometimes also called the Hawks. We, however, hear of a still loftier title—the Father of the fathers; it may be, I venture to suggest, that this most honorific title corresponds with the Thrice-greatest degree of the Hermeticists, and that in this ritual we have to deal with the self-initiation of a 'seer' or 'prophet' of one of such schools.

At any rate, the father in our liturgy who hands on the rite, declares that he himself, through the blessing of Mithra, possesses this eagle-power, 'so that I, Eagle as I am, may soar to heaven and contemplate all things.' He asserts that he is a spiritual father handing on to a spiritual son, 'worthy of this our craft,' the mystery of his own immortality.

The rite thus handed on describes the method of this eagle-flight of the soul. It is of the nature of a heaven-soaring or psychic journey to the height of cosmos. The form of the visions presented to the psychic consciousness is, as usual, conditioned by the traditional notions of the school concerning the successive phases of the invisible cosmos, corresponding with the supposed regions of the physical cosmos.

The most interesting feature of the experiment, however, is that the theurgist is directed (at the

same time as he projects his consciousness so that he appears in one part of his nature to soar to heaven) how he is to keep unbroken contact with his physical consciousness by means of certain breathings and other devices, so that he should not pass into trance. He, so to speak, projects, by a powerful effort of the will and imagination, a subtle body for the transmission of his visionary experience of a heaven-journey, and at the same time strives with all his might to hold the two consciousnesses simultaneously, so that one conscious centre seems to soar aloft while the other still remains on earth. The unitary consciousness embraces the two phases.

The organon or vehicle of this projected consciousness is said to be of a substantial nature, and to be composed of the subtle or purified elements. In the ritual it is called the body of immortality or of resurrection, for the rite is one of mystical death and of rising from the dead. This subtle body has many phases and is called by many names in the mystical psychology of East and West. Fundamentally a simple essence, it can be made, it is said, to pass everywhere and to take all forms at will; it is of no form and yet pantomorph, simple yet protean in its possibilities of change—a magical stuff indeed.

The first thing our theurgist has to do, is to call this latent simplicity or ideoplasm into activity. This he can do only because he has already so purified himself that, as it were, a germ of it is already alive in him. This substrate or pure essence of the primal elements, our theurgist

regards as the immediate creation of the Supreme, and his future perfect body of immortality, which he now proceeds solemnly to invoke, or to call into activity, as follows:

"O Primal Origin of my origination; thou Primal Substance of my substance; First Breath of breath, the breath that is in me; First Fire God-given for the Blending of the blendings in me, First Fire of fire in me; First Water of [my] water, the water in me; Primal Earth-essence of the earthy essence in me; thou Perfect Body of me!"

This 'perfect body,' the utterance goes on to say, has been fashioned in the Light-World by the Hand of the Almighty. It is, as it were, a single organ of celestial sense, by means of which all divided senses may be blended into one, or which may become all-eye, or all-ear, and so on. The utterance then proceeds to invoke this 'perfect body' as though it were a living being of celestial power, a veritable magical steed or Pegasus, mounted on which the man may be translated to the Light-World. The theurgist proceeds:

"If, verily, it may seem good to you, translate me, now held by my lower nature, unto the Generation that is free from death; in order that, beyond the insistent Need that presses on me, I may have vision of the deathless Source, by virtue of the deathless Spirit, by virtue of the deathless Water, by virtue of the deathless Solid, and by virtue of the deathless Air; in order that I may become reborn in Mind; in order that I may become initiate, and that the Holy Breath may breathe in me; in order that I may admire the Holy Fire;

that I may see the Deep of the [New] Dawn, the Water that doth cause [the Soul] to thrill; and that the Life-bestowing Æther which surrounds [all things] may give me hearing."

We may omit the symbolic and apocalyptic stages of the vision of ascent towards the height or pole of heaven; the main point of interest is that when the highest limit of the cosmos has been reached in safety, then, just as in the experiment of Plotinus, the vision of the God supervenes, and the initiand utters the final prayer:

"O Lord of me, abide with me, within my soul! Oh! leave me not!"

If this union were achieved, it was believed that the now fully initiated had his 'perfect body' permanently enlivened and confirmed and his mind enlightened and glorified. It was called the rite of *apothéōsis* or *athanasía*, the rite of divinising or immortalising; in other words, the sacrament of regeneration, or of transcending the sphere of genesis or mortality (of birth-and-death or ever-becoming), and of being translated or reborn into the Divine life and consciousness. It is referred to also as 'being made "great,"' in the sense in which the word 'great' is used by a number of mystic schools in East and West—that is as attaining to the state of a completion or wholeness, a *plērōma* or *aiōn*. And so this most remarkable fragment of mystic antiquity ends with the words:

"O Lord, being born again, I pass away in being made Great, and having been made Great, I die.

"Being born from out the state of birth-and-

death that giveth birth to [mortal] lives, I now, set free, pass to the state transcending birth-and-death, as Thou hast stablished it, according as Thou hast ordained and made the mystery."

(*b*) It is now sufficiently clear, I hope, that the 'perfect body' of the 'Mithra'-worshipper is the 'body that can never die' of the Pœmandrist, the 'cosmic body' of Philo, and the 'circular' or 'spherical body' or 'body of the spheres' of Plotinus, as he elsewhere calls it. This idea of a subtle substance of embodiment or primal plasm was one of the fundamental notions of Alexandrian psychology or psycho-physiology, as indeed it is also in the living tradition of India to-day. On it these philosophers and mystics based all their theories of physical sensation as well, referring to it as the common sensory. In normal mankind it had become dull and densified by the corrupting influence of passion and vice; the mystics, therefore, sought to purify this plasm by various disciplines and ascetic practices, so that it might be, as they believed, restored to its primal state, and what had been previously a carapace of self-hood, might be transformed into a robe of power and freedom, which they referred to as the *augoeidēs* or *astroeidēs*, the ray-like or star-like glory.

Origen, though professedly basing himself on Paul, is saturated with such ideas when treating of the nature of the resurrection-body. Origen regards this primal paradisical body of light as the *seminarium* from which all bodily forms, both subtle and gross, can arise. Thus he writes (*Ep.* 38 *ad Pammach.*):

"Another body, a spiritual and aetherial one, is promised us; a body that is not subject to physical touch, nor seen by physical eyes, nor burdened with weight, and which shall be metamorphosed according to the variety of regions in which it shall be. . . . In that spiritual body the whole of us will see, the whole hear, the whole serve as hands, the whole as feet."

If such a view appears in last analysis to be the surrender to a subtle form of materialism, it may be urged on the contrary that the notion of absolute divorcement from embodiment or substance of every kind seems to land us in empty abstraction, rather than hold out the promise of a vital fulfilment in which the whole man shall share.

IV.

If I have so far trodden warily in venturing to bring forward these ancient notions in the hope that they may contain some element of interest for present-day students of the psychology of religious experience, for the rest of this paper I must proceed on tip-toe. For my last illustration will be taken from a document of Early Christian syncretism or Christianised gnosticism.

Let us now consider briefly the so-called 'Hymn of Jesus' as contained in the important recently discovered new fragments of *The Acts of John*, first published by Dr. M. R. James, in 1899, in *Texts and Studies*.

The 'Hymn' appears in the *Acta* as an

integral part of the narrative, but we know that it was in wide circulation as a separate document among many of the early mystical circles. It is, I suggest, an earlier document incorporated by the redactor of these Acts, and it was in the first place fashioned to a certain extent as to the setting on a pre-Christian model. If, as is generally held, the *Acta Johannis* formed part of the second century Leucian collection, the 'Hymn' should be early.

But have we here to deal with a simple hymn, as is generally, as far as I know hitherto universally, supposed? I do not think so.

Elsewhere I have ventured, in a detailed analysis of the document, to put forward the theory that this so-called 'Hymn' is no hymn, but the remains of an ancient ritual which set forth in dramatic form a high phase of the *unio mystica*, hierogamy or sacred marriage, which was in manifold forms one of the chief elements of the mystery-rites of antiquity.

I submit that in high probability we have here to do with a case of adoption of certain elements drawn from the innermost circles of private Pagan rites, transformed and transfigured for Christian purposes, by men who did not draw so sharp a line of demarcation between the holiest *sacramenta* of their contemporaries and predecessors and the Christian mysteries as has been so strongly insisted on in later times.

Though in the *Acta* the whole 'Hymn' is put in the mouth of Jesus as sung by him from the first to the last word, it is very evident that the

sentences can be far more appropriately distributed among two speakers, one of whom takes the part of the Saviour and the other of him who is to be saved, while the whole sacred drama is enacted in a mystically shut-off area defined by the circular dance of the *chorós* of assistants.

For the 'Hymn' is not only a song but a dance; it contains the two elements of the *chorós* proper. In those days the idea of the sacred dance of the heavenly bodies was widespread. It was possible, the faithful believed, to set up on earth a certain mimicry of the celestial dance and eternal praise-chant, and so put themselves into sympathetic relation with the Divine harmony.

In the narrative of the *Acta*, the Twelve are bidden to join hands and move round in a ring—a solemn circle-dance; while to every sentence or pair of sentences of the ritual they intone the sacred asseveration Amen!

In this way, as I conceive, it was believed that a holy ground could be formed, shut off from the turmoil of the world, in which the *sacramentum* or *mystērion* could be duly celebrated.

In the centre of this sacred circle stood the Master, the supreme initiator; but he was not alone. Who was the other? Surely no other than the suppliant, the one who longs for release from the dominion of the world and for spiritual freedom.

It is well known that in a number of Christian Gnostic traditions the human soul was regarded as the 'lost sheep,' as the suffering 'sophia,' whom the Saviour comes to seek and take home; to free

her from her sufferings and unite her unto himself. The second in the circle, I believe, can be no one else than the neophyte, the initiand, the one who longs for salvation, the representative of the repentant 'sophia,' the candidate who has made himself ready.

Such phrases as 'I would be saved' and 'I would save,' as they now stand in the 'Hymn,' cannot be appropriately assigned to one and the same speaker. They are far more understandable as the utterances of two distinct *personæ* of a mystery-drama.

To the utterance of the one desire of the heart, to the heart-felt prayer of the postulant: 'I would be saved,' comes instantly the comforting answer of the equally yearning desire to grant that prayer: 'And I would save'; while the sacred circle-dance proceeds and the joyful assent of the choir on earth, corresponding with the supernal *chorós* in the heavens, is given by the solemn intonation of the 'So be it!'

There are first seven utterances, in which the suppliant prays successively to be saved, loosed, wounded (or pierced [*al.* dissolved]), begotten (and so new-born), to eat of the Divine substance, to hear the Divine wisdom, and to be baptised (or dowzed) in the Divine presence. To all of these the response is instant, that what the postulant longs to receive the Saviour longs to bestow. Meantime the solemn dance proceeds, and each promise is confirmed by the chanting of the sacred word.

After these preliminaries an unrelated sen-

tence breaks suddenly into the text: 'Grace danceth' or 'leadeth the dance with song' or music.

Grace, as is well known, was among the mystics one of the names for the celestial Sophia, the Harmony of the heavenly spheres, and also for the supernal Wisdom or Divine Mother, who is sometimes equated with the Holy Spirit.

It may even be that in the original form of the rite there may have been other *personæ* within the circle who represented the celestial Ogdoad or company of Eight, just as the Twelve in the outer ring represented the celestial Dodecad. In some traditions of the Christianised Gnosis there is a band of women disciples.

In any case the ritual proceeds in keeping with the grandiose symbolism that regarded the eight supernal spheres, of the fixed stars and the seven planets, as a mighty instrument of heavenly music, a celestial pipe or harp, the Lyre of the Logos, or Divine Harper, or the Pipe of the Spiritual Piper:

> "I would pipe; dance ye all. Amen!
> I would play a dirge; lament ye all.
> Amen!"

The text then seems to suggest that now manifest sympathy between the Below and the Above has been established, that the 'cosmic mystery' (of which perhaps we may have a dim echo in the most obscure passage of The *Didaché*) is beginning to make itself felt in the enthusiasm of the *chorós* on earth, for it is declared:

"The Eight harps with us as one harp.
Amen!
The Twelve above doth dance with us.
Amen!
The Whole on high is a-dance."

This declaration of the Hierophantēs or Mystagōgos is immediately followed by the striking utterance:

"Who danceth not, knows not what is being done."

Ethically this means, of course, that only by doing the Will shall we know of the Doctrine; but in olden days among the mystics sacred rites were devised in the belief, that a congregation of human units could be built up into a miniature cosmic organism that could be used as a means of bringing into activity greater forces, or of experiencing deeper emotions, than it was possible for a single individual to set going by his unaided efforts.

In our ritual there then follows a second set of three dual utterances of a similar nature to the first seven, and to these succeed a series of remarkable mystical declarations by the Master of the rite speaking in the person of the Saviour; but these I must omit for lack of space.

So far, apparently both Suppliant and Hierophant have remained motionless. But to know, to enter into the life of the mystery, the aspirant must join the sacred dance; the instruction is no longer by word of mouth, but by practice of the deed. For the ritual proceeds:

"Now answer to My dancing! See thyself[1] in Me who speak, and dancing what I do, keep silence on My mysteries; for thine is the Passion of Man that I am to suffer."

There follows, as we have every right to assume from the next sentences, a mystery-dance or drama of the Passion of Man—the central *drōmenon* of the rite. What it was precisely, we have, unfortunately, no longer any means of ascertaining; but it was a sight that filled the postulant with dismay. The mystery of suffering was shown in the person of Him whom the many believed should be exempt from all suffering. This, the greatest of all lessons, has still to be learned by the aspirant for truly spiritual gnosis; and so the ritual draws towards its close with the to me extraordinarily suggestive and beautiful words:

"If thou hadst known how to suffer,
Thou wouldst have had power not to suffer.
Know then how to suffer, and thou hast power not to suffer.
That which thou knowest not, I Myself will teach thee.
I am thy God."

From the few remaining sentences we learn that the mystery thus sung and danced is the Mystery of the Logos.

This intensely interesting ritual with its lofty suggestions may well bring to a conclusion these rough notes on some mystical experiments illus-

[1] The use of the singular is a strong confirmation of the hypothesis that there were two actors in the circle.

trated by private rites on the frontiers of Early Christendom.

But the modern mind has grown so disdainful of the mind of antiquity that it has little patience to bestow upon its conceptions even a patronising attention. If then I am fortunate enough to persuade only a few of my readers that there may be some still living value in these dim and distant echoes of a long forgotten faith, I shall be quite content.

VIII.

THE MEANING OF GNOSIS IN THE HIGHER FORMS OF HELLENISTIC RELIGION.

UNTIL quite recently the study of gnosticism was treated solely as a department of heresiology or at best of early Church-history. The term has generally been taken to denote a wide-spread heretical movement, in very varied forms but of a characteristic tendency, solely within the borders of nascent and developing Christianity. Of late years, however, it has been shown along various converging lines of research,[1] that the notion of gnosis, in its essentials, was widely diffused prior to the rise of Christianism, mainly among the Hellenistic mystery-cults and mystic communities, or those forms of personal religion in which Oriental and Greek elements were blended. Movements of this nature, enshrining an inner gnosis, continued to exist parallel with and entirely independent of the growing Church of the first three centuries. Gnosticism, then, should no longer be regarded simply as a party-name within

[1] See especially Reitzenstein's *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (Leipzig, 1910), to which I am much indebted. By far the best work on the sources, or pre-Christian material, of the Christianised gnosis, from a religious-historical standpoint, is Bousset's *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (Göttingen, 1907), which is summarised in his article on 'Gnosticism' in the 11th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. For the influence of Oriental religions on Roman paganism, see Cumont's *Les Religions orientales dans le Paganisme romain* (2nd and revised ed., Paris, 1909).

the early Church. Gnosis is a far more widely spread religious phenomenon and should be treated as a characteristic element of the general history of religion. What has previously been called gnosticism is thus seen to be a department only, though an important department, of the history of the gnosis, and should be preferably referred to as the Christianised gnosis, if not the Christian gnosis, which latter term may be reserved for the views of a Clement of Alexandria or of an Origen. Gnosticism as a whole must be made to enter into the general history of religion, for even if we do not go further afield eastwards, as we might very well do, and if we do not pursue the subject beyond the first three centuries of our era, as again we might do, we can point to similar movements in the Egyptian, Phrygian, Jewish and Christian religions, and further back in Persian doctrines and in the Chaldæan or later Babylonian star-lore with its wealth of astral mythology and theology.

What then is gnosticism essentially, what is the most characteristic meaning of gnosis? Hitherto for the most part an arbitrary interpretation has been given to these terms, based at best on subjective judgments of value. It has been said: Gnosis means knowledge; therefore the gnostics are religio-philosophers at best. What has not suited this definition has been rejected as not pertinent to gnosticism. But the word 'gnosis' had early become a technical term, and its meaning must be established from the usage of the time. So far from meaning philosophy, in the sense in

which we now generally use the word, or even religio-philosophy, it connoted well-nigh the opposite of this, namely, to use Reitzenstein's definition:

"Immediate knowledge of God's mysteries received from direct intercourse with the deity—mysteries which must remain hidden from the natural man, a knowledge at the same time which exercises decided reaction on our relationship to God and also on our own nature or disposition."

However the sects and systems differ from each other, and they differ very widely, the general conception of the gnosis remains the same. It is fundamentally based on revelation or apocalyptic vision. This revelation, however, was essentially of a vital order rather than of a formal nature, for there was the greatest freedom of adaptation and interpretation of the formal symbolism. Thus we find that in characteristic gnosticism every pupil can bring ever new completions and transformations to the teachings of his master, that refined primitive folk-notions together with the most personal phantasies of vision permeate such teachings, and that Oriental mystery-beliefs and magical conceptions change clothes with Greek philosophy.

Before dealing more in detail with the meaning of gnosis in its higher forms outside the limits of Christendom, it may be of service to summarise what Liechtenhan[1] has to say of its meaning among its adherents within the Christian borders.

By gnosis, he tells us, we usually understand

[1] *Die Offenbarung in Gnosticismus* (Göttingen, 1901).

speculative knowledge, in the sense of a correct explanation of the world, in brief philosophy. It is true that the quest of the gnostics was also essentially an attempted explanation of the world-process; but that explanation was not an interpretation to be discovered by themselves simply; they did not seek for it by the use of their unaided intellect, but rather by means of authoritative revelations of a religious nature. They by no means set themselves as philosophers over against the pious; they too would be pious, religious. Only they seek their religion for the most part in combination with knowledge of the world-process, in the sense, as the Excerpts from Theodotus made by Clement of Alexandria phrase it, of "the gnosis who we were, and what we have become; where we were, and where we have been cast; whither we strive, and whence we are redeemed; what is generation, what regeneration" (p. 78).

It was, therefore, not only gnosis of the world but also gnosis of salvation which was the object of their quest, as indeed is abundantly manifest on all sides, both inside and outside Christianity.

They did not, continues Liechtenhan, want philosophy in addition to religion, or along-side of it; their only quest was religion in its perfection or consummation. This meant for them the employment of the spiritual mind on the highest objects which corresponded to it, its occupation with the spiritual kernel and source of reality, of actuality, with the pure, the eternal, the boundless. The characteristic of this religion was that its followers did not hope to enter into communion

with the higher by moral effort and faith in God only, but also by means of thought, knowing, imagination, feeling; that it was precisely in gnosis that they saw the highest function of religion.

But here we must be on our guard against interpreting thought as the purely ratiocinative intellect. For if the gnostics set themselves over against the world, not as philosophers, but in the two-fold character of being knowers and spiritual, we must ask ourselves whether it was not that, just as the business of the spiritual is gnosis, so the organ of this mode of knowing is precisely the spirit. If, moreover, the spirit itself, as a substance or essence of the immaterial world, is the organ for the comprehension of that world, then its characteristic function of gnosis is nothing else than the comprehension of the things of that suprasensible world. And if, finally, this invisible world is inaccessible to us of our natural normal selves, and can be disclosed to us only by revelation, then spiritual knowledge or gnosis has for its object nothing else but revelation. It thus follows that the possession of gnosis means the ability to receive and understand revelation. The true gnostic is one who knows the inner or hidden unveiled revelation and who also understands the outer or published veiled revelation. He is not one who has discovered the truth of himself by his own unaided reflection, but one to whom the disclosures of the inner world are known and become understandable.

So far in summary Liechtenhan on what he

considers, and rightly, the chief characteristic of the Christianised gnosis—namely revelation. It is true that gnosis for the most part equates with revelation; but the object of this revelation is not simply the inner, invisible, immaterial, supersensible or spiritual world. This, as we shall see, is the beginning and not the end of gnosis, whether Christianised or otherwise.

Prior to Christianity, as well as alongside the developing Church of the first three centuries, the idea of gnosis was, as has been already said, widespread; this chief characteristic of Oriental religion strongly influenced not only the Hellenistic religions directly and the Greek world indirectly, but also even the general thought of the West in the first centuries of the Roman empire. Writing of the influence of Oriental religions on Roman paganism, Cumont tells us:

"In a general way there was a persistent conviction that redemption and salvation depend on the revelation of certain truths, knowledge of the gods, of the world and of our own personality, and piety became gnosis."

But to discover what gnosis meant for the best of its adherents in the non-Christian world, we must turn to the writings of the ancient mystæ and let them speak for themselves. Gnosis is necessarily gnosis of something—but of what? The answer given both by the lofty Trismegistic literature and by the popular Magic Papyri, as indeed by the majority of our sources, is identical: it is finally gnosis of God.

Gnosis is not intellectual knowledge; it is

conceived of rather as power or virtue. In this connection it may be of interest to note that one of its synonyms is faith, as this term is used in Hellenistic theology. Thus, in the inscription of the Phrygian (?) mystēs Aberkios, we read (v. 12): "Faith was everywhere my guide and everywhere afforded nourishment"; just as the Isis mystēs Apuleius tells us that after his second initiation he was in 'full faith' and 'constant in the divine service and true religion' (xi. 28). The Magic Papyri personify Faith and speak of the 'Circle of Truth and Faith,' apparently to be equated with Plato's famous 'Plain of Truth,' which typifies the spiritual state, as indeed it is explained both by the Hermeticists and by Plotinus, in a sense that enables us to parallel it with Paul's Third Heaven or Paradise. According to the Trismegistic school, faith is spiritual understanding or insight; it is the virtue or power of the spiritual mind, which is said to find its rest in the 'fair faith' of gnosis. Indeed in the Christianised gnosis as well, prior to the Valentinian school, faith and gnosis seem to have been synonymous terms; subsequently, however, a sharp contrast was drawn between them owing to theological controversy.

If in the Trismegistic literature, or tradition of Thrice-greatest Hermes, gnosis is called the 'religion of the Mind,' Mind must be understood as the Divine Mind or Spirit; for gnosis is also spoken of in the same tradition as the 'single love of God,' the 'true philosophy' or 'love of wisdom,' which embraces also, it is true, the science of nature and of man, as in most forms of high

mysticism; but this wisdom is characterised also as 'worship,' though not in the sense of an external cult but as an inner devotion or praise-giving of the spirit. "Devotion is God-gnosis," for "the seeds of God, 'tis true, are few, but vast and fair and good,—virtue and self-control, devotion" (*Corpus Hermeticum*, ix. 4).

The Divine Mind is also called the Shepherd of Men, the Poimandrēs, and also Divine Love (*Perfect Sermon*, i.). To be knowers we must be lovers, must have "the single love, the love of loving-wisdom, which consists in gnosis of Divinity alone—the practice of perpetual contemplation and of holy piety" (*P.S.* xii.). The gnosis of the Mind is of a spiritual nature, for it is operated by the spiritual principle in man: "This is, my son, the gnosis of the Mind, vision of things divine; God-gnosis is it for the Mind is God's (*C.H.* iv. 6).

In the Hermetica, gnosis is the highest, or rather the synthesis, of the seven virtues or spiritual powers. The seven virtues are said to be: gnosis, joy, self-control, continence, righteousness, sharing-with-all and truth. Beyond these come the triad of Life, Light and the Good, making up the ten or 'perfect' number (*C.H.* xiii. 8, 9).

The 'end' or 'perfection' of the whole discipline was 'to know God,' who is pre-eminently He "who willeth to be known and is known by His own." Gnosis is not knowledge *about* anything, but direct contact or communion, knowledge *of*, in the sense of immediate acquaintance with deity. And so in the praise-giving which fitly

brings *The Treatise on Perfection* to a conclusion, we read:

"Grace unto Thee, O Highest, do we give, for by Thy grace have we received the light of gnosis. O Name ineffable, in substitute for which we in our worship use the appellation 'God,' and in our giving-thanks address as 'Father,' for Thou hast shown to all—to all of us both men and women all—a fatherly goodwill, affection, love, and as it were most sweet behaviour, by graciously bestowing on us mind, reason, gnosis—mind that we may know Thee, reason that we may estimate Thy worth, and gnosis that by re-cognition of Thee we may rejoice.

"Made whole by Thee we now rejoice that wholly Thou hast shown Thyself to us, rejoice that Thou, by vision of Thyself, hast made us gods while still embodied. To know Thy greatness is man's Godwards bliss. We have attained to gnosis of Thyself, O Light, light sensible to the intelligence alone; to gnosis of Thyself, O Life, life of all human life; to gnosis of Thyself, O fecund Womb of all [who are re-born]; to gnosis of Thyself, O Thou eternal Permanence of that fecundity inherent in the fatherhood's begetting.

"Wherefor in this our worship of Thee, no other guerdon of Thy goodness do we crave, save that Thou deign to keep us constant in the gnosis of Thyself, when Thou art prayed not to let us fall from this high life of sanctity."

It is here quite evident that gnosis is a gift, a grace of the spirit; so, though the gift itself is from God, the light of it could be handed on, for

spirit lives by giving. "Fill me with Thy power and with this grace of Thine, that I may give the light to those in ignorance" (*C.H.* i. 32); thus prays the suppliant for gnosis. It is also evident that mind is spiritual intuitive mind, the human counterpart of that Mind or Divine Monad in which we are to be dowsed or baptised, according to the doctrine of the treatise called *The Cup*, and that the whole conception of gnosis is due to religion and not to philosophy. Salvation by gnosis is the making whole, a spiritual completion or fulfilment, of the nature of *apotheōsis* or *theiōsis*, that is of transfiguration from the life of separation into the self-sufficient divine life.

In the Trismegistic literature, 'those who are in gnosis' are contrasted with the men of the world, by whom they are said to be "ridiculed, hated, and even put to death" (*C.H.* ix. 4). But in all such tribulations, the pious are sustained by their consciousness of the gnosis. Not only so, but to one who is really 'in gnosis':

"All things, though they be evil for the rest, are good to him; nay, every plot against him he translates unto the plane of gnosis, and he alone transmutes all evils into goods" (*C.H.* ix. 4).

This spiritual consciousness is said to be initiated by an illumination, generally set forth in terms of vision, but of a vital intelligible nature. The illuminator is the Logos, the Light of God, both for our Trismegistic Suppliants, and also for Philo's Therapeuts, or Suppliants as he also calls them; as, for instance, when we find the Alexandrian Jewish mystic and Platonist writing:

"'For the Lord is my Light and my Saviour,' as is sung in the hymns [*i.e.* the psalms]. He is not only light, but the archetype of every other light; nay, rather, more ancient and sublime than the archetypal model [of all lights], in that this latter is His Word (Logos). For the universal model is His all-full Word, the Light, while He Himself is like to nought of things created" (*De Som.* § 13).

Illumination is a fulfilling, a completion, a fulness (*plērōma*), as the above Philonean phrase, 'His all-full Word,' already suggests. And so the Pœmandrist exclaims:

"Thou hast, O Father, fulfilled us with the vision good and fairest; with such a spectacle that my mind's eye has well-nigh been awe-struck by it" (*C.H.* x. 4).

And therefore also in the treatise on rebirth the suppliant prays:

"And now do thou fill up the things that fall short in me" (*C.H.* xiii. 1).

The vision of the Good, in the mode of the Beauty of the Immortal Light, supervenes at first on rapture or entrancement or ecstasis from bodily sense. To 'drink deeply' of the vision, the earthly man must be utterly at rest.

"For thou shalt see it then when thou canst say no word concerning it. For the gnosis and the vision of the Good is holy silence and a giving-holiday to every sense. For neither can the one perceiving this perceive aught else, nor he who contemplates it have vision of aught else, or hearing of aught else, or stir his frame in any part at

all. Oblivious of his body's every sense and every motion, he stayeth still.

"Then bathing all his mind in light [the mystical baptism], it lights up his whole soul as well, and draws it upward through the body, and transmutes the whole of him into essential being. For 'tis impossible, my son, soul should be made divine by vision of the Beauty of the Good while in the body of a man; it must be separated from his body and transformed by being made divine" (*C.H.* x. 5, 6).[1]

According to the belief of the mystæ, gnosis was operated by means of an essential transformation or transmutation leading to a transfiguration. There was first of all a 'passing out through oneself,' a mystical death, and finally a rebirth into the nature of a spiritual being of a god. Indeed it is indubitable that in the inner circles of the mystæ the chief interest was in this apotheosis or transfiguration effected through gnosis or the vision of God. The human separated soul was believed to be transmuted into a spiritual or daimonic (in a good sense, as it was used in Hellenistic theology) or angelic nature or essence. Many passages could be quoted from a number of traditions in illustration of this capital doctrine, but considerations of space restrict us to a single citation from Philo, who in his *Life of Moses* writes (iii. 39):

"He (Moses) was about to sail for heaven and, abandoning the life of death, to be transformed to

[1] For the last sentence I have adopted Reitzenstein's emendations and completions, the received text being very corrupt.

life immortal; for he had been recalled by God the Father, who was changing him from being dyad, soul and body, into the nature of the monad that transcends all elements, restoring him a whole through wholes to mind most glorious like the sun."

The Pœmandrists, or Trismegistic *illuminati*, mean precisely the same thing when they tell us:

"It is by transmutation into daimones [*i.e.* spirits or angels] that souls possess the source of immortality, and thus they dance back to the choir of gods (or join the dancing of the choros of the gods) . . . and this is the most perfect glory of the soul" (*C.H.* xiii. 7).

All this was connected with the doctrine of the spiritual union or 'sacred marriage,' as it was termed, a subject that would require a paper to itself even to outline, and the transformation thus effected was regarded as the birth of a new creature. It was this substantial transmutation into a spiritual being that made gnosis possible and bestowed the power of divine vision, by means of the unitary sense of the intelligence. The new consciousness was conceived as the result of the impregnation of the inner self, so they phrased it, by the rays, emanations, effluxes or influences of the divine splendour. In an ethical sense, these seeds were, as we have seen, virtue, self-control, devotion, and in general the choir of the virtues.

The 'good end' of those whose feet were set on the path of the gnosis was, thus, 'to be made into gods' (*C.H.* i. 26). This 'end' or 'perfecting' is a technical mystery-term, the *locus classicus* of

which Reitzenstein finds already securely established in Plato's *Symposium* (210 E):

"He who has been instructed up to this point in the Mysteries of Love, by successive right contemplation of things beautiful, if he go to the very 'end' of this initiation, he shall have vision of a Beauty whose nature is a wonder—(namely Beauty absolute, simple and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all things). He who ascending from these under the influence of true Love begins to have vision of that Beauty, has almost reached the 'end'" (211 B).

The supreme end or perfection is union with the Good or with God. The beginning is the vision of the process of creation, of how the world comes into existence. Such visions may seem futile enough to modern minds steeped in physical research, for whom the cosmological notions of antiquity without exception are deemed the dreams of children. It should, however, be remembered that these mystæ believed that the substance of their very being was to be transmuted or 'cosmified'; and that accordingly it had to pass through stages of re-formation similar to the states through which they imagined the world-stuff or world-soul had passed in its formation or becoming, and that what was being operated in themselves was shown them in vision, as a projection on to the cosmic screen, as though it were a world-making. Their interest in cosmogony was, therefore, personal. According to their notions, there had to be an 'enformation according to substance,' before the

'enformation according to gnosis' could be effected. And so we find that in the first treatise of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, in the famous *Poimandrēs* or *Shepherd of Men* document, the demand of the initiand is:

"I would (1) learn about existant things and understand their nature [*i.e.* the origin and development of the world], and (2) know God" (*C.H.* i. 3).

And after the showing of the vision of the world-order and world-process, the Initiator, the Divine Mind, informs the contemplator:

"Thou hast been taught the nature of the universe, yea the grandest vision" (*ibid.* 27).

The world-vision, however, is, as we have already seen, not the end, but the beginning of the path of perfection; and naturally enough, for it has to do with beginnings and not with ends. This is seen most clearly in the so-called Mithra-liturgy, where the 'perfect body' has first to be 'enformed' out of the pure elements before the mystēs can ascend to the vision.

But if we talk of beginnings with regard to the universal process, we must not forget that they are only beginnings *for us*, and not of reality itself, which has no beginning or end. This is admirably brought out in the Trismegistic tradition as follows:

"For to the Good there is no other shore; it has no bounds; it is without an end; and for itself it is without beginning, too, though unto us it *seemeth* to have one—the gnosis.

"Therefore to it gnosis is no beginning; rather is it that gnosis doth afford *to us* the first beginning of *its being known*" (*C.H.* iv. 8, 9).

The world-vision is often referred to symbolically as the contemplation of the imagined typical Makranthrōpos or Cosmic Man, of whom man was thought to be essentially an image.

"If thou wouldst see Him through things that suffer death, both on the earth and in the deep, think of a man's being fashioned in the womb, my son, and strictly scrutinise the art of Him who fashioned him, and learn who fashioneth this fair and goodly image of the Man" (*C.H.* v. 6).

This doctrine of the beginning and end of gnosis is well brought out in the famous formula of the Christianised Naassene Document quoted by Hippolytus (*Ref.* v. 8):

"The beginning of Perfection is gnosis of Man, but gnosis of God is perfected Perfection."

Perfecting is the technical term for development in gnosis, the accomplished gnostic being known as the 'perfect.' The beginning of, or initiation into, this supra-consciousness was said to be given in a cosmic vision of the Heavenly Man, that is, not of the Supreme as absolute, but of the Universal Body; the end or consummation alone was union with Deity.

But the world-vision could only be enjoyed if the initiand had already so purified himself as to have as it were within him a nucleus of the pure elements to start or initiate the formation of his new 'perfect body,' as is so well shown in the so-called Mithra-liturgy. Thereafter only ensues the 'recognising of oneself as deathless' or immortal, according to the Trismegistic statement: "He who doth know himself returneth unto God."

In this connection it may be of interest to quote, from the concluding chapter of Hippolytus' great work against the gnostics, a neglected passage which shows how strongly the Church Father, in spite of his detestation of their general teachings, was influenced by this central doctrine of the gnosis. In his Epilogue, while setting forth what he terms the 'Doctrine of Truth' as contrasted with what he regards as the 'Doctrines of Error,' Hippolytus writes:

"And thou shalt have thy body deathless and free from all corruption together with thy soul . . .; thou shalt consort with God. . . . For now thou art become a god. . . . And all things whatsoe'er attend on God, these hath God promised to bestow on thee; for thou hast been made god, thou hast been born immortal. This is the 'Know Thyself'—knowing the One who hath made god of thee."

As to this immortal or spiritual body, the general belief of all the mystics was that in the human body there was so to say the potentiality of a cosmic body, a body of wholeness. Thus in one of the Trismegistic mystery-prayers we find the petition:

"The all in us—O Life, make thou it whole; O Light, enlighten it; O God, inspirit it" (*C.H.* xiii. 19).

This 'all' is the new immortal body, the body of the resurrection; Life, Light and the Good are the Divine Soul, Mind and Spirit which are to complete it in gnosis. The outpouring of the gnosis is to operate a change of being—enliven-

ment, illumination, inspiration. God, as Spirit, transmutes us into spirit; as Light, He glorifies us, irradiates us so that we become glorious; and, as Life, bestows upon us immortality. The consummation is to be a fulness or æonian being of spiritual immortal lustre.

Though it is true there is something of an absolute nature about this 'light of the gnosis,' for it is essentially spiritual and immediate, the gnosis is also frequently spoken of as a 'path,' a gradual 'ascent.' In the loftiest conceptions of it, however, this path is not a psychic 'heaven-journey'; it is rather a spiritual immediate way that opens out in every walk of life. There is no need to 'leave the world' to find it, except in the sense of casting out of ourselves the 'supreme vice' or 'chiefest evil,' which, as set over against the supreme virtue of gnosis, is called ignorance of God, in the sense of a positive force of wilful disregard of the divine. It is a question of 'repentance,' but in the spiritual sense of a turning back of the *whole* nature, that is of the whole will being set towards the Good.

"But to be able to know Good, to will, to hope, is a straight way, the Good's own path, both leading there and easy. If thou but sett'st thy foot thereon, 'twill meet thee everywhere, 'twill everywhere be seen, both where and when thou dost expect it not—waking, sleeping, sailing, journeying, by night, by day, speaking and saying naught. For there is naught that is not image of the Good" (*C.H.* xi. 21).

This way of return is symbolised indifferently

as a path, a voyage, or the ascent of a mountain. That the gnosis was essentially religious or spiritual and not intellectual, is already fully established, but it may be authoritatively confirmed by the following categorical statement with reference to the vision of the Beautiful and Good:

"There is one way alone that leadeth unto it —devotion joined with gnosis" (*C.H.* vi. 5).

The entrance on the pathway of the gnosis is called a 'going home'; it is, as we have seen, a return, a turning back from the world, a repentance of the whole nature:

"We must turn ourselves back into the old old way" (*C.H.* iv. 9).

Entering into gnosis is a waking from drunkenness and sleep, and nescience of God, from world-drunkenness to righteous soberness.

"For the evil [deluge] of unknowing is flooding all the land and bringing utter ruin on the soul boxed up within the body, preventing it from sailing for the harbours of salvation" (*C.H.* xii. 1).

The only salvation is gnosis—gnosis of God, for:

"God is not ignorant of man; nay rather is it that He knows him through and through, and that His will is that *He* [in His turn] should be well-known [by him]. This is the only means of safety for a man—his gnosis of his God. This is the Way up to the Mount (lit. Olympus). By this [ascent] alone is it that man's soul is made good" (*C.H.* x. 15).

The climbing of the mount is the ascent (*anodos, anabasis*) of the soul to the height of contemplation, or its plunging into its spiritual nature; it is the way above, as well as the return.

Looked at from the human standpoint, gnosis is the 'contest of devotion' (*C.H.* x. 19), the 'virtue of the soul' and also the 'end of science' (*C.H.* x. 9); he who 'knows himself' is said to be "good and pious and still while on the earth divine" (*C.H.* x. 9). Regarded, however, from the soteriological standpoint, or in regard to the theory of salvation, the path is not self-made, but made by the descent of the Saviour, in pre-Christian as well as in the Christianised forms of the gnosis. Thus in the conclusion of the over-written Naassene hymn based on Pagan and Oriental material, Jesus is made to say (Hipp. *Ref.* v. 10):

"Seals in my hands, I will descend; down through the universal æons will I make a way; all mysteries I will reveal and manifest the forms the gods display. Unto the secrets of the holy path I'll give the name of gnosis, and will hand them on."

The ascent of the mount is repeatedly mentioned, as it is throughout nearly the whole of mysticism, and must not be referred to the Moses-legend; it is purely Pagan. Thus Julian (*Orat.* vii.) says that Hermes as guide or mystagogue meets the mystes at the foot of the mount; while in the Magic Papyri (*Pap. Lug.* v.) we read: "I am he whom thou didst meet beneath the sacred mount," and in the Trismegistic treatise called *The Secret Sermon on the Mount*, the probationary path is called the 'wending up the mount' (*C.H.* xiii. 1), on the top of which the transfiguration and vision take place. In the same initiatory sermons elsewhere the neophyte is exhorted:

"Seek for a guide to lead thee to the gnosis'

gates, where shines clear light, pure of all darkness, where not a single soul is drunk, but all are sober, waked from their drunken sleep, with heart's eyes fixed on Him who willeth to be seen" (*C.H.* vii. 2).

This is brought out still more finely in the passage:

"But on the pious soul the Mind doth mount and guide it to the gnosis' light. And such a soul doth never tire in songs of praise to God and pouring blessings on all men, and doing good in word and deed to all, in imitation of its sire" (*C.H.* x. 21).

The knowing of God is thus a knowing or 'seeing' with the 'eyes of the heart'; such eyes are called 'spiritual,' 'blessed,' 'immortal.' The eyes of the body are not the organs of true vision, as the souls lament when first shut in body: "Windows are these—not eyes!" The body is the 'veil of nescience,' the 'surround of darkness,' the 'carapace of selfhood'; for:

"No ear can hear Him, nor can eye see Him, but only mind and heart" (*C.H.* vii. 2).

Gnostic knowing is the intuition of the true or spiritual mind, immediate apprehension or apperception of the living reality. Though generally referred to metaphorically as seeing, vision or contemplation, because sight is the keenest of the differentiated senses, it is rather immediate insight; indeed it is called the one sense, the simple sense, the unitary sense, the 'sense of the intelligence.' It is spiritual tact or contact, immediate becoming, a state beyond subject and object, just as Plotinus describes it, a single synthetic sense, for which he also uses the technical term tact or touch.

"Intuition alone sees the unmanifest, inasmuch as it is itself unmanifest. If thou art able [to perceive it], it will be manifest to thy mind's eyes. . . . Unstinted is the bounteous nature of the Lord; 'tis manifest through all the world. Thou canst know it—nay see it, take it in thy very hands, and gaze upon God's image" (*C.H.* v. 3).

Here the mind, or heart as it is elsewhere called, is the spiritual being or monad of the man, as with the Moslim Sūfīs and most of the high mystics; it is not the so-called brain-mind or even the ratiocinative intellect; its knowing or seeing is of an immediate nature. It is this which is the image of God in man, and it is by this that the image of God in the universe or the Beauty of Life is contemplated. This knowing is called the 'power of divine vision,' which is no seeing but a becoming, as for instance in one of the Hermetic Extracts preserved by John Stobæus (*Ek.* I. xxi. 9):

"He who doth not ignore these things, can know God in the accurate meaning of the term; nay, if one dare say so, can see Him by becoming the very thing he sees, and seeing thus becomes immortal."

Gnosis, moreover, bestows freedom, sovereignty, kingship. The kingdom of the gnosis is thus set over against the realm of fate or of the sensible world, and is therefore conceived of as the suprasensible or immaterial order, the world of spiritual freedom as contrasted with the mechanical world of cause and effect. Gnosis makes free; the spiritual mind is free, for:

"Lord of all things is Mind, the Soul [=Spirit]

of God; yea Lord of fate and law and all things else. Naught is impossible for it, neither to raise a human soul above the sway of fate, nor set beneath fate's sway a soul that has neglected it" (*C.H.* xii. 9).

And so Zosimos, the Pœmandrist and Alchemist,[1] at the end of the third century, quoting from Trismegistic writings that are no longer extant, tells us that Thrice-greatest Hermes calls natural men—*i.e.* the 'psychics,' as they were termed, or those who were as yet unable to contact the immaterial or spiritual consciously in themselves—the 'mindless,' and playthings or toys or processions of fate. Those, however, who have this spiritual mind active in them are called philosophers or wisdom-lovers; they are superior to fate and kings of themselves, because they know themselves in the gnostic way. So also in *The Perfect Sermon* (xii.) we are told that gnosis and philosophy, in the sense of love of wisdom, are one; for we read of "philosophy which doth consist alone in knowing the divinity—a vision oft renewed, the cult of sanctity."

It has been contended by some that gnosis was mainly magic, and its distinctive meaning was essentially knowledge of magical formulæ; and it is true that in some of the traditions we do find in the blend a wealth of such formulæ—*barbara nomina*, mystic sounds, vowel-permutations and combinations (perhaps sometimes to be regarded as a forgotten musical notation), the *detritus* of

[1] See Berthelot, *Les Alchemistes grecs*, pp. 229ff.

ancient, and therefore sacred, languages, and the rest. But this can certainly not be said of a number of the chief schools, and least of all of the Trismegistic tradition. Indeed, from the lost treatise *About the Inner Door*, Zosimos quotes Hermes as declaring:

"The spiritual man, the man who knows himself, should not make anything succeed through magic, not even if he think the thing is good; nor should he compel fate, but suffer it to take its natural course. He should move onward by the quest of his true self alone, and thus attaining unto gnosis of divinity, should gain the 'three' that has no name on earth, and let fate carry out its will on its own clay—that is upon the body. And if he understand it thus and order thus his life, he shall have vision of the Son of God becoming all things for the sake of saintly souls, in order that he may draw every soul out of the region of the fate into the realm where it is free of body."

The 'three' or 'triad' are, presumably, Light, Life and the Good, as we have seen above. The Son of God is the Mind, the Shepherd of Men, the Divine Guide unto the Light, who illuminates the mind of every soul and so bears it aloft, or makes it free of fate. As the attainment of gnosis connotes the idea of freedom and salvation, so also it suggests the notion of power, conquest and control. The possession of gnosis thus bestows 'authority,' a term interchangeable with 'power' in a gnostic sense.

A wealth of additional evidence could be brought forward, but enough has already been

given to show that the ground-idea of gnosis is transmutation into spiritual being, and this is fundamentally an Oriental religious idea, the antipodes of philosophy in its general modern meaning of the fabrication of an intellectual system. Gnosis is thus accompanied with vision and revelation in the sense that the above quotations should have by this time made clear. It would further be easy to show that these also are the general characteristics of the gnosis in the Christianised systems as well, but that would require a paper in itself. It is enough here to quote a single pronouncement from a little known fragment of a Valentinian apocalypse preserved by Epiphanius (xxxi. 5):

"Greeting from Mind that never weary grows to minds that nothing can make weary! Now will I wake in you again the memory of the mysteries above the heavens themselves, the mysteries to which no name can anyhow be given, of which no tongue can tell—the mysteries no rulership and no authority, no subject or mixed nature, have power to comprehend, but which have been made plain unto the understanding of the consciousness that stands above all change."

The above indications of the meaning of gnosis in the higher forms of Hellenistic mysticism may be not without interest to a more general public than the small number of those already acquainted with them. There is to-day a revival of interest in mystical subjects, and a number of books have recently been published dealing with religious experience of this nature. But for the most part

the enquiry is devoted almost exclusively to mediæval and later Christian mysticism. The wealth of Eastern mystical literature is practically ignored, while as to the Western traditions outside the Church, beyond a reference or so to Plotinus, we hear scarcely anything of the many mystical movements of the early days, some at least of which are of very great interest and importance.

IX.

THE 'BOOK OF THE HIDDEN MYSTERIES' BY HIEROTHEOS.

THE enormous influence on scholastic theology and mediæval mysticism of the writings which ascribe themselves to Dionysius the Areopagite, is too well known to need any elaboration. Indeed, it has been said that if these important documents had by any chance been subsequently lost, they could have been verbally recovered not only from the endless quotations of mediæval scholars in general, but even from the citations of a single one of them—Thomas Aquinas himself, the supreme systematiser of Latin theology.

In those days these precious books and letters were unquestionably accepted as documents of the first century, written by Dionysius, the hearer of Paul at Athens; their orthodoxy, genuineness and authenticity were unchallenged. Subsequently, however, criticism got to work on the subject. We now know that these writings emerge for history in the East in the opening years of the sixth century only, when they were first translated out of Greek into Syriac. The earliest dated external mention of them is in the acts of the Council of Constantinople in 533. Curiously enough their genuineness was then called into question by the orthodox, but solely because they had been appealed to by the Monophysite party.

The Monophysites held that the two Natures of Christ were so united, that although the 'One Christ' was partly Human and partly Divine, His two Natures became by their union only one Nature (*μόνη φύσις*). The Monophysites of course did not so name themselves; they called themselves the Orthodox. It is difficult nowadays for a modern mind to enter with enthusiasm into the subtleties of this controversy, which was waged with great bitterness for centuries. These first doubts, however, as to the genuineness of the Dionysian writings were speedily forgotten and gave place to general admiration; commentary succeeded commentary in Greek and Syriac, testifying to the great esteem in which they were held in the East. In the Western Church they were practically unknown till 827, when the Byzantine emperor Michael the Stammerer sent a copy to Louis the Pious, in the childhood of the scholastic period. They were immediately translated into Latin by Hilduin and John Scot Eriugena, and at once found favour on all sides. Other translations followed; commentaries on them were written by the greatest doctors and mystics, such as Hugo of St. Victor, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Dionysius the Carthusian. Buonaventura is saturated with their influence and so are also the great German mystics Eckhart and Tauler. In brief, on all hands they were accepted as authoritative, until the Renaissance period, when their genuineness was again called into question. Since then the battle has raged furiously with varied fortunes; and not only their authenticity but their

orthodoxy as well has been assailed by Protestant scholars, who regard all mysticism with suspicion.

Irrespective of many other difficulties, apologists have never been able to give any satisfactory explanation of the fact that not a single word is heard of these indubitably important treatises for at least five centuries from the time at which they claim for themselves to have been written. The best that can be said is that they were first circulated privately, or were 'withdrawn' documents, containing a secret tradition.

I have no intention of following the fortunes of this controversy; it is enough to note that as far as the question of authenticity goes, the claim is now practically abandoned on all hands, judging at least by the very carefully worded language of the most recent writer on the subject, in a work that bears the *imprimatur* of that Church whom the question more nearly concerns. "On the whole," says Mr. A. B. Sharpe, "it may be held that though the Dionysian authorship is not absolutely disproved, the balance of probability is strongly against it."[1] This is the language of ecclesiastical diplomacy; such an admission, we may be sure, would not be made in such a quarter, unless the case were hopeless. All Protestant and general encyclopædias and books of reference, however, without exception, now speak of the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius.

But criticism has gone still further; elaborate research has marshalled a mass of evidence in

[1] *Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value, with a Translation of the 'Mystical Theology' of Dionysius*, etc. (London, 1910), p. 199.

demonstration of the strong influence on the Dionysian doctrines, not only of Alexandrian theology but also in part of Neoplatonism, and that, too, of the peculiar development of later Platonic doctrine in the fifth century, including a passage that Proclus and Dionysius have textually in common, to state the similarity in its lowest terms. Another element of great interest is that the quite peculiar nomenclature of the Dionysiana for the officers and sacraments of the church, etc., is extraordinarily reminiscent of the technical terms of the ancient philosophical mystery-cults.[1]

It is not, however, to be supposed that under present conditions Roman Catholic scholarship will be anxious to enter this wider field of research except for the purpose of moderating extravagant criticism, and it is much, very much under the circumstances, for it to have to admit that "the authority of these writings lies not in their authenticity as the works of any particular writer." All that now can be said is that "they have been adopted by the Church as truly representative of certain phases of her doctrine, and as containing nothing contrary to it." For the Roman Church to-day their orthodoxy is guaranteed by "the accumulated authority of the long list of approved writers whose work has been based on them, or in accordance with them."[2]

These preliminary remarks may perhaps

[1] The best study of this nature with which I am acquainted, is that of Hugo Koch, '*Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen*' (*Forsch. z. christl. Litt.-u. Dogmengeschichte*, Mainz, 1900, Bd. i. Hft. 2, 3).

[2] Sharpe *op. cit.* p. 202.

enable the reader to estimate the interest and importance of any addition to our information that may tend to throw light, even indirectly, on the genesis of these documents, which were the chief source of mediæval mystical theology.

Who the writer of the famous treatises on Mystic Theology, on the Divine and Ecclesiastical Hierarchies and on Divine Names, and of the nine Letters, actually was, we shall perhaps never know. For scholars of the history of the evolution of dogma, however, he had a long line of predecessors; while for himself he emphatically acknowledges his special debt to one of them in his own peculiar way. Thus he proclaims as his master and teacher, next after Paul, a certain Hierotheos, of whom he speaks in the very highest terms as an illuminate. This Hierotheos, he tells us, had written books of the greatest value; indeed he refers to these writings as inspired Logia second only to the scriptures. Of these works he explicitly mentions two by title—namely a collection of ecstatic hymns and a book on the elements of theology, and from the latter he quotes textually. These quoted passages are evidently the product of an independent mind of high attainment and marked individuality. They cannot possibly be dismissed as inventions of the Dionysian writer himself; he is only too eager to praise them and to draw a marked distinction between them and his own work. The writings of Hierotheos, he says, are 'solid food' intended for mature minds, that is for the perfect, whereas his own compositions are in a subordinate category; they are milk

for babes, instruction for 'newly-initiated souls. "Therefore," he continues, "do I assign this teacher of perfect and mature intelligences unto those who are above the crowd, as second scriptures (lit. oracles) analogous to those divinely inspired."

This clearly suggests that the writings of Hierotheos were never in general circulation but were kept withdrawn among the 'perfect.' It further suggests that in all probability these writings contained what the general Church would have condemned as heretical. If, as has been supposed, the Dionysiana are the product of a school and not of an individual,[1] that school possessed a body of 'withdrawn' writings ascribed to Hierotheos from which it drew its chief inspiration.

Who then is this mysterious Hierotheos, the supposed hearer of Paul and the first bishop of Athens, of whom history knows nothing prior to the appearance of the Dionysian documents? Speculation has been rife, but of the few bearers of the name known to us none is in any way suitable. Hierotheos is, like Dionysius, in high probability a pseudonym.

Now of the two Books of Hierotheos referred to by Dionysius no further mention or trace is known in history. There is, however, both mention and trace of another work ascribed to Hierotheos. We know of a Book of Hierotheos which was said by some to have been forged by a certain Stephen Bar Sudaili. This Stephen was a Syrian mystic of Edessa, who flourished at the beginning of the

[1] See J. Langen, '*Die Schule des Hierotheos*' (*Rev. internat. de Théol.*, Berne, 1893, pp. 590-609; 1894, pp. 28-46).

sixth century, when he was bitterly attacked by an orthodox Bishop of Mabūg for his heretical opinions, the most obnoxious of which was that of the non-eternity of hell; in brief that all, including the very demons themselves, would ultimately be saved. This doctrine of universal salvation was by no means new, we are glad to say, but was in the line of tradition of Origenistic optimism and prior even to Origen himself; and as a matter of fact Stephen while he lived at Jerusalem was in an Origenistic monastery. Two centuries later on, this same Stephen is said by Kyriakos, Patriarch of Antioch (793-817), to have been 'probably' the writer of a certain Book of Hierotheos; while John Bishop of Dara, who was well acquainted with the Dionysian writings, makes the same accusation about the same date, on the ground that the book teaches that there is to be an end to condemnation.

I had, however, no idea that any work claiming to be by Hierotheos was actually in existence, until chance brought into my hands a copy of a monograph of 111 pages, by A. L. Frothingham, Jr., and printed by Brill, of Leyden, in 1886; it is entitled *Stephen Bar Sudaili and the Book of Hierotheos*. Beyond a bibliographical reference in Herzog, I have not been able to discover that any notice has been taken of this instructive study.

The special interest of Mr. Frothingham's essay is that among the Syriac treasures of the British Museum he found the unique MS. of a work ascribed to Hierotheos, together with an extensive commentary upon it by Theodosios, Jacobite (and presumably Monophysite) Patriarch of Antioch

(877-896). This Book of Hierotheos seems to have been jealously withheld from circulation, for Theodosios tell us that he and his friend Lazaros, Bishop of Kyros, had experienced the greatest difficulty in procuring a copy. They had searched for it high and low, desiring to take it as their guide, from what they had heard of it. Here, then, we have a high dignitary of the Syrian Church—who though of incomplete orthodoxy, as judged by the general Church, was yet by no means a scandalous heretic—holding the Book of Hierotheos in the highest veneration. Not only so, but three centuries later, Gregory Bar Hebræus, the Monophysite Patriarch of the thirteenth century, who in his earlier writings had repeated from Kyriakos the accusation that the Book of Hierotheos was a forgery by Stephen Bar Sudaili, is loud in its praise, when later on, and again after great difficulty, he obtained a copy of the Book itself. Curiously enough this very same thirteenth century MS. in the British Museum is the actual copy of the commentary of Theodosios that Gregory used for the purpose of making a compendium or rather a rehash of the Hierothean document, to which he now refers as 'the Book of the illustrious, wise and learned Hierotheos'—a 'great and wonderful' work. Gregory has evidently entirely abandoned the idea of its being a forgery by Stephen.

Nevertheless, Mr. Frothingham still maintains that it was. He bases his contention mainly on the similarity of some of the ideas in a book of Stephen's (which was bitterly attacked by his contemporary Mar Xenaias, Bishop of Mabūg, in a still

extant letter) to some of the ideas in the Book of Hierotheos. It is, however, quite evident from the quotations of the Bishop, who had the book of Bar Sudaili before him, that Stephen's book was *not* the Book of Hierotheos which is known to us. Moreover, the Bishop characterises Stephen's style as contemptible, while Mr. Frothingham himself admits that the style of the Book of Hierotheos is admirable. Further, if the Book of Hierotheos was a forgery by Stephen we should expect to find him attempting to authenticate it by incorporating the Dionysian quotations, or at least to find his forgery in some way dependent on the writings of Dionysius; but this is by no means the case. The Book of Hierotheos is the work of an original and independent mind. This even Mr. Frothingham himself has to admit when he writes:

"The intellectual position of the two minds is entirely different: Pseudo-Hierotheos is a simple monk whose thought is entirely distinct from any philosophical system, claiming direct vision, drawing his theories from his own consciousness [he professes to have more than once attained to the highest point of mystic union with the Good], and expressing them with great naïveté and freshness; it is the divine seer, and not the philosophic genius who speaks. On reading his book we feel it to be the genuine outpouring of a strongly-excited religious imagination, and the work of an original mind, but of no eclectic or imitator."

This, we may note, is precisely the characteristic of the writings of Hierotheos on which Dionysius insists. The above estimate, however,

has to be somewhat modified, for no seer can be really independent of his environment or of tradition. As we might expect, we find in the Book of Hierotheos reminiscences of ideas from the schools of Alexandria both Christian and Pagan, echoes of Gnosticism and of Babylonian and Persian conceptions of cosmology and soteriology; all, however, is "marshalled into a perfectly symmetrical and harmonious whole, in subordination to the ideal peculiar to Hierotheos himself."

Taking everything into consideration, then, we see no reason why this Book may not just as well be one of the Hierothean writings of the 'solid food' order, referred to by Dionysius, as a later forgery by Stephen Bar Sudaili. This of course leads us to expect in any case that its contents would be heretical; but they need not on that account be any less interesting, at any rate for those who prefer the flight of the mystic to the pedestrian gait of the systematisers, who would reduce all illumination to the dead level of common terms and stereotyped notions.

Though Mr. Frothingham promised us twenty-seven years ago a full translation of this interesting document, he has so far, unfortunately, not fulfilled his promise. We have, therefore, to be content with his version of a few only of the more salient passages, and for the rest with a summary which is by no means easy to follow. The work consists of five books, and the whole is entitled 'The Book of the Holy Hierotheos on the Hidden Mysteries of Divinity (lit. of the House of God).' The major part of it is a veritable epic of the soul setting

forth the mystical stages of the ascent of the mind or spirit to the Supreme, in a series of 'vivid pictures' of spiritual combat, of which we will now attempt to indicate the salient features; though, unfortunately, their vividness has already largely disappeared in Mr. Frothingham's summary.

They who desire to ascend must first purify their garments—both soul and body. For the mind to ascend, the body must be as if dead, and the purified soul absorbed in the mind; the ascending mind being guided by that good-nature by means of which alone it can attain to union with the Divine. Such a spiritual struggle arouses the fiercest antagonism of the opposing essences that lie in wait for the soul on the first stages of the ascent, the purgatorial realms of unseen nature, corresponding with the external sub-lunary spaces, where are the demons of the ways of the midst, as they are elsewhere called. But by the grace of the Divine goodness all these are vanquished and the mind is raised to the firmament, while the angelic hosts above it cry aloud: "Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and the king of glory shall enter." For they recognise that the victor in this fight is potentially or spiritually higher than themselves; the doctrine being that not even to the intelligence of angels are the wonderful mysteries of pure and holy minds, that is of spiritual men, revealed. The first stage of the ascent, then, is marked by that degree of purification of the lower nature which enables the aspirant while still alive in an earthly body to win his way through the purga-

torial realms of Hades, and their opposing and at the same time chastening hosts.

The next stage is that of spiritual rebirth, which occurs when the mind is made worthy to ascend beyond the firmament, regarded as a 'wall of separation' between the purified and the unpurified, between Hades and Heaven; the mind is become "as a new-born child that passes from darkness into light." This child has now to grow in stature. It enters the heavenly realms, the celestial states, of which there is a multitude. Through these, as it grows in stature and in purity, it continues to ascend. As it rises it becomes the purifier and sanctifier of the essences below it. The mode of its communion in these states is that of the mystical sacrament of the eucharist; it eats and is eaten, to use the graphic symbolism of the most primitive and elemental act of all; it is benefited and benefits in turn. It has communicated to it the mysteries of the orders of the essences through which it passes and communicates to them the perfection of its intelligence. This may seem, at first sight, a strange doctrine. It explains, however, the first greeting of the celestial essences; the idea is apparently that the purified ascending mind, precisely because it has been incarnated in the lower realms and has fought its way again above, is possessed of a treasure which is lacking to the celestial essences who have not descended. They recognise in it the sign manual of the supreme nature of the Good and assemble to adore it.

But Heaven is by no means the end. As in

the doctrine of so many other great schools of the mystic way, the joys of Heaven are an even greater hindrance to the attainment of perfection than the mingled joys and sorrows of earth-life. The regenerate or spiritual child or youth is allowed to taste the celestial joys; but as the mind grows in stature and reaches spiritual manhood, it has to approve itself by a mighty trial of suffering willingly borne. When then the ascending mind has passed through the heaven-stages, it draws nigh to the Great Boundary which separates Heaven from the mysteries beyond, that limit apparently which divides the finite from the infinite, or at any rate from the supercelestial spaces. Here for a time it rests from its labours to gain strength for the great trial, in that state which is called Distinction.

Beyond this lies the mystery of the Cross. If it would go further the mind must endure the great passion and suffer crucifixion; for unless the mind undergoes all that Christ suffered, it cannot be perfected. The purification of the superficial human nature is the preliminary to the stages of perfection which transcend the purely human stage, and connote the perfection of the very depths of that nature. But how is the mind to be crucified when it has already reached the height of celestial bliss? When the deep motion to union with Christ arises in the regenerate nature as though it were the sign of true spiritual manhood, then a mighty revolution or transformation occurs in the depths of the lover's being. They who crucify the mind are those very same celestial essences or angels

who previously adored it. These now, it would appear, desire to keep it with them, and because it would ascend still higher, hate it and oppress it. The crucifixion, however, is not of the mind only, it is of the whole human nature; for the mind is crucified in the midst and the soul and body crucified on the right and on the left. Thus only can the amazing subtlety of sin be vanquished and destroyed.

After the great passion, the mind is laid in the 'sepulchre' to rest for three days; what state the 'sepulchre' symbolises we are not told. But on the third day it rises from the dead, and unites to itself its now perfectly purified soul and body, which in the new life of the perfected human stage are now subjected entirely to it, and are no longer the causes of its subjection. The mind now becomes conscious of its being made like unto Christ—'our union.' But though the evil of soul and body has been purged, there are still elemental depths of the nature within that have not yet been vanquished, and which cannot possibly be vanquished till some degree of identification with Christ is reached. The very root of evil has now to be eradicated. The temptations of normal man are overcome, even the subtle temptations of the celestial joys have been transcended; but there are temptations that assail those greater than men, and roots of evil from which these superhuman deceptions arise. From this root of ignorance there grows up again and again an immense tree, whose branches cast darkness over divine souls and hide them from the perfect light. These branches

are cut down time and again, but like the heads of the hydra of fable they spring up ever anew in the depth of man's nature, until they are finally destroyed by fire—the Baptism of the Spirit. This is the stage of the dark night of the soul indeed.

It is now that the mind sees by the grace of Divine illumination that it must descend again to the very lowest regions to tear up the tree by its roots. The sorrowful return is begun; the newly awakened or illuminated mind descends into the depths of Sheol, to combat the subtlest and fiercest essences of evil and opposition in its own nature. It fights and fights on, but finally is slain, for of itself it cannot win the victory; the debt of death even of the mind itself must be paid, for as yet it is not one with the Divine Mind, the Christ. The mind then is slain; it is the final mystic death. But as it was crucified above and raised above; so now it is slain below and raised in the depth by Christ Himself, the Divine Mind, and so peacefully and swiftly makes its second ascent through all the regions and states.

Then and not till then is it deemed worthy of the divine Baptism of the Spirit. For now it becomes not only like to, but enters on the first stages of identification with Christ. It now receives the adoration of the heavenly hosts, apparently the supercelestial choir, and has the power of the divine High Priest bestowed upon it. No longer is it mind, it has entered the sonship consciously, though as yet it is not the Son who doeth all according to his will.

One would have imagined that here the seer

would have ceased and not dared to go further. By no means; he still continues with ultimate visions of the divine *drōmena*, now set forth as the mind conceives them as experiences of its own, while still short of identity with Christ, and then again as the triumphant deeds of Christ Himself. There are still further combats for the sonship itself; for beyond all personal salvation, there is universal salvation, and a mystery of utter simplicity in which all oppositions are finally to be resolved.

After consciously entering or being born into the Christ-state by the Baptism of the Spirit, the Mind, as High Priest, now communicates to the supercelestial host in the holy of holies the supreme eucharist, the spiritual type of every eucharistic feast. After this farewell banquet as it were, the Mind passes into that state where there is no longer vision, to enter on the stages of mystery of union with the Universal Essence itself. Though there is now no longer any 'vision,' for the conflict is really with principalities and powers and essences, the writer is still constrained to use symbols and personifications. The Universal Essence is first figured as the Tree of Life.

The Mind first becomes a divine catechumen, as it were, and is instructed by the High Priest of the Universal Essence in three mysterious doctrines —namely, the distinction of minds, the coming of the mind into the body, and the final end of the nature of all things. But instruction must be followed by realisation, the hearing of the doctrine is to be followed by the doing of the will. Though

the Mind is now in the supernal Paradise, it is not content but would be one even with the Tree of Life itself, a union which is said to be "the consummation of visions and the perfection of mysteries." But this desire, sublime as it is, necessitates still further combat. There now comes on the scene the Arch-Enemy himself, the adversary of the Christ, and transforms himself into the semblance of the Tree of Life, at the same time proclaiming: "I am the bread which came down from heaven; whoso eateth of me shall live for ever." The Mind thus deluded hastens to unite itself with the evil essence. But thereupon the Christ is fully revealed as the perfect Great Mind, burns down the false tree utterly and unites the Mind with the Tree of Life. Then apparently and not till then does the Mind become identical with the Christ.

But beyond the Tree of Life of the supernal Paradise is the Arch-Good. Even the unutterable rest and peace of union with the Tree of Life is not the end. Before the universal consummation can be reached the Mind must execute judgment on the adversaries of the Good. That which was effected for it above, it must now effect for itself below.

It then receives a mystic sword and takes its downward way once more, but now with joy in full consciousness that none can any longer oppose it. The Divine Mind enters Sheol, apparently the purgatorial realms, or Hades, overthrows the essences of the demons of those regions, who gather together to oppose it, and the minds

imprisoned therein are delivered, enlightened and forgiven; these regions moreover are illuminated and purified and made like to the celestial realms.

The Mind has now cast out of itself the whole adversative nature. But below the purgatorial realms lie the depths of perdition. The Mind accordingly descends into Hell, and thereon the minds there who are the slaves of perdition, amazed at its beauty, desire to be united with it and be saved. Just as previously Purgatory was transformed into Heaven, so now Hell is changed into Purgatory; perdition is transformed into purgatorial chastisement of an essential nature. For when it is said previously that the Mind destroys the purgatorial demons, it means that it destroys them as demons, and not in their essence.

When the Mind has executed judgment in Gehenna, it descends still further to the lowest Abyss, the seat of the Prince of Darkness, to destroy the very root of demonic evil, the that which had had the power to appear to it above as the Tree of Life itself. Here is the limit of the sensible universe depth-wards. When it is said that the Mind destroys these roots, we are told it signifies that it has reached a stage of universal purification, when its sole will is to be united with the Arch-Good alone.

But between it and this supreme consummation lies a mystery called the Insensible Essence. It has long reached a state where there is no vision or symbol of any kind. There is the simple sense of the Insensible—utter negation. This Essence possesses no name that is named on earth

or under the earth; it possesses nothing of nature. It is immaterial, unconscious, lifeless and insensible. Although the Mind would vanquish it, it will not submit, for it is the final essence of contumaciousness. Before this mystery of 'non-being' can be revealed, the final resurrection must take place; that is to say, apparently, the Mind whose purified nature first included as far as the purgatorial realms only, must now extend itself to the whole sensible universe below as well as above.

It therefore once more begins its ascent from the very ground of what it has thought to be non-being. Thereon begins the final ascension and resurrection. As it mounts it sees all those that it had slain lying dead before it. Together with its supreme yearning to become the Father, there arises in it an overwhelming love to have mercy on the slain and raise them from the dead. It would now extend its goodness to all, including the evil and 'make them all like unto itself.'

Thereon a wondrous voice is heard: "Come from the four winds, O Breath, and breathe upon those slain that they may live!" The resurrection is consummated; the slain are raised and draw nigh the Divine Mind, who greets them with the words: "Ye are my brethren: for truly are ye bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." They are thus united with Him that they may ascend with Him.

Then are all His limbs gathered together and He has united to Himself all minds in the universe. Thus made whole He contemplates the Essence Above, the Light of the Divine. Nay more, He

descends again below all essences, and there now sees that what He had before resurrection 'sensed' as the Insensible, is the very same one Essence of the Divine He had seen above, and so he cries aloud: "If I ascend up into heaven Thou art there, and if I descend to hell there also art Thou. And if I raise the wings of my understanding like those of the eagle, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me."

With this Universal Essence then at last is the Divine Mind united and embraces all in itself. It now no longer ascends or descends, for it is all-containing. Time has also now ceased for it. The Mind has even left the name of Christ, for it has transcended distinction, name and word. It can no longer be said: "Father, glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee," for all distinction of glorifier and glorified has passed away. Nay, more, Love the Spirit even, in any sense of distinction between lover and beloved, is transcended by perfect Minds. "For whom should they glorify, as the Good is in them and they in it? granting it correct to use the expressions *in it* and *in them*, for one is the nature and one the person of them and of it; granting it correct to use the terms *of them* and *of it*. Neither will they any longer be named heirs, for distinction is blotted out from them, and when there is no distinction, who can inherit from another? Come now therefore, and let us glorify with unutterable glory the Mind which no longer glorifies but is glorified."

This consummation, however, is by no means

a monotonous sameness of sheer unity. It is the prelude to the creation of a new and better universe. For now is the Mind united to the creative power of Divinity.

"It will thus begin, by a new and holy brooding, to create a new world, and will create a new man in its image, imageless, and according to its likeness likenessless. It will mete out heaven with its span, and will measure the dust of the earth with its measure; it will number the drops of the sea, and weigh the mountains in a scale. And who will speak of it, that cannot be spoken? or name it, that cannot be named? Let us, with the apostle, marvel at a mystery and say: Oh the depth and the riches, the wisdom and understanding, above the name of Divinity, of the Perfect Mind when perfected. For man cannot comprehend its judgments, and its ways are inscrutable. For who hath known its mind? or who hath been its counsellor?"

The writer of the Book of Hierotheos draws a distinction between union with Christ and commingling with the Arch-Good. The latter consummation Mr. Frothingham translates as 'absorption,' though he admits that he has no support for this rendering from the lexicons. Christ is then the name of 'our union'; but there is a state that transcends even this; to it no name can be given. It is, therefore, not very helpful to translate it by 'absorption,' for there is, as we have seen, a new creation; and mystically this renovation is an eternal process.

Thus though the writer tells us we should

know that all natures will finally blend with the Father; he adds that nothing will really perish or be destroyed. Nothing will perish or be destroyed, but all will return, be sanctified and united and blended. Then God will be all in all. Even Hell and its roots will pass away, and the damned and the slaves of perdition will return. All orders and distinctions known to us will cease. Even what we call Spirit will be no longer; even what we call Christ will cease as such; even what we call God will be no more as we think it. The Divine Universal Essence alone will remain. But all this is at best an accommodation to the weakness of human thought and feebleness of human speech. It means simply that the universe as we know it shall not only be transformed but recreated.

Such are the 'speculations' of the seer who wrote the Book of Hierotheos. Judged by the standard of Patristic theology they are of course heretical; they go far beyond any doctrine taught by the orthodox. It is, however, by no means improbable that documents of this nature were known to the writer of the Dionysian tractates, who explicitly admits that he adapted the teachings of Hierotheos to the capacity of newly-initiated souls. This means in plain words that in his own expositions he endeavoured to keep more within the limits of the ordinary and orthodox. In this he succeeded so well that, as we have seen, he has been accepted as orthodox by Latin theology. But the true charm of 'Dionysius' does not flow from his orthodoxy. That element to which he chiefly

owed his charm was to be found more nakedly in the writings of Hierotheos. We might even go further than this and say that, at present, we can see no insurmountable objection to considering 'The Book of the Hidden Mysteries of the House of God' precisely such a document as allows us a far more extended view into the mind of the more intimate circle of 'Hierotheos,' than does the unsatisfactory glimpse afforded by the few quotations from 'Hierotheos' in the Dionysian writings for the 'newly-initiated.'

X.

THE RISING PSYCHIC TIDE.

PERHAPS it would be more correct to speak of a wave and not of a tide, when endeavouring to estimate the present steadily increasing interest in the psychic and the psychical. But whatever it may be in the scale of general history, in comparison with the state of affairs, say, even sixty years ago, it seems to me to be almost a tide. Concentrated attention no doubt exaggerates, but the thing is with us in steadily increasing volume. Even if one has a good acquaintance with the spread of the various movements connected directly or indirectly with the psychical in one form or other, it gives no idea of the number even of organised bodies, societies, associations, and groups, that have sprung up like mushrooms from the ground, in well-nigh every country. It is indubitably very large; and as to the members of such bodies they must be estimated in millions. But even if we possessed statistics, they would give us no idea of the extent to which interest is spreading among the general public. I am using 'interest' to include every kind of attentive attitude. It may be an open-minded spirit of enquiry, it may be simple curiosity, or it may be any grade of belief, from soberest credence to wildest credulity.

I am also using the terms psychic and psychical in a more widely extended sense than some

may be inclined to allow them, though not in their common psychological meaning of mental. There is no accepted definition even among students of psychical research, and we may expand or narrow the meaning according to our proclivities and values. On the nether side the psychical is secular and materialistic enough in all conscience; it rises through all grades, and accompanies the inspiration of the artist and genius; it thus contacts the spiritual and brings us face to face with the enormously important study of the psychology of religious experience, in which it is of first importance to determine what are the psychical elements and what the spiritual. But, as is well known, spiritual, like all such general terms, is an equally indeterminate label with the psychical; spirit has been used for anything from breath to divinity itself. For some people accordingly the spiritual world is all that is not physical, while for others, spiritual transcends the physical, the psychic and the mental. I think it preferable to use spiritual in an ethico-religious sense, or for an immediacy that transcends 'vision' of any kind; spirit, I would believe, is independent of all 'planes' and 'states'; the 'powers' of the spirit are the choir of the virtues; it should transcend the duality of subject and object, as all the mystics have declared and as our most intuitive philosophers to-day contend. Thus, for instance, Eucken writes:

"Life in the individual must have roots deeper than the immediate psychical life; for psychical life cannot itself produce and make clear that which occurs in it, for this reason at least, that it

involves the antithesis of individual and environment, of subject and object, beyond which spiritual creation results."

So also Bergson, whose conception of the chief end of genuine philosophy is that it should introduce us into the spiritual life, by means of the spirit, by which he says he means "that faculty of seeing (or intuition) which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up somehow, by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge."

Spirit transcends subject and object, even as the true person transcends unity and multiplicity.

"I am then (we must adopt the language of the understanding, since only the understanding has language) a unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is one; but unity and multiplicity are only views of my personality taken by an understanding that directs its categories at me; I enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity that I find at the base of my own self. Such is my inner life, and such also is life in general."

I therefore prefer to call psychical much that is generally referred to in ordinary parlance as spiritual. If, however, as Sir William Barrett tells us in a recent volume on the subject, the study of human personality and the extent of human faculty form the main objects of psychical research, it is difficult to see where the limits of the psychical are to be set; for human personality can contact

the divine, and communion or union with divinity is the *summum bonum* of all the great religions. In any case, Sir William agrees that the spiritual is of another order, and the psychical but a stepping-stone to it at best.

In a general sense we may say the psychic can be contrasted with the spiritual because of the former's phenomenal nature; though invisible it is still seen, though inner it is still outer, though internal it is still external; it is also 'phenomenal' in a vulgar sense, for there is no doubt that it is the element of the marvellous in it that has been the chief cause of the great attraction it has ever possessed for mankind in general throughout the ages. To-day also attention to the soul and its mysteries has been re-aroused by *mira* if we are no longer to speak of *miracula*. Now, as ever, it is not the inmost things of the soul, but its outer marvels, that have amazed the public and challenged the scrutiny of science. It seems almost as though the exaggerated denial of materialism, scepticism and rationalism had to be startled with as exaggerated assertion from the other side. In any case attention to the psychic has been re-aroused by the abnormal, extranormal and supernormal phenomena, 'faculties,' and activities of human personality. It began with mesmerism a century or more ago, and every phase of the movement has been met, as is well known, by the most bitter hostility on the part of official science. In spite of denial and ridicule, however, the evidence as to mesmeric phenomena accumulated by degrees, and a vast field of research was opened

up, until under the name of hypnotism[1] it has become part and parcel of accepted scientific investigation. The chief interest of the medical faculty in mesmerism or hypnotism has been its use as a curative agency. Many think that the phenomena can all be explained by talking of suggestion; but suggestion is merely the name of a trigger that liberates forces of which we know nothing. To-day, outside medical circles, mental and spiritual healing, as it is called, and psychotherapeutics of every kind and description, are practised on an enormous scale and that, too, without putting the patient into an hypnotic state. All this falls within the domain of the psychical. Hypnotism has at the same time made us acquainted with a large number of extraordinary phenomena which were previously considered incredible, and has largely aided to build up a new science of psychiatry. Some of the earlier experimenters, however, discovered that there was a great deal more in it than has been since brought out by medical specialists. They discovered among other things 'lucidity' as it used to be called, now

[1] Dating from the mechanical means discovered by Braid in 1843 to induce mesmeric states. This line of research and theory was taken up and developed by the Paris School founded by Charcot, to which later on was opposed the school of Nancy under Liébault and Bernheim, who would explain everything by suggestion. Both schools scout utterly the idea of what used to be called animal magnetism or psychic force; but of late this theory has been revived on strictly scientific lines by Boirac, who contends that not only must *both* hypnotism *and* suggestion be taken into account, but *also*, in cases where both have been rigorously excluded, a force of some kind transmissible from operator to subject. See Emile Boirac, Recteur de l'Académie de Dijon, *La Psychologie inconnue: Introduction et Contribution à l'Étude des Sciences psychiques* (Paris, Alcan, 1908, 2nd ed., 1919).

better known as clairvoyance, and for some this re-opened the whole question of an 'other' world and the domain of the supernatural, as it used to be called in the old culture.

But what has done most to make this world-old subject once more an experimental question has been the rise and enormous spread of modern spiritualism or spiritism. Sometimes a precise date is given for its origin, and we are asked to trace the whole of this movement to what are called the 'Rochester knockings,' in the United States. But I remember many years ago reading records prior to that date of a seven years' 'controlling' of members of the Shaker communities by what purported to be the spirits of North American Indians. These religious communities took the whole matter very seriously, and endeavoured by their prayers to free these earth-bound souls, as they believed them to be, and it is said they succeeded in doing so. In any case the idea of communication with the dead once more began to present itself to many who had been taught, by science and the new culture, to reject such a possibility as a vain superstition. The practice began first of all generally by crude methods, such as rappings and table-turning; soon mediums and sensitives were discovered, or developed, who passed into trance and were controlled in various ways, and the whole complex of phenomena associated with modern spiritism speedily followed. An enormous mass of communications and 'teachings' of all kinds, purporting to come from the dead or from other intelligences in the unseen

world, has thus been poured forth. There has been of course much folly, unconscious mediumistic deception and self-deception, and with the advent of the paid medium and professional sensitive deliberate fraud and trickery of all kinds. But much of the phenomena has occurred in family circles or in small gatherings of intimate friends where the medium was one of themselves.

The phenomena of mesmerism and spiritism paved the way for a revival of interest in, and a psychological interpretation of, what are called the occult arts and sciences, and all those practices that had been shrouded in secrecy in the past; and therewith the idea of controlling instead of being controlled emerged. There followed a widespread endeavour to learn not only from the past what bore on the development of psychic powers, but also from the East what it still practised. Much of this has been gradually adapted and modernised and changed beyond recognition, and the ferment is still working powerfully. Though the preponderating interest has always been in the phenomena and in the powers, at the same time a more serious interest has developed in the deeper problems of religious experience, and in self-discipline and self-culture of a higher order.

It is impossible to give in a paragraph any idea of the enormous modern literature that now exists on all these subjects. Looking back some thirty years, when this literature was comparatively small in volume, it seems quite amazing that in so short a time so much could have been produced. Most of the literature confines itself to the present;

some of it attempts to revive the past or to adapt it to the present, and some of the highest inspiration of antiquity has thus been popularised. Taking it all together it is by far the most extraordinary literature of the times. It is, of course, largely popular; the unlearned have not waited for the scientists, scholars and specialists, to lead the way; some have taken from the works of the specialists what they could adapt for their own purposes; others have been led to study at first hand for themselves. At the same time among the learned, from a different point of view, the comparative study of religion, mythology, folklore, magic and all the rest of it has developed in a most remarkable manner. The difference is that when the people are deeply interested, when they believe, they try to practise; it becomes intensely personal for them, it is not a matter of purely intellectual interest.

Of course in all this there are abundant ignorance and error, and extravagance and self-deception of all kinds. How should it be otherwise? For the psychical is really more puzzling and misleading than the physical and intellectual; the personal factor cannot be eliminated; it enters into it in every phase, and therewith human nature in the raw. The human element with all its hopes and fears is there all the time; it cannot be suppressed. There are no mechanical contrivances of lifeless matter as in physical research: the instruments are living organisms.

But science has gradually been forced to turn its attention to the phenomena of spiritism as well

as to those of hypnotism; and men of the greatest distinction in physical research and other departments of methodical work have tested many of these psychical happenings. First of all there were a few pioneers who risked their reputations and faced the greatest ridicule and contempt in affirming that certain of these phenomena occurred. Then co-operative systematic work of an experimental and observational character was organised. Certain classes of phenomena were authenticated and analysed, and hypotheses put forward which are gradually influencing all but the most reactionary schools of psychology. And now, after thirty years, even with regard to the crucial question for so many, as to whether or not there is survival of bodily death, some of the most distinguished and experienced leaders in methodical psychical research, after the most rigid tests to eliminate fraud and self-deception, and after stretching the hypothesis of the ever-extending subliminal of the medium and sitters to the breaking point, are giving way in face of the evidence, and cautiously admitting that in some cases it is possible to find oneself in touch with some part of a surviving personality. What wonder, then, that ordinary untrained and unlettered men and women should have jumped to this conclusion from the start? Indeed, it must be confessed by those who have had experience of the better class of phenomena of this kind, that it looks as if it were probable; or, if not so, that we are dealing with a baffling power of simulation that is quite beyond the range of the cleverest actor.

It is sometimes asked by enquirers when they begin to be acquainted, at first hand, with these subjects, Why are not more people interested in them? Our contention, however, is that the interest is already very great, and that there is now less need of convincing people about the genuine occurrence of psychical phenomena, than of insisting on caution and sobriety in dealing with the subject. In the extended sense in which we use the word, we repeat, interest is no longer of the nature of a spasmodic wave; it is a rising tide. We meet with it on all sides and in the most unexpected places; psychism is the talk of the drawing-room and the scullery, of the palace and the cottage. There is no class of life, no grade of intelligence, that this rising tide has not moistened to some extent.

Philosophers and students of history tell us that there is no exact parallel with the present state of unrest and uncertainty and the rejection of traditional beliefs in any epoch in the past. But if we might, for the sake of a rough comparison, conjure up a picture from the past, then, turning one's eyes in certain directions in the London of to-day, we might almost fancy ourselves back in the Rome or Alexandria of nineteen hundred years ago. Many of the beliefs and practices that dogmatic rationalism, and for the matter of that the whole tendency of modern culture, has hoped to banish for good and all to the limbo of superstition, are back again; and with them a host of subtler beliefs, some of which seek weapons of defence in the latest discoveries and speculations

of borderland science. In many directions we may see, if we look for them—and we may even have the strident indications of them forced upon us by frequent sandwich men in the most fashionable thoroughfares[1]—revivals of divination, seers and soothsayers and prophets, pythonesses, sibyls and prophetesses, tellers of dreams and of omens, mantics of every description and by every sort of contrivance; astrologists and even alchemists; professors of magical arts and ceremonies; cosmologists and revelationists; necromancy and communion with spirits; enthusiasm, trance and ecstasis. And with all this, as of old, keeping pace with religious unrest and loss of faith in traditional beliefs and blank denial of anything beyond the range of the physical, there is what looks very much like the bringing in of new gods and new saviours and new creeds, the blending of cults and syncretism of religions; societies and associations, open and secret, for propagating or imparting new doctrines, new at any rate to their adherents though mostly old enough.

This is a very rough sketch, of course; the outlines are over-emphasised and the colours are crudely used to bring out the comparison. But there was at the same time, also, as we know, in the past a genuine spiritual life stirring in the depths which manifested itself in many modes and lives, and finally out of a number of competitors for popular favour there emerged for the West a victorious form of religion, a new world-faith. I

[1] This was written before the recent stringent police measures were taken.

believe, and many believe, that there is also to-day a genuine spiritual life stirring in the depths under all the stress and struggle and ferment, psychic and otherwise. But the present age can be compared only very imperfectly with any period in the past. The past has never had to deal with a real world-problem or with such widespread profound uncertainty. The Græco-Roman world was a circumscribed area. Our present world is the whole globe, and our present age is of necessity faced with problems that embrace the whole of humanity and its recorded history. What we need to-day, I believe, is not a new religion in any separate sense, but a better understanding of religion and all it stands for. We need to be suffused with a new spirit of genuine sympathy, a spirit that will enable us to recognise and value the essential truths in the great world-faiths as all of one origin; though indeed that is not a new idea—it was attempted also in the past among the Hellenistic mystery-religions. Mystery, however, and even high mysticism are now out of fashion and looked upon with the gravest suspicion. We need a creative spirit that will replace all this with new forms of immediate self-realisation. What we want above all is that wisdom of the spirit that will enable us to bring about a genuine reconciliation between science and religion. They have been divorced too long, though perhaps it is for a beneficent purpose that the future alone will be able rightly to appreciate. Is it possible that this recrudescence of interest in the psychical may, if purified and rightly used, supply us with the means of at least

approaching the ground on which science and religion can not only meet in friendship but join hands in whole-hearted co-operation? Art and philosophy must also come powerfully to the rescue and aid in the reconciliation. But in this age of technical and industrial development, we are suffering chiefly for want of a vital science to complement the science of physical things; we have crying need of some spiritual mode of knowledge or assurance that can satisfy the whole man; it is unnatural to keep our religion in one compartment and our science in another. It is the mark of an artificial age, an age divorced from living nature, though one of ever-increasing mastery over the inorganic; but with our enslaving of physical forces comes the ever-increasing slavery of ourselves by the physical and material; our wants are steadily increasing.

The marvellous results that have attended modern methods of physical research are absolutely without parallel in the history of the world. In relation to the physical achievements of the past they can be represented diagrammatically by no curve of development. Compared with the painfully slow rate of progress up to a century or two ago, the present leap forward must be represented by a straight line not far out of the perpendicular. Physical research has in its own domain broken down the barriers of physical ignorance on all sides. But magnificent as are the triumphs of the intellect in dealing with the material, they are the result of a one-sided effort and cannot satisfy man as a whole. This material progress must be comple-

mented with equal success in the inward way. It seems very much as though we have lost as much as we have gained, and are at last beginning to be conscious of it. The present state of affairs reminds me somewhat of the old mystery-saying which two thousand years ago declared: "Ye have eaten dead things and made living ones; what will ye make if ye eat living things?"

Before the rise of modern science, in the days of the Renaissance, there were those who attempted to cover the whole field of the arts and sciences, encyclopædic men, students of books for the most part; but to-day it is utterly impossible to do so. It is an age of specialisation, and even the specialist is unable to keep up with the whole of the work done in his own subject. No intellect can cover the whole field of knowledge of this kind; there is need of some complementary function; some synthetic means of apprehending.

The natural organiser and orderer is life. By entering into life perchance we might learn somewhat of its secret operations. Does man possess the means whereby he can come into immediate touch with life so that he can learn to know its nature, not as the intellect thinks and knows matter, but in some way appropriate to vital knowledge? That there is such a possibility in man, has always been maintained by the illuminate and by sharers in certain modes of immediate spiritual experience. But leaving on one side what the best of these have declared and the sublime subject of the possibility of communion, not only with life, but also with the source of life, the

theme and end of the highest religion, as beyond the pale of present-day science, we have all been recently struck by Bergson's brilliant advocacy within the pale of a more immediate means of knowing life. What is this means? It must, he contends, be of the nature of a divining sympathy —a purified and transmuted instinct, as we shall see at length when dealing with the philosopher's intuitionism.

Now sympathy, instinct and intuition are of the greatest interest to students of that extended sensitivity which plays so large a part in the psychical. Intuition for Bergson, however, does not supersede intelligence for practical scientific purposes; it complements it.

"Intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it. On the one hand, it will utilise the mechanism of intelligence itself to show how intellectual moulds cease to be strictly applicable; and on the other hand, by its own work it will suggest to us the vague feeling, if nothing more, of what must take the place of intellectual moulds. Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognise that life does not quite go into the category of the many nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give sufficient interpretation of the vital process. Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly

continued creation. But, though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached."

This statement should especially be noted by those who speak of intuition as though it were disdainful of intelligence and could dispense with it. But the most remarkable fact is that we have here a modern thinker who has a profound grasp of science and philosophy, telling us that consciousness can install itself in life, and that unless it does so and returns to lend its aid to the intellect, our theory of knowledge remains "involved in inextricable difficulties, creating phantoms of ideas to which there cling phantoms of problems."

As far as I am aware the philosopher of creative evolution has nowhere explained how the "intellect can turn inwards on itself and awaken the potentialities of intuition which slumber within it." But many have told us that the way to intuition lies in that direction—the turning inward of the mind on itself, the stilling of the mind, the banishing of phantasy and the bringing to rest of the operations of the discursive reason. This is no negative quietism nor is it a blankness and a passing into other regions of subtler phantasy or even of the veridical invisible, but a very positive state of intense attention, followed by vital union. It is the cultivation of a divining sympathy for vital processes, not of an extended consciousness of things.

I do not know whether I have caught Bergson's meaning correctly; but I believe myself that the

inner living realities by their very nature remain hidden to what I would call the externalising intellect in every plane, phase or state of the formal side of things, no matter how many of these there may be in the 'other' world. Intelligence for form must be complemented with immediate apprehension of life. It is not a question of inner sight, but rather of insight.

But intelligence or intellect is not mind itself, it has, according to Bergson's theory, been cut out of the latter by a process resembling that which has generated matter. On the contrary,

"Intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itself. . . . We recognise the unity of the spiritual life only when we place ourselves in intuition in order to go from intuition to the intellect, for from the intellect we shall never pass to intuition."

Now, as William James says, in all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by reference to the most distant ends, has been held to possess the highest intelligence; and by 'most distant' is meant of course wide-reaching and deep-going; and this should mean already the dawning of the power of the immediate intuition of the purpose of life. The more remote is the end in this sense, the more moral becomes the determination. Thus for the highly developed intelligence the good of the individual is to be found in such activities as favour the common welfare. The individual is inextricably bound up with the whole; his good is its good, and its good is his good. The most practically moral faith thus seems to me to require the belief that

under the guidance of divine providence the soul of humanity is working towards an organisation and harmonisation of its individual units that will enable it to reach a self-consciousness of its own proper order, and that this higher consciousness can gradually be shared in by the individual in proportion as he subordinates his interests to those of the whole.

Within this high over-belief in the divine origin, guidance and end of man, there is reasonable room for the notion that the soul of humanity as a whole is potential in the individual, and that the actualising of this potentiality in the perfected person is the end towards which the ever-changing individuality, in seemingly seeking its own ends, is unconsciously striving under the impulse of the inworking of that common soul of humanity. Consciousness of this purpose and process would seem to depend fundamentally upon the development of the power of sympathy, whereby the individual comes into ever greater awareness of the life in nature, in humanity, and in himself. Sympathy in this humane sense connotes harmlessness, well-wishing and good-will to all that live. But sympathy is also of another order, for in the individual man there is as it were a recapitulation of all the characteristics of the lower orders of sentient existence. His body is possessed of a sympathetic system, and it is largely with phenomena of an automatic, spontaneous and instinctual nature, that we have to deal in preliminary psychical investigation. But such extension of sense and action requires far greater discipline and con-

trol than does the normal field, if man is to maintain the equilibrium and poise of his whole nature, without which the individual cannot become the conscious vehicle of that higher order of spiritual energy which works deliberately for the good of the whole of humanity. This spiritual energy may be said not only to sum up the experience of humanity but also to be provident of its future needs.

Man is driven by this spiritual impulsion to seek the means of satisfying needs of his nature that are totally unknown to the animal. He must perforce strive for all those things which constitute civilisation and culture, for scientific and artistic, for social, moral and religious ends, for the satisfaction of instincts, sentiments and ideals that do not concern his purely material and secular existence. Though he may not be able to explain the nature of these high aspirations that stir his deeper nature, he is perpetually driven to seek satisfaction for them by a purpose that leaves him with a feeling of loss short of utmost self-realisation. The nearest approach to legitimate satisfaction for the individual in this ceaseless struggle is perhaps to be found in a consciousness of harmonious development in his whole nature. When through moral training and self-discipline, thought, feeling and action co-operate, we experience a sense of being in harmony with the purpose of the whole of our individual life, or with the purpose of things manifesting through us as a moral personality. This purified and balanced state seems to be the one condition under which the individual can without

harm to others or himself wield extended powers of sense and activity. But this is an ideal state of things, and we are far from it. Creative life does not seem to be much interested in avoiding risks. Extension of the field of sense and the rest, and invasions and uprushes of a psychical nature, do not wait upon the development of moral character; they occur at all stages of human growth.

If then the psychical is not the spiritual, it is also as we have seen not the intellectual. Indeed ordinary psychical capacity is notoriously unaccompanied with intellectual ability. But meanings and values in the psychical are vastly more difficult to find, even for the most highly trained intellect, than they are in the study of the physical. The present invasion of the psychical thus affords the developed intelligence, which has so successfully dealt with the physical from a material point of view, an admirable opportunity for further development, and for a deep-going rectification of the inner senses as well as the outer, by purging them from the operations of the phantasy, and further freeing them from the power of fascination of subtler sense-impressions, thus arriving at a truer meaning and more correct evaluation of the phenomena of invisible nature. It is a very difficult undertaking indeed, for we have first of all to invade the border-realm of the mythic old man of the sea, ancient Proteus, who perpetually changes his form to prevent capture; it is only when he is held securely by the illuminated intelligence and purified instinct that he reveals his secret. The dissolving-view kaleidoscopic dæmon must first be

exorcised before we can go further. But beyond that is the fascination of subtle sense-experience in supernormal states. We have had enough of dressing up the living things of unseen nature in the cast-off clothes of physical representations. This critical work is beginning and the way is being prepared for a further advance, and therewith for a further revision of things of greater moment.

Meantime popular psychism is intensifying many undesirable elements in human nature, and values are at a discount. Psychic sensitivity is frequently regarded as a sign of spiritual development; psychic experience is looked upon by many as something desirable in itself; indeed all the extravagances of the past are repeated as though the history of their disastrous results had never been written. Not to speak of the patent dangers of mediumship, of the risk of insanity, obsession and physical and moral degradation, there is much else that is very unhealthy. The idea of the adept and initiate in secret knowledge, the idea of the divine man or woman, of the god-inspired, or at any rate of the human with superhuman powers, is in the air. No claims are too egregious to command acceptance by a following of some sort or other, and sometimes by an adhesion of thousands. Among people psychically suggestionable it is enough to assert and to continue to assert to obtain wide credence; skilful or even the clumsiest modes of self-advertisement are sufficient for the purpose. Adulation and idolatry are lavished by the impressionable on psychics as impressionable

as themselves; lo here and lo there! is heard on all sides.

But in spite of all this extravagance the psychical on its disciplined side does indubitably point to an extension of effective human personality, and I believe that the rising tide of interest in it is the forerunner of a new age of enquiry. It is to the spiritual, however, and not to the psychical, that we must look for salvation; it has always been so taught by the greatest of mankind, the founders of the world-faiths. But faith may be transformed to knowledge of a spiritual order. Towards this high end psychical science may be made to yield something of value; but we must surely agree with Sir William Barrett in his recent volume already referred to, when he writes:

"Psychical research, though it may strengthen the foundations, cannot take the place of religion, using in its widest sense that much-abused word. For, after all, it deals with the *external*, though it be in an unseen world; and its chief value lies in the fulfilment of its work, whereby it reveals to us the inadequacy of the external, either here or hereafter, to satisfy the life of the soul. The psychical order is not the spiritual order, but a stepping-stone in the ascent of the soul to its own self-apprehension, its conscious sharing in the eternal divine life."

XI.

VAIHINGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE 'AS IF.'

THE dominant philosophical thought of India is based, as is well known, on the conviction that there is but one absolute reality and all else is fiction (*māyā*): 'Brahman is true, the world false.' The purpose of the present paper is to consider a philosophy[1] which adopts as standpoint precisely the opposite view and contends that the world of sense alone is real, all else is fiction. The author of this radical criticism of human knowledge is the veteran Professor Hans Vaihinger of Halle, perhaps the profoundest 'knower' of Kant in Germany,[2] who however goes far beyond Kant in his critique of our means of understanding and perhaps even beyond Nietzsche in his merciless analysis of our ideals and ethical motives. So drastic is the treatment he applies to what are generally considered the

[1] *Die Philosophie des Als Ob: System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus. Mit Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche.* Herausgegeben von H. Vaihinger. Berlin (Reuther und Reichard). Preis 18m.; pp. xxxv.+804. Part I (pp. 1-327) deals with the general conception and fundamental principles of fiction; Part II. (pp. 328-612) gives special and historical instances and illustrations; Part III. (pp.613-790) for the most part brings Kant and Nietzsche into court as philosophers of the As If. The present paper deals with Part I. only, and the references are to the pages from which paragraphs are summarised or salient phrases selected.

[2] Founder of the Kantgesellschaft, editor of the *Kantstudien*, and author of a voluminous commentary on Kant's philosophy in two volumes.

most fundamental truths of science, philosophy and religion, that though the MS. of his book was practically completed some thirty-five years ago, he did not venture to give it publicity before 1911, when he presented it to the International Congress of Philosophy at Bologna. Had the treatise been published when it was written, there is little doubt that it would have caused in the philosophical circles of the day something very much like what the Americans call a 'brain-storm'; but a *blasé* age like our own that is familiar with pragmatism and radical empiricism, that has survived the wild castigations of a Nietzsche in the domain of morals and is popularly pleased rather than otherwise with a Bergson's pillorying of the intellect on a charge of false pretences to the power of comprehending life, is incapable of such excitement.

We are now asked to believe that such fundamentals as the atoms of physics, the differentials of mathematics, the general ideas of philosophy and the dogmas of religion are recognised to-day by radical positive thinkers to be all, without exception, united by one common tie—namely the intuition of the necessity for *conscious fictions* as the indispensable foundation of our scientific research, æsthetic enjoyment and practical ethical behaviour (xv). The next step in advance, we are assured, depends upon a calm *recognition* that the reification of concepts, as Stallo called it half a century ago, *i.e.* the treating of ideas as things, is purely fictitious. In dealing with life, in behaviour, we over-esteem the means and treat it as the end; hence arise passions, and errors, and—ideals!

Equally in our science we bring forward concepts as of objective validity, as ends in themselves, we reify our ideas; hence arise theoretical passions and errors and the inversion of values.

Accordingly, the chief contention of this philosophy is that, though in the theoretical, practical and religious spheres, we progressively arrive at what is right, we do so on a basis and with the help of what is erroneous or clearly wrong (viii). The main problem to be discussed, therefore, is: How in spite of consciously false ideas we nevertheless arrive at true results (vii); how is it possible that although in thinking we calculate with a falsified reality, the practical result still can prove itself to be correct (289)?

There are many strange names to be found in the baptismal registers of philosophy, but 'as-if-ism' must be admitted to be distinctly original. But why has Vaihinger selected such a cognomen for his mental offspring? His allegation that all fictions are ultimately to be referred to the clear conception, or apperception, of comparison, he contends, is very precisely expressed in the linguistic form *as if*. For what lies at bottom of the combination of the particles *as if*? Evidently in the first place a comparison; *as if* are adverbs of comparison. For a simple analogy or trope, *i.e.* for an imaginary illustration or illustrative fiction, *as* alone would suffice; but for genuine fictions, *as* must be supplemented by *if*, in which latter term lies the supposition of a still further qualification or condition. In the combination *as if*, therefore, is to be found the whole thought-process of fictions.

Thus, as examples: *if* there really were infinitesimals, then the curved line could be treated *as* composed of them; *if* there were atoms, then matter could be treated *as* made up of them; *if* egoism were the only motive of human conduct, then social relationships could be deduced *as* from it alone (161).

We are not, however, to be plunged into the abyss of scepticism because our fictions do not actually equate with reality. For though Vaihinger thus contends that our whole outfit of ideas consists of fictions, they are not only efficient fictions, but even indispensable instruments for working on reality (xv). Indeed an intimate acquaintance with present-day revolutionary (in a good sense) movements in the domains of mathematics, logic, epistemology, law and practical philosophy, shows that everywhere one and the same principle emerges—namely, that not only does thought always employ fictions, or invented methods and concepts, but also that all action and performance rest on such. Thus the whole system of the *as if* philosophy is intended to prove that such fictions are not only permissible, but indispensable; for without them not only are we unable to think even in the most elementary fashion, but also all our highest and profoundest thinking rests upon them (133). Nay, further, our whole higher life reposes on fictions, and a pure ethic can be built only on a ground of recognition of its fictitious thought-foundation (142). For fictions have no end in themselves; they are only means to an end, adaptations for the purpose of practical action (174).

Genuine science, therefore, has two tasks before it: (i.) to establish securely the actual successions and co-existences in the sense-flux; (ii.) to make the web of concepts which we weave round reality, ever tighter and more adequate, so as to increase its practical utility (97). Research into the mechanical processes of thought, therefore, is the aim of logical science; but it is only psychology that can in last analysis explain these processes (183). The endeavour of science should thus be directed to making the world of ideas an ever more useful instrument of computation for action; still it must never be forgotten that the ever more perfect world of ideas which results from this endeavour, and therewith the high ideas which we usually call truths, are in final analysis but the most suitable and fruitful complex of errors, from which we from time to time select that mode of conception which most quickly, neatly and certainly, and with the minimum stock of irrational elements in it, makes calculation and action possible. What we call truth is thus not reality, but the most suitable degree of error for effecting practical purposes (193). It is then not true science, Vaihinger protests, that is aimed at by this critique, but only the dogmatic playing with concepts as if they were reals. Though these fictions are not reals, yet they have positive worth; they are scientifically permissible inventions, artifices, devices, contrivances, dodges (257).

The natural designation of such a philosophy should apparently be fictionism, but its author prefers to call his mental offspring idealistic posi-

tivism in the sub-title, in mitigation somewhat of its *nom de guerre* of the philosophy of the 'as if.' The choice of this distinctive expression is determined by the claim of the system to be a synthesising knowledge, in which the two objects it aims at—namely, facts and ideals—equally arrive at validity (xv); Vaihinger further claims that precisely because it unites in itself ideals and facts, it has the future in its hands (xvi). At first, he tells us, he hesitated as to whether he should not sail under the flag of pragmatism, for his valuation of conceptual truths is practically pragmatic, in that what is necessarily thought of is not immediately dictated by the actuality of the real, but is only what is best adapted for the purpose of effective action (193). But pragmatism could by no means afford a cloak ample enough to cover his sweeping generalisation of the whole world of ideas as at best a complex of serviceable fictions. This point of view is rather that of a positive criticism, or a critical positivism, which must, he believes, in the future replace all forms of dogmatic idealism and uncritical dogmatism. The main danger that Vaihinger has to avoid falling into is what he himself calls the logical pessimism of radical scepticism, and with it the utter despair of ever reaching the truth. He would then avoid not only the scylla of such scepticism, but also the equally dangerous charybdis of the logical optimism of dogmatism, which creates an ideal world of its own by simply eliminating or turning its back in thought on the actual difficulties of objective reality. Thus he would endeavour to steer a middle course in his

critical bark (293). For all philosophy that operates unrestrainedly, *i.e.* uncritically, with the categories, or general ideas of thought, or with any one of them, is, he holds, dogmatism; scepticism, again, by the discovery that nothing real is arrived at by such means, falls into universal doubt. Criticism, on the contrary, sees through the devices of the categories, and treats them as simple analogies, as fictions invented by thought to co-ordinate the mass of sensations; it, therefore, does not create for itself the illusion that such conceptions explain reality, but regards these devices solely as necessary means for dealing with actuality (316, 317). Thus, he claims, it is true criticism or logical positivism alone that advances free of all prejudices to the dispassionate investigation of the instrument of thought (295).

What, then, is this instrument of thought, the 'soul,' the 'psyche'? We will not apply Vaihinger's critique to his own terms, or the serpent would swallow itself (for all his terms are of course fictions), but be content to use them. The soul, he says, is an organic enforming or plastic force (2). It not only receives sense-impressions, but it appropriates them, works them up, digests them; it thus manufactures thought-instruments out of sense-impressions. In the course of its development it constructs for itself, by means of its adaptive constitution, out of its own nature, owing to external impulses, organs suited to dealing with outer conditions. Such organs are certain forms of perception and thought, concepts and other logical images (3). We have thus to accompany

the soul through what may be called its 'story of creation' (4). It follows then that epistemology, or that branch of logical thinking which undertakes to prove that knowledge is possible, in last resort is a biological and psychological study.

As the final or proper end of thought is action and the making of action possible, the world of ideas of each individual is simply an organon for this purpose. Its separate parts are also simply instruments. As man is a maker of objective tools whereby he can conquer the material world, so is he the creator of subjective instruments for ultimately ever increased efficiency in the world of objective reality. The psyche is thus an organised system of thought-instruments or expedients (101), which mutually aid and support one another, and the highest product of it is a scientifically perfected world of ideas, an infinitely fine machine which the logical movement evolves, and which, in comparison with the sensuous prescientifically constructed world of ideas of the logical past, is as the most perfect products of a modern steel-foundry or scientific instrument-factory to the clumsy stone hammer or flint knife of tertiary man, or the finest locomotive or motor car to the cumbrous wain of a primitive forest-dweller (95).

It is the chief virtue of positive criticism, however, ever to insist on guarding against the error of confounding this means, this marvellous instrument, with the objective concrete reality for the manipulation of which it has been called into existence (101). We must ever guard against ascribing to our thought-complexes and thought-

instruments, reality; for the actual is the sensed alone, the that which opposes us in feeling, whether this sense is of an internal or external nature (186). In sense is rooted all our mental life; this sense comes to its proper end in action. All that lies between is purely a state of transition. The psyche is thus a machine which is being ever perfected more and more to fulfil the end of expediting the life-supporting movements of the bodily organism as surely and quickly as possible and with the least expenditure of force (178). The end is the attainment of efficient purposive action, and, finally—expressed idealistically—of ethical performance (179).

Our whole world of ideas thus lies as it were between the two poles of sense; it is the organised motion between them. The psyche is for ever inventing and interpolating more extensive (? intensive) middle terms between these extremities. Our world of ideas thus lies between the sensory and motor nerves; it is an infinite world between them; and its function is solely to make the mediation between these two elements ever richer, finer, more purposive and easier (95). The psychical world lies between the entrance and exit doors of the soul, *i.e.* intermediate between the reception of sensations into the psyche, and the processes of such reception, and the liberation or discharging of the generated thought-images and concepts again into sensations of practical activity (297). The ideal world is in no sense the copy or exact reproduction of the actual world of being; it is an instrument by which to lay hold of the latter and

subjectively conceive it (88). The world of ideas is thus in first instance a secondary or indirect product of the true world, a construct which the organic beings of the world of actuality evoke out of themselves. Thus the thought-world is a symbol, or system of symbols, which serves the organic beings of the real world for orienting themselves in the world of actual being, and is the means whereby they translate the proceedings of this world into the language of the soul (89). Compared with the actual concrete world, however, our present ideal world is but a monstrous world of fictions full of logical contradictions (90); and it is the task and interest of science to make this symbol ever more adequate and useful (93). Still, as there is never any identity of thought and being, even the most perfect thought-world will be unable entirely to grasp being (93). We must live and act, not think life.

In the psyche considered as an instrument, just as in the body, the principle of evolution holds. As the higher organisms are evolved from the lower, so are ever higher and higher, or more and more efficient, conceptual forms evolved in the psychic organon by the simple elementary laws of its own nature. Highly complex ideas must never be taken as native, but always be genetically derived from simpler forms (182). As, then, the comparative history of evolution enquires into the gradual development of the organs of any special animal mechanism in the various orders of fauna, so is it also the task of the logical psychologist to follow the gradual evolution of any special organ of the

psychical mechanism in the various systems of the special sciences and scientific methods (230). Nor must we forget that the laws which govern the organic functions of thought are, as in the case of all natural laws, indifferent; they work 'blindly' as is said. Whether they bring weal or woe depends on the circumstances; they are ever two-edged (292). How then, again we ask, is it that though the calculus of thought is employed and carried out in quite a different way from that in which the process of objective nature is brought about, nevertheless both ways can concur and our calculations frequently work out in a quite remarkable manner? The solution must lie in the mode in which thought computes, and we have therefore to make a special enquiry into its workings. The process of nature is a constant, unalterable procedure, it is accomplished according to fixed inflexible laws; the will of nature is iron. Thought, on the contrary, is a self-accommodating, flexible, plastic organic function (290).

Therefore the logical function, or theoretic activity of the mind, should never be taken for an end in itself; all such theoretic functions arise solely out of the impulse of the will, and in last resort serve practical action only (6). Thought undertakes sensible operations, invents artificial means, knows how to introduce highly developed processes (8). The task of logic, therefore, is precisely this—to light up the dark and unconsciously working activity of thought, and to learn to know the artificial operations and the sensuous paths which that unconsciously working activity

opens up to reach its practical end (10). The logical functions are thus organic teleological, or purposive, processes which are essentially distinguished from external occurrences. We should, therefore, never interchange the paths, by-paths and detours of thought with the modes of real happenings (11). Logic is, therefore, an art, not a science (12), and yet in it we have to do not so much with an artistic activity as with an artificial or technical dexterity (13).

Moreover, just as walking is a regularised falling, a succession of restorations of equilibrium, so is progressive thinking, or the logical thought-movement, regularised error. No one knows without science that in walking he is continually falling and recovering himself, yet that is what physiology, the mechanistic science of the human body, or mechanics of the animal organism, teaches us; so also no one without science can know that in logical thinking he continually falls and errs and yet makes progress (217). As falling and the restoration of equilibrium is the principle of mechanical locomotion, so is contradiction, and therewith the restoration of logical equilibrium, the principle of the progressive human thought-movement. Without contradiction we can make no move forward (218). The discovery that thought corrects the mistakes it has itself made, is the illuminating principle by which the science of fictions works (86). In this light the logical products appear to us no longer as disclosures, discoveries of the actual, but purely as mechanical auxiliaries of thought, so that it may move forward

and realise itself in a practical end (312). Here we may enquire of Vaihinger: Is there only one kind of logic, the logic of the intellect; or is there not also a logic of the emotions and a logic of nature as well; and cannot the will employ all these as means and so grasp reality—whatever *that* ideal may be?

For critical positivism, however, the only real, the sole actual, is the sense-world, and efficient action therein is the proper end of our existence. True ultimate being, it contends, is for the thinker simply a uniform flow of successions and co-existences. Here we seem to have what is little better than the canonisation of the empiricism of a Locke. Idealistic positivism, however, would also seem to verge on practical mysticism, if we remember the latter's watchword of 'Here and now,' and also, as we shall see, on the philosophy of the spirit which would transcend subject and object. For Vaihinger tells us, for instance, that the division into inner and outer is simply an expedient of the psyche. To treat the soul as if it had arisen out of the contrary notions of two things—subject and object, to make the distinction of material and spiritual things, is at best an artificial and not a real division(84). Moreover, however positive Vaihinger's standpoint may be, it is idealistic and not materialistic, for the sensations which the psyche projects as material qualities of an object, or which it converts into properties of a thing, are really processes in the soul itself. It is a fundamental error, however, to reify these projections and conversions; the pure experience of the actual is

sensation and nothing but sensation (301). We must never let go of the basic fact that the 'given' is only sensation, and that all else is the independent work of the soul, its very own achievement (302). This radical empiricism, however, is by no means materialism, for dogmatic materialism in no way goes back to pure sensation. It operates with concepts, namely 'force' and 'matter,' and thus simply with analogies, for 'force' is an analogy on the ground of inner experience, while 'matter' (which is only an external mirroring of the 'I') is ever more and more being abandoned and being liberated and decomposed into 'force' (315).

As the soul, however, can never consciously register pure sensations, but can have only perceptions of its sensations, its perceptions being conditioned by the intensive manifold of all its past impressions, it would seem that Vaihinger thus cuts us off entirely from any possibility of direct, clean contact with the actual. Is there, indeed, no activity of the soul, essentially a self-identifying will, that can put us in direct touch with the life of concrete reality? For if it is true that to-day the dominant tendency of refined thought is no longer to recognise, not only any 'faculties,' but even any 'powers' of the 'soul,' but only psychical occurrences, processes and forms of these processes (if all this by itself brings us any satisfaction!), yet without some fundamental direction of the contradictory operations of thought we are landed in chaos. It must be confessed that Vaihinger is very confusing in some of his statements in this connection. Thus, for instance, while on the one hand

we are told that the specific characteristic of the imagination is the *arbitrary* combination of the elementary psychical pictures or percepts, whereby the psyche can of course never invent anything absolutely new (325), yet on the other hand we learn that the same imagination has an important *rôle* to play in the science of organised thinking—but by the light of what? Surely by that of the reason, and that too, not only of the practical reason or intellect but also by that of the contemplative reason or vital intuition of the real? Vaihinger, however, appears to draw very little distinction between ideas of sense and intellectual ideas, between sensuous cognition and rational cognition.

But perhaps after all Vaihinger means no more than that the intellect (not the mind or soul as a whole) can never grasp becoming, movement, life, as Bergson contends. For he says quite rightly that our rules of calculation never get at the real content of a thing; our computation rules are finally nothing but a combination of symbols by which the unknown reality lets itself be calculated for practical purposes solely, but never really comprehended. Every advance of discursive thought, that is of the logical or theoretical elaboration of the sense-induced reality, brings to light new problems and contradictions. These contradictions, however, are not in the reality itself, but only in the mind of man; for as the actual does not follow our laws of ethical behaviour, so also does it not conform to our logical laws. Man only, he says, is ethical and logical; he alone would create a moral and logical world-order (160). We

should prefer to say that perhaps after all it is finally only a question of degree; babes are not men, their understanding is weak; the 'microcosm' is also not the 'macrocosm'; but there is growth, and progress, and development, and hope therefore that some day, somehow, we may come to know reality—a utopian idealistic fiction, no doubt, for criticism, but perhaps an intuition of the fundamental, elemental, practical will.

And this hope rests on the proved fact of human progress. Thus we find that in the beginning the natural man knows neither logical contradictions nor ethical conflicts; only in the course of evolution do these logical and ethical struggles arise out of the ground of the soul itself. And yet it is only in this strife that progress lies, so that the idea, or rather feeling, of sin is as much the principle of ethical improvement as contradiction the motive of logical perfection (161). But is it not rather that the 'natural' man is gradually giving place to the 'spiritual' man—to use common fictions? To-day, owing to the development of intelligence, it is impossible for us ever to go back to the natural man, for the natural man takes the spoken word immediately for the natural itself, the actual; thus at the beginning he accepts the concepts of thought for reproductions of reality, *i.e.* as real themselves, and later he considers the methods and ways of thought as identical with the ways and laws of being—an error which even great philosophers have canonised (173). Shade of Hegel, to be classed with the primitive and natural man! Not only then are words not things, but

also thoughts are not things—a sad disillusionment for 'new'-thought-ism and the rest of it!' While 'Back to nature,' to sensuous reality, therefore may be a good cry and philosophic corrective, 'Back to the natural man' is a counsel of serious imperfection.

By this time it is fairly evident what Vaihinger means by his comprehensive concept 'fiction'; practically all logical products are fictions; he lets none of them escape his net. Fictions are in general products of the imaginative activity of the soul—means, devices, stratagems, for arriving *indirectly* at the end aimed at, namely action. All activities of the soul other than automatic reactions are fictions, subsidiary notions, secondary operations of thought (18). They are all purposed or teleological thought-means (171), the efficiency of which is justified by action alone. Vaihinger is thus an energist or activist, though perhaps not in Eucken's sense.

Fictions may be divided into two main classes: namely, full fictions or fictions proper, and semi- or half fictions. The latter are contrary to or contradict the 'given,' while the former not only do this but also contradict themselves (24). If Vaihinger had called his fictions thought-instruments or logical tools or something similar, he would have perhaps avoided the now almost inevitable danger of a pure logomachy or war about words; but although he has chosen perhaps the most provocative epithet in the vocabulary of philosophy with which to characterise indiscriminately the most highly prized ideas and ideals of

human thought, as well as the most worthless products of the imagination, we must refuse to be drawn by his nomenclature, and try to extract what value we can from his meaning, for we live in an age of the grossest abuse of names.

Vaihinger tells us over and over again that we must always combine with fiction the strictly defined notion of a scientific thought-invention towards a practical end. This invention has no value as an end, but only as a means. Thus, for instance, the conception of freedom has worth, but only as it is *consciously* treated as a purposive mental image (65).

As to semi-fictions, as distinguished from full fictions, they are concepts and methods which, as they rest on a deviation from and not on a falsification of reality, are yet in final analysis found to be contradictory to it (124): Fictions proper are self-contradictions as well as contradictions, products of '*fingere*,' that is of the imagination which constructs out of the elements of reality the unreal. If we were to call a departure from reality a 'fault' and designate a self-contradictory concept as an 'error,' then we could call semi-fictions conscious faults, and fictions proper conscious errors or conscious contradictions. The former serve more for practical ends, the latter for theoretical purposes; the former more for calculation, the latter more for conception; the former are more artistic, the latter more artificial. The former substitute the imaginable for the given, the latter confound the given with the unimaginable. The former suppose the unreal, the latter the

impossible. The former in departing from the reality evade the difficulties of the actual; the latter create new difficulties to add to those that already exist. The former falsify the given reality in order to discover the true reality; the latter make the given incomprehensible in order to make it—comprehensible! Though the former are only indirect ways, still they move on the same *terrain* as the actual; whereas the latter abandon the ground of reality entirely and move 'in the air.' Semi-fictions are mostly simpler than the reality, fictions proper more complex (128).

The art of fiction, however, may nevertheless claim to equal privileges as an independent supplement to what has been called the science of induction (125). For a very large number of fictions, perhaps even all, are to be reduced finally to analogies; and while all fictions are artificial analogies, analogy is an inductive method. Induction shows the direct ways by which we approach the end in view, fiction is the indirect or circuitous route. Induction is a methodology of descriptive mental science; fiction is a method of mathematical science as also of moral-political discipline (126). For mathematics, as some of the greatest mathematicians think, is at bottom symbolic logic. Vaihinger suggests, moreover, that the nomenclature might be eased by keeping scientific fictions apart from, *e.g.*, mythological, æsthetic, etc., fictions, and calling the latter 'figments' (129); and further that though all scientific fictions also, both complete and half fictions, are roundabout ways, artifices, stratagems, contrivances, with

which thought endeavours to over-reach circumstances, or the difficulties of actuality, and also to over-reach—itself, semi-fictions might be distinguished from full fictions by calling them hypotheses.

Thus the battle of epistemology, or of the theory of knowing, will arise with the question as to whether the conceptual forms are hypothetic or fictitious—*i.e.*, in logical terminology, whether they are objective or subjective (90). Hypothesis always looks to reality—*i.e.* the mental representation or concept contained in it, claims or hopes to be found congruous with a percept that will one day be given; it submits itself to the test of reality and demands finally verification, that is, it wants to be substantiated as true, as actually a real expression of the real (144); an hypothesis looks for a definite fixation. The fiction, on the contrary, is merely an auxiliary representation, or image, a scaffolding that should be taken down later on (148); it can demand only justification. Thus the hypothesis remains, the fiction falls away. The former builds up a construct of real substantial knowledge, the latter is only a methodological or formal means. The hypothesis is a result of thought, the fiction a means or method of thought. The intent of the hypothesis is to discover, that of the fiction to invent (149). Thus man is said to discover the laws of nature, but to invent machines. The verification of the hypothesis has as correspondence the justification of the fiction (150). The method of the former consists essentially in the supposition being not only thinkable, but also

actually or factually possible, so that it serves for elucidation or explanation (152); the latter serves only for calculation or computation (187, 263). While a doubt as to its objective validity prevails, the fiction remains a dogma; only when doubt is at a minimum does the hypothesis stand as an expression of truth (220). It is owing to the state of tension occasioned by an unverified hypothesis and the concomitant feeling of mental distress, that our natural tendency is always to turn an hypothesis into a dogma (220).

In the general sense of the term, as used by Vaihinger, fictions are well-nigh all-embracing. Not only all concepts, not only every manner of method, not only the whole of discursive thought, but the entire world of ideas is for critical positivism fiction. All methods are fictitious, such as generalisation, abstraction, transference; all conceptual formulæ are fictions. Atoms, space, time, causality, the infinite and infinitesimal, the absolute, and thing-in-itself are fictions: God is a fiction. Thus we read of classes of fictions of every kind—*e.g.* abstract, schematic (classifications of all kinds), paradigmatic (or imagined cases), utopian (such as primal religion, golden age), typical (or imagined original forms), symbolical, analogical, juristic, poetical (similes and myths), personificative (or the hypostasising of phenomena—soul, power, faculty), summatory (expressions in which a sum of phenomena is combined according to their chief characteristics), practical, ethical, religious, idealistic, etc., etc.

We find, *e.g.*, the atom characterised as one of

the most important fictions, the top and bottom fiction of mathematical physics, without which a finer and higher development of this science would be quite impossible (104).

Since 1875/1877, when the MS. of Vaihinger's work was written, however, the atom has been analysed down into a system of charges of electricity, into a complex of forces. Matter has thus been driven inward and is now practically interchangeable with simple inertia, a dynamic concept. Nevertheless for all purposes of calculation the atom remains the basic concept of physics in its theoretical analysis of space. The infinite divisibility of space, however, is also a fiction; for it is an element which stands in abrupt contradiction to actual occurrence and present existence, to motion and all other experience (156). Not but what motion itself is anything more than a mental concept, an idea, with which we endeavour to bring into an ordered system, objective changes, that for us, however, in last analysis are given only as sense-changes (107). But surely if life is real, its reality is essentially perpetual change, movement? We impose upon it, it is true, necessary conceptual immobilities for purposes of calculation, whereas in nature there are no real boundaries. In all our sciences, however, there are boundaries, and a final limit where every science ceases and play and guessing begin; this is especially the case in mathematics and metaphysics (274). Indeed the whole of mathematics is the classical example of an ingenious instrument, a mental device, for facilitating calculation (82); about the flux of becoming

itself it gives us scarcely any explanation (107). Equally so the whole of metaphysics, indispensable as it is, is metabolic, hyperbolic, metaphoric, fictitious (42).

The thing-in-itself without manifestation is a meaningless fiction, as is also subject without predicate (118). Indeed the division of the world into thing-in-itself = object and thing-in-itself=subject is the root fiction from which all others arise. From the standpoint of critical positivism there is no absolute, no thing-in-itself, no subject, no object. There remains, therefore, nothing but the sensations which are present, which are given, out of which the whole subjective world is developed in its separation into a world of physical and psychical complexes. Critical positivism declares every other and more extended supposition to be of the nature of fiction, subjective and groundless; for it there exists only the observed successions and co-existences of phenomena; it attaches itself to those alone (114). Still such fictions as absolute law, absolute ethics, absolute ideals, etc., though they have no theoretical meaning, are of high practical value, and equally so is the fiction of absolute value itself (115). In spite of its unreality the abstract, the ideal, has its justification; it is a practical fiction, and without such a power of imagination neither science nor life in their highest form would be possible. Nevertheless this is precisely the tragedy of life, that the most valuable notions, when considered as themselves actualities, are destitute of substantive worth. Indeed it is in this way that the value of reality is inverted (61).

Even the unity of the good and true, as it is an ideal, is a philosophical fiction (64).

The analogical, that is fictional method, moreover, is as much, or more, at home in theology as in mathematics and metaphysics. For critical positivism such valuable religious dogmas as God, the soul and immortality are fictions. How then does Vaihinger extricate himself from this very delicate situation? Somewhat casuistically it must be confessed. The enemy might even ask: Are we to become augurs and walk our philosophical, scientific and religious streets with our tongues in our cheeks? Thus, for instance, 'God' is not the 'Father' of men, but he is to be considered and treated *as if* he were (41). We should so act *as if* it were a duty imposed upon us by God, *as if* we should be called to account for it, with the same promptness and earnestness as those of unquestioning faith. But, he continues, if once this *as if* is changed into *because*, the character of pure and disinterested morality ceases, and our action is distorted by motives of low and common interest, of mere selfishness (71).

It is especially in the categories, or chief generalisations or highest forms of thought, that the nature of fiction is to be seen. All categories, and perhaps even all fictions, can be reduced to analogies (126). As categories are all artificial so also are all classifications, for in the actual sense-world we can find no natural boundaries (339). Categories are epistemological analogies, analogical fictions for mediating the possibility of knowledge (41). They are all symbolic and formal (286).

Categories arise out of sought-for comparisons (157). Comparison and finally the blending of similars in the soul is the proper psychological principle of logic; thus epistemology, or the science of knowing, is at bottom fictionism, for it deals precisely with the devices which the psyche resorts to in order to equip itself with the most effective instruments of comparison (158). The categories are thus simply notional constructs, or conceptual symbols, which are of use for the apperception or clear cognition of the given (44). As has been pointed out already, however, a clear distinction must be drawn between true and substantive analogies, which it is the business of semi-fictions, or of hypotheses, and of the objective method of induction to discover, and fully fictitious analogies, which are purely the business of the subjective method (45). Though then the transformation of the reality into fiction consists chiefly in the remodelling of the material of sensations by means of subjective categories (289), and though by the mere mental pigeon-holing, or the subsumption, of sensation into the categories, without deliberate consciousness of the operation, no adequate knowledge is at all attained (302), nevertheless without the employment of the categories, and especially those of substantiality and causality, no judgment is possible (98). The psychical processes by which this theoretical elaboration proceeds are analysis, comparison, abstraction and combination. This elaboration, however, we repeat once more, in following Vaihinger at the risk of becoming tedious, is nevertheless a means only; it can never be the same

thing as its object or end (312); and again, we repeat, the art of conceptual knowledge as such a means to practical action has very high theoretic value, but not the slightest value as scientific knowledge grounded in reality (303).

Another process we should be ever conscious of is this. In the evolution of the categories the chief thing to be noticed is the principle of displacement from the objective to the subjective. What was once thought of as a thing is subsequently considered as a property. From this shifting from the objective to the subjective which is peculiar to all categories (*e.g.* cause and effect, whole and part, essence and appearance), the subjectivity of all categories may be concluded. We can further understand from this principle of transposition, how one member of a pair of fictitious contraries can be thrust back beyond experience so that the real empirical mass, or the true elements of experience, come to stand as the second member, instead of holding their proper ground as the only reality. In this way arises, for instance, the fiction of a substance which is supposed to stand on the other side of the objects of experience; the latter are then taken *as if* they were attributes or modes of that substance. In this way also arises the fiction of an absolute cause of which the universe of experience is taken to be the result; so also arises the fiction of a macrocosm of which the objects of experience are looked upon as the parts; and finally of an absolute thing-in-itself which is regarded as the essence of phenomena (299). Even such sensuous contraries as light and darkness,

black and white, life and death, are purely artificial products of thought-abstraction, necessary for accuracy, for the clearer and surer hold they give us on the phenomena of the flux, but always to be used in their application to reality itself with the greatest caution (339).

There is moreover a gradual eliminating of the categories as mental evolution, and with it the power of even greater generalisation, proceeds; for it is evident that the psyche originally possessed a far fuller table of categories than it does to-day. The present list of categories is the product of natural selection and adaptation (313). As, however, the psyche is a self-conscious organic life, the final analysis of the categories must be the work of psychology, for cause and effect are at bottom nothing but abstract expressions for will and deed (317).

Sufficient has now been given of the general ideas and positions of the philosophy of the 'as if.' But when all has been said, where precisely are we *positively* apart from the pertinent *criticism* of what we usually regard as knowledge? It is to be noticed that nowhere does Vaihinger, who professes in last resort to take refuge in biology and psychology, deal in any way with possibilities of consciousness beyond the normal; he probably holds that all supernormal states are purely imaginary. His main thesis, then, practically amounts to this: sense mediated by intellect eventuates in purposive action and the efficient use of the material forces of life, and finally in ethical performance. This is, however, we venture to think, an incomplete

programme of the possibilities of human perfectioning. That there is also a reasonable possibility of genuine knowledge of life as a whole, and the consequent self-realisation of ourselves in reality, is, we believe, a sensible hypothesis. We can be conscious even of the at present normally unconscious spontaneous automatic actions and reactions in us and in others, and so learn to know life directly. What we now call purposive ethical action, when it becomes for us free from all taint of selfishness, free from all calculation and motive, when it becomes 'natural,' gives birth to immediate understanding, and proves itself in feeling to be co-operative with the spiritual forces of life. From this point of view, however, which rises beyond subject and object, the material forces and the spiritual forces are seen to be but the passive and active modes of the same reality.

XII.

BERGSON'S INTUITIONISM.

In 1887/1888, some three years after leaving Cambridge, I spent six months at the little University of Clermont Ferrand in Auvergne, following the courses of lectures on literature and philosophy. The pleasantest of many pleasant recollections of the courtesy and friendship shown me, by both the professors and students of the Faculté, is the memory of a small, quiet, hawk-headed man, of penetrating intelligence, who lectured unceremoniously, as it were *en famille*, to some half-dozen students, and with whom I had many a long and instructive talk. This quiet man was Henri Bergson, who had so far published nothing; he was then only writing his *thèse pour le doctorat*, which appeared a year after as his now famous *Essai sur les Données immédiates de la Conscience*.[1]

Little did any of us who then enjoyed his intimate conversation and admired his humility and penetrating thought, foresee the preëminence to which Bergson was destined. We little imagined he would become not only Professor at the Collège de France and Member of the Institute, but one of the greatest philosophical influences in the modern world of thought, both critically and constructively, and that, too, not as a deft rearranger of things on

[1] Eng. Trans., by Pogson, under title, *Time and Free Will*, Swan Sonnenschein, 1910.

the surface or even the builder of a new system, but as a drastic critic of principles and the inaugurator of a fundamental reform in method.

In this brief sketch I do not propose to follow Bergson through the various moments of his thought-evolution as recorded in his printed works, but shall confine myself chiefly to his maturer period as exemplified in his last great work, *L'Évolution Créatrice* (1907),[1] and his very important essay, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1903),[2] which is an indispensable *prolegomenon* to it.[3]

If I understand Bergson aright, he looks to what the mystics would call the 'sacred marriage' of the intellect and the intuition for the birth of a regenerate understanding of reality. In order the better to define these necessary mutual complements he sets them over against one another in sharp, sometimes perhaps too sharp, contrast. Now, to follow sympathetically a man's meaning we must allow him to define his own terms; we will therefore refrain from the time-wasting diversion of fighting about words, and let Bergson speak mostly for himself.

Intellect with Bergson stands in general for the formalising and materialising energy of the mind, as opposed to man's vital and spiritualising consciousness—the intuition. "Our intellect . . . is intended . . . to think matter" (p. ix.).

[1] Eng. Trans., by A. Mitchell, Macmillan, 1911.

[2] In *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (Jan. 1903). Eng. Trans., by T. E. Hulme, Macmillan, 1913.

[3] The page references are to the English translations. When not further indicated they are to *Creative Evolution;* the *Introduction* is cited as *I.*

"Intellectuality and materiality have been constituted, in detail, by reciprocal adaptation" (p. 197). Intellect "runs naturally to space and mathematics, intellectuality and materiality being of the same nature and having been produced in the same way" (p. 231). These and many other similar considerations lead Bergson to formulate the proposition: "The more consciousness is intellectualised, the more is matter spatialised" (p. 199). It thus follows that "the intellect is characterised by a natural inability to comprehend life" (p. 174).

Man, as distinguished from the rest of the lives known to us, is primarily characterised by his power of fabrication: he is 'demiurgic,' and a maker of tools and machines. This is because his intellect is mechanical and because of the 'mechanism of the intellect' (p. 50). He is, as apart from his other deeper characteristics of being a religious, moral, social, etc., animal, essentially *Homo faber*, or Man the artisan. "We are born artisans as we are born geometricians, and indeed we are geometricians only because we are artisans" (p. 47). "Intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture" (p. 146). Further the intellect is largely arithmetical and geometrical, for "in a general way, measuring is a wholly human operation, which implies that we really or ideally superpose two objects one on another a certain number of times" (p. 230). So then "manufac-

turing is peculiar to man. It consists of assembling parts of matter which we have cut out in such manner that we can fit them together and obtain from them a common action. The parts are arranged, so to speak, around the action as an ideal centre. To manufacture, therefore, is to work from the periphery to the centre, or, as the philosophers say, from the many to the one" (p. 97). Organisation, on the contrary, works from the centre to the periphery. "It begins in a point that is almost a mathematical point, and spreads around this point by concentric waves which go on enlarging" (p. 97).

The intellect is thus the instrument of science; it cannot create. It can 'manufacture,' it cannot 'organise.' Therefore science cannot deal with man as the vital microcosm of the living whole. We are not, however, to question the fundamental identity of inert matter and organised matter. "The only question is whether the natural systems which we call living beings must be assimilated to the artificial systems that science cuts out within inert matter, or whether they must not rather be compared to that natural system which is the whole of the universe" (p. 32). Intellect, and therefore science, as we know it, cannot comprehend life. To convey some notion of the nature of life Bergson employs the following symbolism of the infinitesimal. "A very small element of a curve is very near being a straight line. And the smaller it is, the nearer. In the limit it may be termed a part of the curve or a part of the straight line, as you please, for in each of its points a curve coincides with a tangent. So likewise 'vitality' is

tangent, at any and every point, to physical and chemical forces; but such points are, as a fact, only views taken by a mind which imagines stops at various moments of the movement that generates the curve" (p. 33).

The approach, therefore, for Bergson, to the deeper problems of philosophy is primarily through the sciences of biology, psychology and sociology.

We may next pass to the puzzle of ontology. Bergson will have nothing to do with a so-called 'static' absolute in which all is supposed to be given simultaneously and eternally unchangeable; he is irreconcileably opposed to the dogma 'all is given.' We here say 'so-called' and 'supposed to be,' for if we sympathetically enquire into the matter, it is difficult to find any system that preaches a purely 'static' absolute; the epithet is rather one of derision hurled by the empiricist at the naïve mystical philosopher, on the one hand, or at the radical mechanist, on the other, who wrongly seeks to depreciate the value of the ever-becoming. Thus Bergson writes:

"Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once. But duration is something very different from this for our consciousness, that is to say, for that which is most indisputable in our experience. We perceive duration as a stream against which we cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live.

It is no use to hold up before our eyes the dazzling prospect of a universal mathematic; we cannot sacrifice experience to the requirement of a system" (p. 41).

Bergson's philosophy is thus one "which sees in duration the very stuff of reality" (p. 287). For Bergson, then, duration or "real time, regarded as a flux, or, in other words, as the very mobility of being, escapes the hold of scientific knowledge," that is, of the intellect (p. 355). "Real duration is that in which each form flows out of previous forms, while adding to them something new, and is explained by them as much as it explains them" (pp. 382, 383). Such time is, thus, 'invention or it is nothing' (p. 361). "By following this new conception of time to the end, we shall come to see in time a progressive growth of the absolute, and in the evolution of things a continual invention of forms ever new" (p. 364).

This vital notion of duration or real time, as distinguished from spatialised or clock time, is fundamental with Bergson; real time with him is a psychical reality and should never be confused with physical time, which is a device of the intellect, a symbolism of mutually externalised moments, imposed upon real time through analogy with space. Bergson's main criticism of modern thought is thus that it creates for itself a host of unnecessary problems through its fundamental error of confusing time and space. For him, pure time, or duration, is "the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our Ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present

states from its former states" (*Time and Free Will*, p. 100). In brief, duration is dynamic continuity; or, to quote the graphic words of Éduard Le Roy,[1] the most able and sympathetic appreciator of Bergson, duration "is a melodious evolution of moments, each of which contains the resonance of those preceding and announces the one which is going to follow; it is a process of enriching which never ceases, and a perpetual appearance of novelty; it is an indivisible, qualitative, and organic becoming, foreign to space, refractory to number" (p. 189).

Though, then, as we have seen, Bergson will have nothing to do with the abstract conceptual absolute of the schools, he nevertheless does not jettison the term as radical empiricism would have us do. For him the absolute is the object and not its representation, the original and not its translation; as such it is perfect 'by being perfectly what it is' (*I.* p. 5); it is unique. Such an absolute, however, can be given only in an intuition, while everything else falls within the province of analysis; but these two methods, though opposed, are complementary, as we shall see later on.

We pass next to Bergson's idea of freedom, for which he cleared the way in his earliest work, *Time and Free Will*, where he showed that free-will is to be found in act alone, and that any attempt to define it in thought lands us in deter-

[1] See two articles, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Feb. 1 and 15 1912). Eng. Trans., by Vincent Benson, with considerable additional explanations by the author, under title, *A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson*, Williams & Norgate, 1913.

minism, and to the meaning he gives to creative evolution, the special subject of his last arresting treatise. "Real duration is that duration which gnaws on things and leaves on them the mark of its tooth" (p. 48). "The more we succeed in making ourselves conscious of our progress in pure duration, the more we feel the different parts of our being enter into one another, and our whole personality concentrates itself in a point, or rather a sharp edge, pressed against the future and cutting into it unceasingly. It is in this that life and action are free" (p. 212)—but free only in the great 'crises' of life, as Bergson elsewhere explains. But to enter into duration we must not *think* about it, we must *install* ourselves in it, live it. "We do not think real time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect" (p. 49). "It is no use trying to approach duration; we must immerse ourselves within it straight away. This is what the intellect generally refuses to do, accustomed as it is to think the moving by means of the immovable" (p. 315). "In place of intellect proper must be substituted the more comprehensive reality of which intellect is only the contraction" (p. 55).

What, however, Bergson seems not sufficiently to allow for is that the power of arrestation is fundamentally coequal with the power of flux, that mind and life are coequal partners in the whole. It is true that the power of the limited human intellect is not coequal with the power of the divine life; but is there not a divine intelligence?

To continue, however, with our philosopher's

contention. "Just because it goes beyond the intellect—the faculty of connecting the same with the same or perceiving and also producing repetitions—this reality is undoubtedly creative, *i.e.* productive of effects in which it expands and transcends its own being" (p. 55).

And if reality is creative, evolution, vitally considered, is creative activity. "There is no doubt that life is as a whole an evolution, that it is an unceasing transformation" (p. 243). If then "evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, it creates, as it goes on, not only the forms of life, but the ideas that will enable the intellect to understand it, the terms which will serve to express it. That is to say, its future overflows its present and cannot be sketched out therein in an idea" (p. 108).

God, therefore, cannot be defined by the intellect; conceived as creative He "has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom" (p. 262). Surely, however, this is but half the reality? Nevertheless we have to thank Bergson for such a magnificent passage as the following: "Life in general is mobility itself; particular manifestations of life accept this mobility reluctantly, and constantly lag behind. It is always going ahead; they want to mark time. Evolution in general would fain go on in a straight line; each special evolution is a sort of circle. Like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it passes, the living turn upon themselves, borne up by the great blast of life. They are therefore relatively stable, and counterfeit immobility so well that we treat each of them as a *thing* rather than as a

progress, forgetting that the very permanence of their form is only the outline of their movement" (pp. 134, 135). Surely Tyrrell must have had such a passage, indeed the whole thought of the philosopher as to life, in his mind when he wrote his last strangely powerful paper, 'Divine Fecundity,' for the first number of *The Quest*.

To grasp fully the nature of creative evolution it is necessary that the intellect should be completed or complemented by the intuition. What, then, is this intuition which so many readers of Bergson either frankly declare they cannot understand or misrepresent by misunderstanding? Intuition, Bergson tells us, is "the kind of *intellectual sympathy* [cp. *I.* p. 59, and note the philosopher's italics in both passages, stressing *both* terms] by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible" (*I.* p. 6). This immediately synthetic activity, which must not be confounded with any logically constructed synthesis, is to be sharply separated from analysis, or "the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is to elements common both to it and other objects" (*I.* p. 6). Intuition is thus the 'metaphysical investigation' of what is essential and original in the object (*I.* p. 16), in other words that reality or absolute which Bergson has called duration. But though the act of intuition is called an 'investigation,' it is a simple act, whereas analysis can go on to infinity (*I.* p. 7). Analysis, again, operates always on the immobile, whereas intuition places itself in mobility, or, what comes

to the same thing, in duration (*I.* p. 40). And so, in accordance with Bergson's fundamental dogma of the priority of mobility, from intuition we may pass to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition (*I.* p. 41). But if intuition is called a 'metaphysical investigation,' we must understand 'metaphysical' in Bergson's meaning and take the object of metaphysics to be the performance of '*qualitative* differations and integrations' (*I.* p. 62); it itself being no generalisation of facts, but 'integral experience' (*I.* p. 79).

Le Roy puts the whole thing in a nutshell in his graphic metaphor: "Analysis cuts the channels, intuition supplies the water. Intuition acquires and analysis expands" (*op. cit.* p. 53); and more profoundly: "Intuition falls into analysis as life into matter: they are two aspects of the same movement" (*ib.* p. 215).

What then is intuition in Bergson's latest view, and how does it differ from instinct? Instinct is said to be 'sympathy' pure and simple, whereas, as we have seen, intuition is characteristically distinguished as 'intellectual sympathy.' "It is to the very inwardness of life that *intuition* leads us, —by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflection upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely" (p. 186). Intuition "introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. But though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence, it

would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest, and turned outward by it into movements of locomotion" (pp. 187, 188). We should not forget that "intelligence remains the luminous nucleus around which instinct, even enlarged and perfected into intuition, forms only a vague nebulosity" (p. 187).

Instinct thus might be called sub-intellectual, whereas intuition is supra-intellectual. The key-passage which brings out the distinction most clearly, is that which follows on Bergson's criticism of Kant: "Suppose . . . that science is less and less objective, more and more symbolical, as it goes from the physical to the psychical, passing through the vital: then, as it is indeed necessary to perceive a thing somehow in order to symbolise it, there would be an intuition of the psychical, and more generally of the vital, which the intellect would transpose and translate, no doubt, but which would none the less transcend the intellect. There would be, in other words, a supra-intellectual intuition. If this intuition exist, a taking possession of the spirit by itself is possible, and no longer only a knowledge that is external and phenomenal. What is more, if we have an intuition of this kind (I mean an ultra-intellectual intuition), then sensuous intuition is likely to be in continuity with it through certain intermediaries, as the infra-red is continuous with the ultra-violet. Sensuous intuition itself, therefore, is promoted. It will no longer attain only the phantom of an unattainable thing-in-itself. It is (provided we bring to it certain indispensable corrections)

into the absolute itself that it will introduce us" (p. 380).

Nevertheless one of the most frequent charges brought against Bergson's method is that of 'irrationalism'; if this objection should still seem to have any substance after what has been written above, it collapses at once when we reflect that this intuitional method seeks verification in action and appeals directly to the verdict of the intelligence itself. Following on Bergson's theory of free-will, it is action alone that removes the barrier of the otherwise inescapable circle of the synthetic and critical intelligence. Nevertheless, as Le Roy graphically and clearly puts it, "if intelligence accepts the risk of taking the leap into the phosphorescent fluid [*i.e.*, the instinctual life movement] which bathes it and to which it is not altogether foreign, since it has broken off from it and in it dwell the complementary powers of the understanding, intelligence will soon become adapted and so will only be lost for a moment to reappear greater, stronger, and of fuller content. It is action again under the name of experience which removes the danger of illusion or giddiness, it is action which *verifies;* by a practical demonstration, by an effort of enduring maturation which tests the idea in intimate contact with reality and judges it by its fruits. It always falls, therefore, to intelligence to pronounce the grand verdict in the sense that only that can be called true which will finally satisfy it; but we mean an intelligence duly enlarged and transformed by the very effect of the action it has lived" (*op. cit.* p. 120).

Bergson's intuitionism is, therefore, not irrationalism, far from it; for though, as we have already seen, intuition and analysis are set over against one another, they are necessary complements. Equally it follows from Bergson's general position that "science and metaphysics are two opposed although complementary ways of knowing, the first retaining only moments, that is to say, that which does not endure, the second bearing on duration itself" (p. 364).

What, then, constitutes the essence of metaphysics and of philosophy for the protagonist of creative evolution? The vital sciences of biology, psychology and sociology are to restore metaphysics to its ancient dignity and free philosophy from the shackles of a rigid conceptualism and contentless symbolism of the mathematical order. For Bergson metaphysics is "the means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short, of seizing it without any expression, translation or symbolic representation" (*I.* pp. 7 and 8). Metaphysics must thus transcend formal concepts and ideas to reach intuition (*I.* p. 18). It is an inversion of the ordinary method, but it must in its turn be practised methodically (*I.* p. 59). Metaphysics is thus "the science which claims to dispense with symbols" (*I.* p. 8). The practice of intuition is accordingly best begun with psychology, for there is at least one reality which we all seize from within by intuition, namely 'our personality in its

flowing through time' (*I.* p. 8). If, according to Bergson, consciousness for us (? preferably self-consciousness) means memory, and memory, as all readers of *Matière et Mémoire*[1] know, is for Bergson a principle entirely independent of matter, neither a manifestation nor an emanation of matter, nor destroyed by brain lesions, but rather spirit itself, —then "inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present" (*I.* p. 38). But we must further each seize for ourselves this 'constitutive duration of our own being,' no intellectual operation will give us this (*I.* p. 13); such 'an inner absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self' (almost an echo of the Upanishads one might think) is possible (*I.* p. 20). Indeed this is precisely the task of philosophy, to recover possession of 'the simple intuition of the self by the self' (*I.* p. 33). For according to Bergson, the essence of philosophy is not utilitarian pragmatism or simply a 'practical knowledge [of things] aimed at the profit to be drawn from them' (I. p. 37); its task is the sublime destiny of striving for immediate realisation, the effort 'to transcend the human condition' (*I.* p. 65).

And as we have referred to this very difficult problem, indeed the root problem, of consciousness, in introducing these latter reflections, we may for a moment dwell on one or two interesting suggestions of our philosopher on the subject. There is a gradual evolution from consciousness, through self-consciousness to supraconsciousness.

[1] Eng. Trans., by Paul and Palmer, Swan Sonnenschein, 1911.

"Throughout the whole extent of the animal kingdom . . . consciousness seems proportionate to the living being's power of choice" (p. 189). But "what . . . is the principle that has only to let go its tension—may we say to *detend*—in order to *extend*, the interruption of the cause here being equivalent to a reversal of the effect? For want of a better word we have called it consciousness. But we do not mean the narrowed consciousness that functions in each of us. Our own consciousness is the consciousness of a certain living being, placed in a certain point of space; and though it does indeed move in the same direction as its principle, it is continually drawn the opposite way, obliged, though it goes forward, to look behind. This retrospective vision is . . . the natural function of the intellect, and consequently of distinct consciousness. In order that our consciousness shall coincide with something of its principle, it must detach itself from the *already-made* and attach itself to the *being-made*. It needs that, turning back on itself and twisting on itself, the faculty of *seeing* should be made to become one with the act of *willing*,—a painful effort which we can make suddenly, doing violence to our nature, but cannot sustain more than a few moments" (pp. 250, 251). Such consciousness is intuition. But indeed consciousness is that in terms of which all else is defined, itself being indefinable, for "consciousness, or supraconsciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter; consciousness, again, is the name for that which subsists of the

rocket itself, passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms" (p. 275).

If this then be consciousness intensifying itself through self-consciousness into supraconsciousness, what is the nature of the 'self' that has to be seized by intuition? It is a multiple unity or a unitary multiplicity, and the question of first importance for philosophy is "to know exactly what unity, what multiplicity, and what reality superior both to abstract unity and multiplicity the multiple unity of the self actually is" (*I.* p. 33). It is of course in duration where is formed the synthesis of this unity and multiplicity (*I.* p. 49). But this synthesis must be seized immediately, for no mingling of contrary or even mutually complementary concepts will ever give anything resembling the self that endures. Thus "if we are shown a solid cone, we see without any difficulty how it narrows towards the summit and tends to be lost in a mathematical point, and also how it enlarges in the direction of the base into an indefinitely increasing circle. But neither the point nor the circle, nor the juxtaposition of the two on a plane, would give us the least idea of a cone" (*I.* p. 33). So of the unity and multiplicity of mental states. But, on the contrary, "from the object, seized by intuition, we pass easily in many cases to the two contrary concepts; and as in that way thesis and antithesis can be seen to spring from reality, we grasp at the same time how it is that the two are opposed and how they are reconciled" (*I.* p. 34).

And here it may be of interest to remark that

between pure intuition and symbolical concepts and formal ideas Bergson quite rightly makes room for a fluid order of what we might call living ideas, and what Le Roy refers to as 'dynamic schemes'; these 'supple, mobile and almost fluid representations' (*I.* p. 18) are the proper instruments and province of metaphysics.

But even these 'dynamic schemes,' and 'vital ideas,' as we have ventured to call them, are the beginnings of falling out of pure qualitative duration into quantitative extensity. What the state of pure intuition may be, cannot be expressed, not only according to Bergson, but according to the common report of the whole race of mystics. Nevertheless we cannot refrain from quoting a quite ecstatic passage from Le Roy, where he writes of this penetrating into the hidden retreat of the soul as follows:

"Here we are in these regions of twilight and dream, where our *ego* takes shape, where the spring within us gushes up, in the warm secrecy of the darkness which ushers our trembling being into birth. Distinctions fail us. Words are useless now. We hear the wells of consciousness at their mysterious task like an invisible shiver of running water through the mossy shadow of the caves. I dissolve in the joy of becoming. I abandon myself to the delight of being a pulsing reality. I no longer know whether I see scents, breathe sounds, or smell colours. Do I love? Do I think? The question has no longer a meaning for me. I am, in my complete self, each of my attitudes, each of my changes. It is not my sight which is indistinct

or my attention which is idle. It is I who have resumed contact with pure reality, whose essential movement admits no form of number. He who thus makes the really 'deep' and 'inner' effort necessary to becoming—were it only for an elusive moment—discovers, under the simplest appearance, inexhaustible sources of unsurpassed wealth; the rhythm of his duration becomes amplified and refined; his acts become more conscious; and in what seemed to him at first sudden severance and instantaneous pulsation he discovers complex transitions full of unexpected repetitions and threaded movements" (*op. cit.* pp. 75-77).

And Le Roy is a mathematician! From this suggestion of the state of intuition of the *élan vital* in itself so to speak, we may conveniently pass for a moment to what may give us a glimpse of insight into Bergson's arresting view of matter. "When," he writes, "we make ourselves self-conscious in the highest possible degree and then let ourselves fall back little by little, we get the feeling of extension: we have an extension of the self into recollections that are fixed and external to one another, in place of the tension it possessed as an indivisible active will" (pp. 218, 219).

If after this intense concentration, we were to relax the strain, and interrupt the effort to crowd as much as possible of the past into the present, and let ourselves go as much as possible, there are those who say there is a spiritual response to our effort and a refreshment of our nature. This is, however, not quite Bergson's view; for in the first place he thinks that the relaxation can never be

complete, for in that case there would be neither memory nor will, and he thinks we can no more make ourselves absolutely passive than make ourselves absolutely free. In the limit of this relaxation, however, he thinks "we get a glimpse of an existence made of a present which recommences unceasingly—devoid of real duration, nothing but the instantaneous which dies and is born again endlessly" (pp. 211, 212). Is the existence of matter of this nature? he asks. Not altogether, he answers, but nevertheless it may be presumed that physical existence inclines in this direction, as psychical existence in the former. Though then "we make only the first steps in the direction of the extended, even when we let ourselves go as much as we can, . . . suppose for a moment that *matter* consists in this very movement pushed further, and that physics is simply psychics inverted" (p. 213). We think there is much truth in this brilliant suggestion and in the contention that "matter is a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive and, thereby, of liberty into necessity" (p. 217). It is, however, no new experiment, for attempts have been made to interpret the ancient cosmogonists and myth-makers in the sense that Bergson suggests when writing: "Physics understands its *rôle* when it pushes matter in the direction of spaciality; but has metaphysics understood its *rôle* when it has simply trodden in the steps of physics, in the chimerical hope of going further in the same direction? Should not its own task be, on the contrary, to remount the incline that physics descends, to

bring back matter to its origins, and to build up progressively a cosmology which should be, so to speak, a reversed psychology?" (p. 219).

Bergson is an acute critic of many of his predecessors and of course of the pioneers of philosophy. As an instance, we may take the following radical criticism: "The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew" (p. 142). It is, however, with regret that we notice that Bergson has not done justice to the genuine Platonic doctrine of ideas, but has adopted the almost ineradicable traditional mis-conception and unjust criticism of Aristotle on this subject which has been perpetuated to the present day. As Prof. J. A. Stewart writes, in his *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (Oxford, 1909): "It was the experience of one who was a great man of science and connoisseur of scientific method, *and also a great artist*. The Doctrine of Ideas, expressing this double experience, has accordingly its two sides, the methodological *and the æsthetic*. The former side Aristotle misunderstands, and to the latter is entirely blind." (The italics are mine.) This is all the more surprising seeing that Bergson is a deep student of Plotinus; but surely the following passage of that great disciple of Plato gives us just what we find in Bergson's duration? The ideas, æsthetically considered

are living, the 'gods' proper. Thus Plotinus writes:

"Nay, rather, the One God is all [the gods], for that He falleth not short [of Himself] though all of them are [from Him]; [and] they are all together, yet each again apart in [some kind of] an unextended state, possessing no form perceptible to sense. For, otherwise, one would be in one place, another in another, and [each] be 'each,' and not 'all' in itself, without parts other from the others, and [other] from itself. Nor is each whole a power divided and proportioned according to a measurement of parts; but this [whole] is the all, all power, extending infinitely and infinitely powerful;—nay, so vast is that [divine order or intelligible world] that even its 'parts' are infinite" (*En.* V. I. viii. cap. ix., 550 C,D.).

The term 'intelligible world' is therefore quite inappropriate when used by Bergson in the following otherwise illuminating passage: "Concepts, in fact, are outside each other, like objects in space; and they have the same stability as such objects, on which they have been modelled. Taken together, they constitute an 'intelligible world,' that resembles the world of solids in its essential characters, but whose elements are lighter, more diaphanous, easier for the intellect to deal with than the image of concrete things: they are not, indeed, the perception itself of things, but the representation of the act by which the intellect is fixed upon them" (p. 169).

This may be of Aristotle; but it is not of Plato, or Plotinus, nor of the Trismegistic school.

All of these criticisms and all of Bergson's notions flow from his somewhat one-sided fundamental dogma of mobility as the prior, simpler and clearer reality. For him, accordingly, immobility is only "the extreme limit of the slowing down movement, a limit reached only, perhaps, in thought and never realised in nature" (*I.* p. 44). He would thus have it that the truth is precisely the contrary of the principle that dominates the whole of the philosophy which begins with Plato and culminates in Plotinus, and which may be formulated as follows: "There is more in the immutable than in the moving, and we pass to the unstable from the stable by a mere diminution" (*I.* p. 64). Instead of the ever-becoming being inferior to the ever-being, the precise opposite is the case, he contends. But surely it does not follow that because the Platonists thought of the cause of motion as being superior to the moved or even the moving, that therefore they conceived that cause as the immobile in the sense of the static, or of the immutable as that which *cannot* move. The changeless as lord of change is not the same as the changeless which is incapable of changing, otherwise it would be slave to immobility and not absolute. The immobile, again, in so far as it is thought of as resisting mobility, instead of being regarded as a slowing down of mobility, might on the contrary be conceived as a concentration of mobility, resisting the flux of mobility, and so still more mobile than what is deemed the original mobility. And indeed Bergson himself insists on the need of concentrated effort for

resisting the current of the habitual in order to arrive at intuition, and that means immobility to it, before entering a new order of mobility. If it is activism and energism and not quietism that is required, at the same time this energetic effort to withstand the flux of conventional conceptualising is an immobility of its own kind; it is a standing up against the normal flow, prior to a dive into the depths, where we are supposed to coincide with the life-flux in sameness with it, and therefore, if still conscious, still retaining an immobility of a certain order. For intuition is by no means a lapse into unpurposed instinct; on the contrary, consciousness must make the effort to arrive at intuition (*I.* pp. 14, 15, 20). Indeed Bergson says that it must be a laborious, a violent (*I.* p. 48), and even painful effort, for he would have it that we must "remount the slope of thought in order to place ourselves directly, by a kind of intellectual expansion, within the thing studied" (*I.* p. 47). But do we not thus, we may ask, succeed in immobilising ourselves in it, so to speak? What we contend for here is that there is really no more virtue in mobility than in immobility; the immediate reality becomes conscious for us in the reciprocals of mobility and immobility, in spiritualisation and materialisation, if you will; but we can make these terms also in their turn mutual reciprocals in that we can regard the spiritualising process from the standpoint both of mobility and immobility, and the materialising process also from both standpoints. And, indeed, for the attainment of the intuition of reality, as

Bergson is for ever reminding us, the "mind has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually thinks, *has perpetually to revise, or rather recast, all its categories*" (*I.* p. 59),—which is also precisely what Vaihinger contends is the proper task of scientific philosophy and logical psychology. Now mobility is the prime category or fundamental general notion of all Bergson's philosophy, and this as well as all the rest of the categories, we should say, the radical intuitionist must revise and recast if he would consistently carry out the philosopher's advice.

Finally the exponent of creative evolution declares that there is 'nothing mysterious' in intuition. "Every one," he adds, "has had occasion to exercise it to a certain extent" (*I.* p. 76). We cannot, however, say that the example of literary composition which he gives—the need of 'something more,' besides the collection of material and preliminary study, before setting about the work of composition—throws much light on the subject even for most literary people. In any case this philosophic intuition must be sharply distinguished from the uninvited flashes of genius and the facile guesses and instinctual feelings of the unthinking, for "we do not obtain an intuition from reality—that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations" (*I.* p. 77). In other words, the scientific definition of the problem is half way to the solution. But where Bergson is of

special value is in his insistence upon the need of our devising ever new concepts, or rather of our replacing the static images by a new order of dynamic schemes, and above all of growing ever more and more conscious of the nature of these living ideas; and this we can do only by continually seeking to plunge into the life stream itself and not being content to take snapshots of its appearances from without.

Setting aside, therefore, questions of detail, we are at one with Bergson when he writes: "Philosophy can only be an effort to dissolve again into the whole. Intelligence, reabsorbed into its principle, must thus live back again into its genesis. But the enterprise cannot be achieved at one stroke; it is necessarily collective and progressive. It consists in an interchange of impressions which, correcting and adding to each other, will end by expanding the humanity in us and making us even transcend it" (p. 202). And so Bergson ends his extraordinarily stimulating, suggestive and illuminating essay with the weighty words: "Philosophy is not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative effort: it is the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism and consequently the true continuation of science—provided that we understand by this word a set of truths either experienced or demonstrated, and not a certain new scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of the nineteenth century around the physics

of Galileo, as the old scholasticism grew up round Aristotle" (p. 391).

This new philosophy, or rather attempt to restore philosophy to its ancient dignity, then, is not an individual but a corporate task. We must march onwards together, clearing away all obstacles and transmuting our values by conscious co-operation with the creative impulse. Bergson is an optimist and looks with confident hope on the great struggle, as when he pens the magnificent lines: "All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us, in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death" (pp. 285, 286).

The ever-increasing interest in Bergson's views is evidence that he has touched on something vital. Some superior people, however, think it a fashionable craze which will speedily evaporate; but Bergson himself has not sought this popularity, has never played to the gallery, and shows no signs of doing so. Convinced as he is that philosophy brings us to the living reality and should not be confined to the purely academical exercise of intellectual gymnastics, he is already a potent force to be reckoned with, and will without doubt as time goes on become a still greater power for good.

XIII.

EUCKEN'S ACTIVISM.

If Henri Bergson's is in this country the best known name of modern thinkers in France, the most familiar from Germany is Rudolf Eucken's, the famous Professor of Philosophy at the University of Jena, who among many other distinctions was awarded the Nobel prize in 1908 for the best original work of an idealistic nature. Eucken has a formidable list of some thirty-three works to his credit, of which seven have already appeared in English dress and at least two more are promised shortly. The leading ideas of this profound and enthusiastic thinker, on which he is for ever insisting in all he writes, are the reality of the independent spiritual life and the task of creating a new world within that life, and therewith the need of a new philosophy of life to complement the metaphysic of the intellect.

No matter what book of Eucken's we take up, we find the term spiritual appearing on almost every page. It is necessary, therefore, from the start to emphasise the sense in which our philosopher uses this term of so many and various meanings. For him 'spiritual' denotes that which looks to the needs and satisfaction of the whole man; it is essentially of a moral nature. Thus, if

we turn to his *Sinn und Wert des Lebens* (1908),[1] we find him insisting that "spiritual values . . . sever themselves definitely from all considerations of mere pleasure and utility. They are ours, and yet more than ours. They lift us into another than the mere human world, and at the same time they are to us more inward and essential than aught else can possibly be" (pp. 88, 89). And here at the very outset we would point out a weakness in diction,—the ever-recurring use of the depreciatory vocables 'mere' and 'merely.' The so frequent occurrence of these question-begging terms seems to us to indicate a weakness. Curiously enough, indeed, they sometimes occur precisely where the strongest attack might be delivered on idealist positions by the Philistine. And this is strange, for Eucken of course recognises over and over again the strength of the opposition; indeed he not infrequently sets it forth with sympathy and insight.

Eucken is continually insisting on the idea of independence in connection with the spiritual life; it is the only possible life of freedom, he holds, for the independent spiritual power is the basis of reality. Yet this basis is no immoveable and unapproachable background, but is rather to be conceived as "a self-containing, self-developing life, a life in which we may ourselves win a share, and, so far as we do, bring our own life on to the same level of self-initiating force-activity" (p. 96). The spiritual world exists in its own right, it has

[1] Eng. Trans., *The Meaning and Value of Life*, by Prof. and Mrs. W. R. Boyce Gibson, Black, 1909. All quotations in this paper refer to the pages of the English versions.

no need of being proved and justified by reference to the sense-world. And this is made clear by a critical treatment of history, for "the course of historical development shows us sense immediacy constantly yielding more and more of its supremacy to a spiritual immediacy; the outward life is lived and viewed from the standpoint of the inward and not *vice versa*. The Ptolemaic centre is replaced by the Copernican" (pp. 101, 102). Further, as Eucken looks chiefly to the 'wholeness' of man, he sees that the 'opposites' must be included and transcended in self-realisation. Life, he holds, as spiritual, can take shape, must indeed enform itself—and in this he does but repeat the ancient ideal of the spiritual gnosis—but this can only be by its inclusive activity whereby it embraces and transcends the opposition of subject and object (p. 93). Again, as to the antithesis of subject and world, the spiritual life, he declares, "envelopes this opposition, and, in the fulness of creative power, can enrich life with a content which reveals itself in and through the psychical functions of thought, feeling, will" (p. 102). This spiritual life, however, is immediate, and can never by any possibility originate in these functions; it demands a complete inclusive activity "transcending the opposition between subject and world, inward feeling and outward fact" (p. 109), whereas our psychical life is ever at the mercy of this antithesis. This spiritual life, however, is not a state where all is given at once, but possesses grades of reality, being revealed from the level of ordinary life up to infinite love in the godhead.

Or let us turn to Eucken's important *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung* (1907),[1] and the same insistence on the spiritual life is found. We want a new philosophy of life as a whole, as reality's consciousness of itself (p. 156). Life for us should be fundamentally spiritual; it is only in relation to life as self-conscious that we can predicate meaning and value for it. The spiritual life, as we have seen, transcends the psychical, for all psychical functions come under the antithesis of subject and object (p. 148). Spiritual life is reality. "From the beginning man, so far as he shares in the spiritual life, is not a being adjacent to reality, but within it. He would never be able to attain to a reality if he did not bear it within himself and needed only to develope it" (p. 223). If the positive impulse of self-preservation is indispensable to complete vital energy, nevertheless this self-assertion in opposition to others does not constitute a genuine self; "a genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual" (pp. 186, 187). We men are by no means personalities from the beginning; we bear within us simply the potentiality of becoming a personality, by striving beyond our present existence to a state of self-determining activity (p. 310).

As to the spiritual individual or moral personality, Eucken reckons it at the highest value:

[1] Eng. Trans., *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal: The Fundamentals of a New Philosophy of Life*, by A. G. Widgery, Black, 1911.

"Each spiritual individual is worth more than the whole external world" (p. 246); but this is so, not because the individual desires this superiority for himself, but owing to the presence in him of a spiritual world, whereby he is securely guarded from all vain self-assurance and arrogance. That this may be revealed in him he must strive with all his might.

But what is it in man that so strives and works, if it is not already the spiritual life in him? Eucken is for ever preaching the gospel of work and striving; the spiritual life does not happen in man, he must strive to bring it into activity. Here we are face to face with the ancient problem of grace and works, and the secret of spiritual spontaneity. In this Eucken's doctrine is that of co-operation or synergism, as, for instance, when writing about the 'nature of freedom,' he says: "The rousing of a new world to life within man is a problem and a task: it cannot be effected unless the spontaneity and self-determining activity that are distinctive of this [spiritual] world also manifest themselves within him" (p. 174). The centre of his life must be removed to the spiritual side; and this cannot happen without the co-operation of man.

It is thus evident that we want a new metaphysic and a new philosophy, for, as Bergson also contends, "the business of metaphysics . . . is not to add something in thought to a reality that lies before us, or to weave such a reality into a texture of conceptions; but to seek to grasp reality in itself, and to rouse it to life in its entire depth

for ourselves" (p. 142). Eucken admits that the desire for the presence of the infinite at the individual point may be regarded as an approximation to mysticism; but if we need a metaphysic and a mysticism in our philosophy of the spiritual life, we want these both in a new form; the older solutions, he thinks, have become inadequate. "The inwardness that we advocate," he writes, "is not a feeble echo and a yearning for dissolution"—it never has been this to any true mystic we should have thought; there is not much feebleness in mystic death and rebirth—"but is of an active and masculine nature, and rests on ceaseless self-determining activity" (p. 247). We may or may not call this mysticism, he adds; but in any case "mysticism of such a kind cannot be charged with that which now appears to us the defect or error in the older form." Here there appears to us to be a weakness and a false generalisation—a weakness, for Eucken is terribly afraid of being thought to give up strenuousness for a single moment, as though activity were the absolute; and a false generalisation, for no single form can be ascribed to mysticism in the past; it is immensely varied and the energy of some of the mystics of the past was almost appalling.

But if the centre of life has to be removed into the invisible world of self-determining activity, seeing that it is in this invisible world that life first attains to spiritual self-consciousness and becomes a complete reality, it is evident that for the increased spiritualisation of human life we require a new presentation of this invisible

world, that shall take into account the visible as now known to us (p. 239).

What, then, is the fundamental characteristic of the spiritual life which Eucken invokes, and we think rightly invokes, to help us out of the ever-increasing perplexities of modern culture? It is, as we have seen, the transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object; this, however, is quite impossible, it remains an inner contradiction, so long as the spiritual life is regarded as occurring in a being of a closed nature standing over against things as though they were alien. This contradiction is removed only when the spiritual becomes really independent and both sides of the antithesis come to belong to each other and are related to one another in a single life. What were previously external constraints and insoluble problems become necessary internal processes of the life-movement: "The life-process is now seen to be a movement that is neither from object to subject, nor from subject to object; neither the subject's attainment of content from the object, nor the object's becoming controlled by the subject, but as an advance of a self-conscious life in and through the antithesis. Life, by this movement, ceases to be a single, thin thread; it wins breadth; it expands to an inner universality. At the same time a depth is manifested in that a persistent and comprehensive activity emerges which lives in the antithesis. In this manner life first becomes a life in a spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining life, a [spiritual] self-consciousness" (p. 146).

To those of a purely intellectual cast of mind

this passage will doubtless read as so much verbiage; but those who have had even a faint touch of spiritual consciousness will understand what the philosopher is trying to adumbrate. It is not, however, new; it is the ancient doctrine of what has been called the 'self.' Neither is Eucken's insistence upon 'activism' so new as he would have it; Plotinus, for instance, is never weary of telling us that without perpetual activity thought and being would not exist. But Eucken is so insistent upon activism in the sense of struggle that he makes everything appear a task. He does not sufficiently bring out the joy and spontaneity and creativeness of the true spiritual life. He refers to it, it is true, but he is for ever harping on work, striving, tasks. "The basis of true life must be continually won anew," he declares in his 'profession of faith' in activism. "Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at the height to which it has attained." Yet "activity without release from the given world is an absurdity; but such release is attainable only through the living presence of a world of self-determining activity; the power of such a world alone is able to arouse the individual to self-determining activity" (p. 255).

But the book which seems to us to give the best survey of the Jena philosopher's life-work is his *Main Currents of Modern Thought*,[1] which in

[1] This work enjoys the distinction of having been twice translated into English,—the first edition (1878), by Stuart Phelps, New York, Appelton, 1880; and the fourth (1909), by Meyrick Booth, London, Fisher Unwin, 1912. The original title was *Die Grundbegriffe der*

its latest thorough-going revision, links up his earlier historical writings with his later constructive period, and works up the whole into a synthetic presentation. To a consideration of this volume the rest of this paper will be devoted, and if we occasionally repeat what has already been said, it should be remembered that Eucken himself is for ever repeating himself, if not in the same words at any rate in the same thought sequences. This, however, does not mean to say that our philosopher has a cut and dried system; he is no formalist, no academic absolutist; but a genuine seeker after a vital solution of the world-riddle, and therefore for ever on the quest.

Eucken is no formalist, he seeks for a vital solution of the world-riddle. "It would hardly be possible," he writes, "to conceive of anything more foolish than the claim set up by certain philosophical systems to exhaust, at a given period, the whole wealth of truth and to solve every riddle. That we remain thus in a state of quest, and at the same time, unavoidably, in error, cannot in any way disturb us if we possess the conviction that all human effort has a world of spiritual life behind it which can be ours only through freedom, but which is independent of our self-will" (p. 63).

Eucken's general method is the attempt to resolve contraries into a higher synthesis, and therefore with Hegel, though he is not an adherent of the latter's panlogism, he makes great appeal to

Gegenwart, which was however changed in the third edition to *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart.*

history and prefaces each topic by tracing the development of its ideas and cultural phases in the past. In this, however, he practically ignores the East; but even so we have enough to be very thankful for. Eucken's idea of history is, we believe, the true one. "Something timeless assists in every great historical event, something superhuman in every spiritual ascent of man. It is a peculiar mission of philosophy to work out this timeless superhuman element—in a word, this *absolute*" (p. 140). And again: "History is valuable to us only in so far as we are able to convert it into a timeless present; its main function is to lead us out of the narrowness and poverty of the merely momentary present into a wider present superior to, and encompassing time" (p. 268). Is it not Wobbermin who has suggested that the German terms *Geschichte* and *Historie*, instead of being used as simple synonyms, should be scientifically distinguished in a somewhat similar sense?

In all he writes Eucken pleads for a new synthesis, for something that will satisfy the whole man—feeling, intellect and will—subsumed in the master-idea of an independent spiritual life. Feeling alone, intellect alone, action alone, will allow us at best only to hobble towards truth, never to seize it immediately. Thus: "The strength of feeling," he writes, "is no guarantee whatever of the truth of any body of thought which may be developed from it (p. 47) . . . Each religion is confident of the entire genuineness of the fundamental feelings associated with it; yet the various religions arrive at quite different truths"

(p. 48). Above all we should remember that "this striving towards truth has nothing to do with any passive state of being existing independently of life; rather does reality lie within life, attainable only through life" (p. 63). Not that Eucken, in this connection, will have anything to do with the pragmatic evaluation of truth as solely a useful means. For him truth can only exist as an end in itself. "Instrumental truth is no truth at all" (p. 78). For "what is true at all is true for all time —or better still it is true irrespective of time; although the statement, under particular circumstances, may be for a period of time only, the manner in which it is expressed is always timeless; as spiritual experience all truth involves a liberation from all time" (p. 267). So also with regard to ethical ideals, "a good (such as right, honour, love, or loyalty) which is arrived at on account of its usefulness, that is to say, as a mere means for the physical and social promotion of life, thereby undergoes an inward transformation and ceases to be a good" (p. 260).

As to intellect it is indispensable, but it is by no means all. For "above and beyond all intellectual processes there developes an inner life, a life which exhibits, in spite of all manifoldness, a permanent character, persisting through all changes and movements (p. 53). . . . Right through every species of change persists the movement of spiritual life towards a unity transcending contradictions" (p. 62). And here we must specially note that "a subjective or objective tendency within the spiritual life is fundamentally

different from a subjective or objective tendency as opposed to spiritual life" (p. 62). With the spiritual life these become necessary complementary movements, whereby that life energises; as separately opposed to it they are partial and imperfect. In fundamental agreement with Bergson and Vaihinger, though of course all three approach the problem from very different points of view, the Jena philosopher declares: "Being a mere tool, intelligence cannot attain to inner continuity, secure self-dependence, or any content of its own" (p. 57). Scholarship and technical knowledge are admirable, nay indispensable instruments; but they are means, never ends. The present age is too prone to forget this. "We incline to substitute scholarly knowledge for spiritual life. This life of sympathetic understanding, which, after all, is never more than a half-life, leads us into the danger of increasingly surrendering a full life of our own, a life of clear thought and firm will" (p. 315). This intellect, moreover, is not genuine reason; and we most heartily agree with Eucken when he writes: "There are not two reasons, one theoretical and the other practical, existing side by side." The conception of self-activity, moreover, is to be included in that of reason, as one of its essential attributes. "Reason must not be conceived of as a thing utterly detached; it is the representative of a completely independent life—of reality self-poised and self-contained. In the absence of such a life there could be no truth at all" (p. 73). Nevertheless—and, therefore, paradoxically enough—the philosophy of activism claims,

precisely because the whole of life must be linked up into a unity, and at the same time transformed into personal action (p. 95), that "it is under no inducement whatever to diminish in any way the importance of intellectual work. It cannot look upon the latter as an accessory to the central things of life, as something that could be quite well dispensed with. The desired reconstruction of life, the direction of life towards self-activity, will never by any chance be accomplished and maintained without energetic intellectual work" (p. 81). On the other hand, however, we must recognise that "intellectual work itself does not become positive and productive until it becomes an integral portion of *an inclusive spiritual life*, both receiving from that life and contributing to its advancement" (p. 85). True reason is not logic simply. "Real human thinking is by no means a mere uniform application of these laws of thought; over and beyond such application it preserves a characteristic quality which penetrates and dominates every detail and can come only from the whole of a life process" (p. 87). Thus it follows that "there is no intellectual truth apart from a spiritual truth as a whole, but this means nothing less than the transformation of the world into cosmic life, an apprehension of reality from within" (p. 94). Eucken again is in entire agreement with Bergson when he writes: "A new stage of life can never under any circumstances come into being as the result of a mere mingling or juxtaposition. The error in this line of argument is one not uncommon in the present age—the unperceived conversion of

the *quantitative* into the *qualitative*" (p. 355). And even more so when he declares with all the emphasis of italics: "*At bottom the chief prop of determinism is intellectualism*" (p. 439).

The whole of Eucken's philosophy, therefore, we see, centres round the ideal of the spiritual life. What, then, again we ask, does he mean by this term? It is far from any simply withdrawn, or abstract, or subjective state. "The life of a spiritual being does not begin and end with its subjective condition; it includes the objective also, and must get into relationship with the objective; it is driven to insist that the rift between subjective and objective shall be overcome, and feels confinement to the merely subjective conditions as an intolerable restriction" (p. 48). Eucken regards spiritual life as "a fully active life which does not run its course between subject and object, but encompasses the antithesis from the very beginning" (p. 149). Spiritual life "becomes in itself an intolerable contradiction if it stands apart from and confronting the world and not within it, and if reality does not perfect itself in turning to spiritual life" (p. 58). Thus spiritual life is 'an independent self-contained life' (p. 58), itself 'giving rise to reality' (p. 60). Its nature is cosmic. "A whole world must come into effective actuality within man himself; a world raised above this contrast [subjective—objective], a world directly accessible to us and not refracted through the particularity of the individual medium. Then, and only then, can there be any truth for man" (p. 54). For "it is a

life issuing from the whole of things, a cosmic life, . . . a new stage of cosmic development which supervenes not below but above the opposition between subject and object" (p. 55). This cosmic character of life, however, "does not become vividly present to man if there be no vision of reality to support it" (p. 143). For the higher task or higher life of humanity is not natural life-preservation but spiritual self-preservation (p. 144). But here is a great danger, for in its contact with spiritual power self-preservation easily increases to a boundless egoism (p. 321). For power of any kind, though by no means a thing evil in itself, is morally indifferent; since it knows no higher goal than itself (p. 361). And this is especially important to remember at the present time, when "society and the individual are both striving for an increase of power, a social-political and an artistic-individual type of culture struggling for the leadership of humanity. This shows with peculiar clearness the inner division of our age, a division which must at the same time operate as an imperative impulse towards an elevation above the antithesis, towards a transition from a merely human culture to an essential and spiritual culture capable of embracing the contrast" (p. 374). For us, for the future, spiritual life means the 'coming-to-itself' of the world-process, a 'becoming infinite,' for the spiritual stage consists essentially in the 'direct participation of each individual in the life of the whole' (p. 390).

But is this linking up the whole of life into a

unity possible? To this Eucken replies: "The effort after unity would itself be impossible if the challenge which to man appears so unrealisable were not the fundamental reality of the spiritual life" (p. 95). But we must set to the task courageously, actively, energetically; such is constantly the admonition of Eucken's activism or positive idealism (p. 140). We must for ever seek a closer connection between truth and life; namely the life of the spirit as a self-sufficient life (*ein Beisichselbstsein des Lebens*), an absolutely independent spiritual world (*eine bei sich selbst befindliche Geisteswelt*) working in us (pp. 79 and 114). The end of the quest of activism is spiritual freedom, beginning with the awareness of an original presence which will extend an awakening and formative influence over the whole of life. "Now such a dominating factor is not to be found in this or that appurtenance of spiritual life, in this or that spiritual achievement, but in *spiritual life itself*," as Eucken understands it; namely, "the movement of reality towards spiritual freedom." For only in spiritual freedom is true being reached at all; "everything else is but the shadow of it." Such being, however, cannot lie outside activity, but only within it, "and it issues out of the depths of activity as it organises itself to a self-subsisting whole and passes, as a whole, into a variety of particular functions" (p. 302). For it is the fundamental conviction of the Jena philosopher that "there is absolutely no content without a self which unfolds itself in activity and actual events" (p. 419). It is the winning of this true self on

which all our efforts should be bent. Therefore Eucken is a strenuous opponent of present-day realism and the denial of soul. Not that there need be any apprehension that the spirit which ever denies will win the day. For, as Eucken insists with all the vigour of italics, "*the soul will not allow itself to be eliminated.*" The very attempt to deny the soul only arouses it to greater activity" (p. 107). The forces of denial, however, are in great strength just at present, and therefore "it is imperatively necessary to go back to the foundations of our existence and *fight a battle for the preservation of the human soul*" (p. 129). The most immediate duty is to gird on our armour for this quest, for "the very movement of reality drives us irresistibly beyond all mere collecting and classifying of phenomena to the winning of a soul." Indeed limitations could not be felt as such if human life and thought were not in some way superior to them. It is, therefore, the special mission of philosophy 'to champion this desire for soul' (p. 136). On the other hand, we must remember that a soul can never be had, it can only be (p. 228). This apparent contradiction is perhaps explained by Eucken when he writes: "For although it is certain that spiritual life must somehow be present to man as something superhuman and universally valid, its specific form is continually being influenced by much that is merely human. We do not possess spiritual life itself, but only a human spiritual life; that is a spiritual life whose superhuman core is never accessible to us except through human wrappings" (p. 229). It is this

superhuman in man that is the source of all true greatness, and "it alone preserves civilisation from becoming a mere man worship, whether of individuals or of men in the mass" (p. 300).

Now as to personality in the high sense of the word, for the most part we cannot be said to possess one as yet; we have rather to strive to acquire it. Our great task, therefore, is the 'self-preservation of a world-embracing personality' (p. 138). Personal decision, so far from being a question of whim or dominant desire, is a decision of the whole man. "Nay, is there any genuine life at all without personal decision, and can there be personal decision without doubt and struggle, without transformation and reconstruction?" (p. 336). Thus within the spiritual life "personality forms an ascent and a concentration which is reached only through the experiences and decisions of the whole man" (p. 416). Genuine personality, the true person, is thus the motive of our whole existence; it is the 'soul of souls' (p. 417). It is thus obviously not a possession, but the highest goal; and therefore for us the whole question is "rather a *becoming* personal than a *being* personal" (p. 417).

The way to reach unto this true self-life, however, requires a distinctive method of its own kind, for "with the conversion of things into a self-life there is here accomplished an overcoming of the contrast between subjective and objective treatment, the result being a treatment which may be called *sovereign* or *eigenständlich*" (p. 421). Elsewhere Eucken calls it the 'supreme' method

(p. 55), and even gives it a distinctive technical term, namely, *noölogical* (p. 61).

As to religion, what is the attitude of activism towards the great historical religions, such, for instance, as Christianity? While on the one hand Eucken holds that the form which it has historically acquired cannot be permanently retained (p. 277), on the other he is convinced that "humanity as a whole cannot be satisfied with any construction of life which does not comprise in itself the spiritual deepening and the moral earnestness which Christianity gave us, nor with any that rejects that liberation of the subject and that acquirement of an inner infinity which were the gifts of the modern world" (p. 323). Within the Christian idea the Jena philosopher is genuinely catholic and therefore he is not favourable to that great world-power "the Roman system, nominally catholic, but in reality as far removed from catholicism as is well possible" (p. 339); for although ecclesiastical Catholicism professes to offer an all-embracing unity, in that it is closely united to the mediæval mode of thought, "it is unavoidably placed in an ever-increasing opposition to the movements of the present age and the needs of the modern man, nay, to the inner necessities of spiritual life itself" (p. 383). Not that the present unrest in things religious is altogether so deplorable, but rather to be regarded as the necessary prerequisite towards the deepening of the spiritual life. For "in spite of all incompleteness and discomfort, one thing at any rate has been attained: from a supposed possession we

have again come to a search, a diligent and eager search; the ancient and eternal questions come to the front again with fresh force" (p. 471). The days of quest are once more with us, and therewith arises a new and deeper romance in life; and there is to be discovered also new beauty, for "without art there is no thorough spiritualisation of life" (p. 314).

Moreover in this spiritual renascence and renewal we must have a special synthetic science and a genuinely independent philosophy,—a purified gnosis as it were. For "all aspiration towards knowledge rests upon a relationship of whole to whole." Nevertheless as "this relationship may remain in the background as a silent presupposition, and the work may concern itself with separate spheres or separate relationships," it is necessary to have a special science which treats the matter as a whole and above everything else fully elucidates the fundamental fact and seeks to explain its content and its relationship to the surrounding world (p. 133). This science is philosophy in the ancient and most honourable meaning of the term. For, Eucken adds in emphatic type, "*the corner-stone of all philosophic thought and the axiom of axioms is the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life*" (p. 133). The crying need of the day is synthesis. "The demand for a synthesis is again heard on every side. The synthesis is not, however, genuine if the connection established be nothing more than a juxtaposition. It does not really go to the root of the matter unless it discusses common ideas and convictions,

and to do this it must take up a commanding position" (p. 128); in other words, there must be an 'independent' philosophy. We must, however, never forget that "when philosophy attempts to pass from the whole of spiritual life to the whole of reality, its work does not lie within a given sphere. It must first create this sphere. It does not find its world; it must make it" (p. 133). This great adventure is doubtless full of dangers; but what prize worth winning is not accompanied with risks and hazards? "If philosophy aims at converting our whole existence into freedom and transferring us from a given world to a self-constructed world of our own, then it must also accept the risks of freedom." Nevertheless, in Eucken's view, "the nature of philosophy assumes quite a different complexion from that it bore in the systems based upon pure conceptual construction." For in the case of activism "the effort is directed in the first place towards a fact, a fact upon which thought itself rests, the fact of a *world-embracing spiritual life;* what it contains must be made manifest as a fact, it must be exhibited, not deduced" (p. 135). So far does this sovereign method of philosophy differ from the intellectual forms of system-mongering that "there must be a decisive break with that unfettered speculation which believes itself able to produce a new world out of mere thought" (p. 146).

What, then, is knowledge according to this genuine synthetic philosophy, which so radically differs from Spencer's jig-saw puzzle variety of a synthesis? "Knowledge is nothing other than

absorption into one's own life, a finding of oneself, a self-knowledge. Such knowledge can never be afforded us by the realm of sense experience, which does no more than provide a juxtaposition of events; nor is it attainable through the reshaping of things within the subjective life of the soul, the self-consciousness of the mere natural man. . . . It is only a spiritual life, seeking and finding itself in things, which reveals an inwardness not forced upon things from without but contained in their own being; with encompassing power this life converts outer resistances into inner obstacles, and transforms the struggle with them into an inner experience" (pp. 135, 136). For "even the hardest resistance does not produce a spiritual effect until it has been converted into an inner obstacle. Individuals, peoples, or whole epochs may suffer from the most serious evils without being greatly aroused by them or driven to any sort of protective measures." For "both great artists and great educators agree in maintaining that the spiritual organs are not brought with us ready-made, but must first be moulded into shape" (p. 150). This experience must be vital; it differs vastly from theoretical empiricism. We take it up into ourselves and yet remain superior to it. For, "as a matter of fact we could not recognise this experiential character itself unless we occupied a position superior to mere experience" (p. 152). Experience, however, is not knowledge; least of all is knowledge a re-presentation of phenomena, or even an accurate description of them. "Knowledge developes subject to conditions and limita-

tions, but it nevertheless remains in the first place *a product of spiritual life.* It does not develope itself *out of* experience, but only *in contact with* experience" (p. 153). Nor is the spiritual life alone sufficient; it "needs philosophy, because only through philosophy does it attain its full illumination, unification, and originative power" (p. 137). But philosophy here stands as throughout for vital gnosis, whose "chief accomplishment is not the deliverance of ready-made doctrines, but the inner elevation of the life-process, the gain of independence and originality, the ability to see things more as a whole, more inwardly, more in their essential nature" (p. 139). And if philosophy is once more to be restored to its ancient grandeur, so also will metaphysics, which has for so long been treated with so much derision and contempt, return in this renascence, but on a higher turn of the spiral; for "the undertaking must appear a reckless venture unless a metaphysic of life stands behind the metaphysic of thought" (p. 142). This we might easily learn from history: "Every important civilisation has its own metaphysics, in which it expresses its inmost being and intention; its desire is, in and through this metaphysics, to attain an essential character and a living soul, to idealise itself therein" (p. 145). And therefore it follows that the positive idealism of activism "is impelled towards metaphysics," not, however, through any "delight in forms and universals," but through "a desire for more character, for a profounder actuality, for a more energetic renovation of our sphere of life" (p. 148).

And here we come to Eucken's key-note which he is for ever sounding, nay hammering on—energism, activism, and therefore struggle, effort, work, tasks, problems, and the rest. What then is the task of the future? It is no longer to be the struggle for natural existence and the survival of the fittest—the fittest simply to exist, but the noble self-sacrificing battle for spiritual self-preservation which is a world-embracing spiritual life, inclusive not exclusive, pertaining to wholes not parts. It is nevertheless struggle still and the most strenuous of all fights, since "it is more especially true that it is through struggle alone that our life fathoms its full depth" (p. 154). The end, however, is not an individual but a social one; and yet in the social whole, as elsewhere, "spirituality does not maintain itself by virtue of its mere existence, but only through a continual renewal, an unceasing creation" (pp. 193, 194). Humanity is no longer a child, it is reaching to manhood, and must take on itself the tasks and responsibilities of that true manhood. Accordingly "it is no longer a question of assimilating an already existing reality. We have now to assist in the completion of an unfinished reality" (p. 254). What then is this struggle of the true man, the *conscious* task of the future? It is the full and joyous recognition of a new world of life, which is nevertheless very old. There are three tendencies or types of life. "One of these is exclusively directed towards permanence, nay, towards a state of eternal rest, and seeks as far as possible to free human being from all movement; another is

wholly taken up with movement and will know of nothing that escapes its influence; the third strives to get beyond the antithesis and aims at an inward superiority which shall do justice to both sides. The first of these tendencies dominates the antique and the second the modern construction of life; the third has from the earliest times been operative in the world's spiritual work, but it has yet to be recognised in principle and to be developed as a type of life into full power and clarity" (p. 275). This is the task of the future. Moreover history teaches us that there are recurring 'hard' and 'soft' periods. To-day we are predominantly in a soft stage. "Thus there is a widespread modern tendency to take sides with the child against the parent, with the pupil against the teacher, and in general with those in subordination against those in authority, as if all order and all discipline were a mere demonstration of selfishness and brutality" (p. 359).

As to the ultimate problems of good and evil and the ground of conviction in the final triumph of the good, Eucken frankly confesses, as every true philosopher must, the inability of the intellect to find any answer; *ignoramus*, and, short of the full realisation of the spiritual life, *ignorabimus*. "Where the resistance comes from; why higher is dragged downwards to lower; why the cycle of the universe should appear indifferent towards that which it itself seems to produce as a goal—these are questions which we men cannot possibly answer" (p. 460). And again: "If it be asked how such a self-activity, such a breaking forth of

primordial spiritual life in man, is possible, and how it can be explained in relation to things as a whole, we must confess with complete frankness our inability to offer an answer" (p. 438). But there is no reason to despair because of this; on the contrary, we may go forward to our high tasks with the greatest confidence, for " if these increased difficulties in our existence have caused us to lose much, one thing we have gained, and this more than compensates for all that has been lost. We can *ourselves work towards the advancement of the whole.* We have passed from passive contemplation to active co-operation in the work of the great whole" (p. 461). The task of the future, therefore, is synergism, though Eucken does not use the term.

What more noble ideal can be set before the bravest spirits of the present age? With such men as Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken in the van of philosophic thought we may confidently look forward to a new era of fruitful work and the clearing away or solution of many a problem that has baffled the greatest thinkers who trusted to intellect alone to help them.

INDEX.

A.

Aberkios, 183
Abhidhamma, 97, 105
Abhidhammatha, 96
Absolute, Berg., 282, 285, 288; Bud., 48; static, 280
Absorption, 223
Abyss, 220
Activism, Euck., ch. xiii.
Acts of John, 90, 169, 170
Achæmenidæ, 128
Adytum, 152, 153
Adaptation, Tao., 27
Adoption, Bud., 114, 119
Adrasteia, 127
Adventurer, divine, 144
Æon, 15-17, 127, 167, 196
After-death, 142, 144
Agapē, 54
Aharṁ-kāra, 62
Åkāsā, 104
Albertus Magnus, 204
Alchemistes grecs, 199
All, and one, 19, 126; is given, 280
All-father, 59
Alexandrian, 129, 131, 143, 168, 206
Als Ob, Philos. d., 248
Amen, 171ff.
Ammon, 151
Anabasis, 195
Analysis, 285f., 289
Ānanda, 91
Anattā (*see* no ego theory), 61, 132
Ancient of days, 57
Anesaki, 67, 68
Angel in heaven, 145
Animism, 92
Anodos, 195
Apotheōsis, 167, 186
Apperception, 112
Aquinas, Thomas, 203, 204
Arch-enemy, 219
Arch-good, 219, 220, 223
Aristotle, 129, 162, 296, 302
Arahant, 113, 114
Arhat, 76, 77, 82
Ariya, 64
Arūpa, 107, 108
Asclepius, 151
Aseity, 76
Ashvaghoṣha, 67, 68, 70
Asia Minor, 15, 127; Central, 128
Astroeidēs, 168
Athanasia, 167
Ātmā, Ātman, 59-62
Atom, 269
Attention, 111
Augoeidēs, 168
Aung (S. Z.), ch. v.
Authority, 8, 91
Avatāra, 91
Avīchi, 93
Avidyā, 70
Awakening, great, 41
Awakening of Faith, 70
Axis, Tao., 13

B.

Bacon, 9
Back to nature, 264
Balfour (F. H.), 3
Baptism, mystical, 188, 217
Barbara nomina, 163, 199
Barrett (Sir W.), 228, 229, 247
Beauty, 160, 187, 188
Beisichtselbstsein, 318
Benson (V.), 282
Bergson, ch. xii., 46, 47, 105, 228, 240, 241, 249, 262, 315, 328
Bernheim, 230
Berthelot, 199
Birth and death, 167; in God, 155
Bhagavad Gītā, 62
Bhavya, 91
Bliss, body of (*see* sambhoga-k.), 89
Bodhi, 53, 63, 64, 73-76
Bodhi, Introd. to, 79
Bodhicharyāv., 79, 84
Bodhi-chitta, 76
Bodhi-dharma, 73

Bodhisattva, ch. iv.
Body, Buddha, 67, 68 (*see* dharma-k.); bliss, 89 (*see* sambhoga-k.); circular, 168; cosmic, 168; perfect, 88, 166-168, 191; transformation, 88 (*see* nirmāna-k.); universal, 192
Boirac (E.), 230
Booth, Meyrick, 310
Boyce Gibson (W. R.), 304
Both—and, 98
Boundlessness, great, 15
Bousset (W.), 22, 177
Brahmā, 57, 58
Brahmajala-s., 57
Brahman, 57, 62
Brahma-nirvāna, 62
Brāhmanism, 62, 131, 132
Bread for hungry, Bud., 80
Breath, holy, 166
Breathing, deep, 25, 42
Buddha, chh. iii. and iv., 113; meaning of, 73; perfect, 77
Buddha, Dialogues of, 57
Buddha-body, 69, 87-91
Buddha-Essence, Discourse, 69, 71
Buddhaghosa, 97
Buddhahood, 67, 76; flower of, 68
Buddha-seed, 77
Buddhology, 91, 135
Burma, 96

C.

Calling, 78
Canons, the six, 8
Carpenter (J. Estlin), 64
Categories, 271ff., 273, 300
Catholic, Bud., 46, 52, 53, 73
Causal consciousness, 112, 113; vehicle, 130, 131
Causation, chain of, 132, 136
Cause, ultimate, Tao., 12, 26
Ceremonies, 31
Ceylon commentary, 97
Changeless, 28
Charcot, 230
Charity, 14, 32-36
Chariot of universe, 44
Chhāndog.-Up., 61
Child state, 30
Chitta, 76
Choros, 171-173; of gods, 189
Christ, 52, 68, 74; our union, 216, 223
Christianity, Euck., 321
Christology, 135
Chronos, 127
Chuang Tzŭ, chh. i and ii.
Circles of meditation, 113
Circumstances and freedom, 145
Clairaudience, 117
Clairvoyance, 117, 118
Clement of Alex., 178, 180
Clermont Ferrand, 276
Clouds, spirit of the, 5
'Come forth from the four winds,' 221
Compassion, 64
Compendium of Philos., 96
Concentrated state, 92
Concentration, 111, 114
Cone, fig. of, Berg., 292
Confucianists and Confucius, chh. i. and ii.
Congress, Philos., Bologna, 249
Consciousness, Berg., 290ff.; Bud., ch. v.; def. of, 102
Contact, 110
Contagion, spiritual, 156
Contemplation, 55
Contemplative Life (Philo), 152
Continual going, 106
Continuum, life, 100, 107
Cooling of souls, 124
Corpus Hermeticum, ch. viii., 154
Corpus sanum, Tao., 23
Cosmic life, Euck., 317
Cosmifying of cons., 159
Cosmology, 126, 190, 295, 296
Cosmos, little, 160
Council of Constantinople, 203
Craft, theurgic, 163, 164
Creation, Berg., 284; new, 223
Crete, 127
Cross, mystery of, 215
Cumont, 177, 182
Cup, The, 186
Curve, fig. of, Berg., 279

D.

Daimones, good, 77
Dāna, 84
Dance of gods, 189; sacred, 172

Dara, John of, 209
Dawn, new, 154, 167
Death, Tao., 40, 41
Demiurge, 55-57
Democritus, 4
Demons, chief of, 60
Desire world (*see* kāma), 110
Destiny, 16, 28, 39; greater, 28; lesser, 27; wheel of, 39
Detend, 291
Determiner, great, 15
Deussen, 61
Devala, 71
Devil, no, Tao., 14, 17
Dharma, 47, 51, 53, 70
Dharmakāya, 66-68, 87-91 (*see* buddha-body)
Dhyāna, 91
Didaché, 173
Dieterich, 163
Dionysius, Pseudo (Koch), 206
Dionysius the Areopagite, ch. ix.
Dionysius the Carthusian, 204
Dīpaṅkara, 76
Distinction, 215, 222
Docetism, 68
Dodecad, 173
Dogmatism, 253
Données imméd., 276
Door, five, 102; of cons., 105; of heaven, 16
Dove, heavenly, Bud., 63
Dream, Tao., 25, 41, 42; self in, 60
Drōmenon, 175, 218
Drunkenness, world, 195
Dullards of the earth, 11
Duration, Berg., 280ff.; theory of cons., Bud., 111, 112
Duty to neighbour, 14, 28, 32, 33-36
Dynamic schemes, 293, 301
Dynamis (*see* craft), 163, 189

E.

Eagle in mysteries, 164
Ear, celestial, 117
Eckhart, 204
Ecstasy, 90; of Plotinus, 160-162
Eight, the, 173, 174
Eightfold path, 66, 67
Eisler (R.), 15, 126
Either—or, 7, 98
Élan vital, 294
Electrons, 130
Elias, 122
Emotions, logic of, 260
Encyc. of Religions, 56, 61, 68, 73, 102
End, good, 189; perfection, 184; of science, 196
Enformation, 190, 191
Ep. ad Pam., 168
Epiphanius, 201
Epistemology, 258
Essence, insensible, 220-222; universal, 218, 224
Eternalists, 71
Eucken, ch. xiii.; 227, 264
Ever-becoming, 46, 47, 83, 167
Evil, impersonal, 68; prob. of, Euck., 327
Experience, Euck., 324
Extremes, great, 17, 19
Évolution créatrice, 277
Eye, celestial, 117; of the heart, 197

F.

Face of the father, 145
Faith, 183; moral, 242
Fasting of heart, 21, 32
Fatalism, 147
'Father, glorify thy son,' 222
Father, Herm., 155; Mithr., 164
Fecundity, divine, 285
Fictionism, 252
Fictions and semi-fictions, 265ff.
Figments, 266
Filial piety, 15
Flux, Bud., 47, 105; of duration, 281; of mobility, 298, 299; Tao., 39
Framer, great, 15
Freedom, Berg., 282, 288, 295; Euck., 318; modern view, 134, 145
Frothingham (A. L.), 209ff.

G.

Galileo, 302
Gate of emancipation, 119
Gautama, 77
Geistige Strömungen, 311
Genesis, 47, 167.

Gehenna, 220
Geschichte, 312
Giles (H. A.), chh. i. and ii.
Gnosis, ch. viii.; Bud., 62, 63; Euck., 305, 322, 325; of God, 74, 184, 185; of good, 191; sotērias, 54
Gnosis, Hauptprob. d., 177
Gnosticism, 56; christianised, 169; meaning of, 177, 178
Gnosticismus, Offenbar. in, 179
God, Berg., 284; fiction, 268, 271; Tao., 44, 45
Godfather, 155
Going home, 195
Good, path of, 157, 194
Gotama, 51, 54
Grace, 173
Gravity, centre of, 26
Great, mystic meaning, 27; being made, 167; mystery, etc., 15; states of cons., 113, 114; unity, 11, 15, 19; way, 11; vow, 64
Greater parents, 14, 15
Greatness, 152
Gregory Bar Hebræus, 210
Grundlinien, Euck., 306
Grundbegriffe, Euck., 311
Gryphus, mystical, 100
Guide, great, 15

H.

Hades, 214; going to, 129
Hand of almighty, 166
Handling=insight, 119
Harmlessness, 148
Harnack, 23
Harp, celestial, 173
Hawks, 164
Hearers, Bud., 90; Manich., 80
Heart, mystic, 1, 15, 32, 74, 90, 93
Heaven, Tao., 15, 37-39; and earth, 15, 17, 21, 22, 39; journey, 164-168
Hegel, 16, 263, 311
Heraclitus, 4, 19, 99, 126, 163
Here and now, 260
Hermes, ch. viii.; 151-155
Hemeticist, 122, 152
Herzog, 209
Hierogamy, 170
Hierophantēs, 174
Hierotheos, ch. ix.
High priest, 159, 217, 218
Hilduin, 204
Hīnayāna (*see* little vehicle), 52, 53
Hindrances, 114, 115
Hippolytus, 74, 192, 196; 'know thyself' passage, 193
History, Euck., 312
Homo faber, 278
Hulme (T. E.), 277
Hyperæsthesia, 117
Hypnotism, 108, 117, 230
Hymn of praise for gnosis, 185
Hypothesis, 267
Hwai Nan Tzŭ, 1

I.

I, Bud., 59, 87, 100; mystical, 99 spiritual, 134
Ideas, living, 293, 301; Plat., Berg., 296
Ideas, Plato's Doct. of, 296
Ignorance, higher, 10
Ignoring knowledge, 9, 23
Impurities in medit., 113
Inaction, 37-39
Incomprehensible, Sūtra on, 69
Individualising, obj., 111, 114
Indra, 60
Initiation, meaning of, 156
Illuminati, 189
Illuminator, great, 15
Inner Door, 200
Insight, 118ff.
Instinct, Berg., 286
Intellect, Berg., 277ff.; Euck., 313-316
Intuition, 228, 240, 242; Herm., 198; Berg., ch. xii., 285ff.; supraintellectual, 287
Investigation, metaphysical, 285
Ionic philosophers, 127
Iranian tradit., 127
Irrationalism, Berg., 288, 289
Iverach, 102

J.

Jacobite, 209
Jamblichus, 151

James (M. R.), 169
James (William), 242
Japan, 47
Jesus, 170; hymn of, 90, 169; life of, 55
Jhāna, 115-118
John Baptist, 122
John Scot Eriugena, 204
Journey home, great, 40
Julian (Emp.), 196

K.

Kāma cons., 113, 114, 118; loka, 107-109
Kant, 248, 287
Karma (*see* causation), 29, 132
Karuṇā, 29, 53, 64, 84
Kathāvatthu, 91
Kathedra, 151
Kāya, 87
Kenōsis, 68
Kevaddha-s., 58
Koch (H.), 206
Koheleth, 41
Kṣhanti, 85
Kyriakos, 209

L.

Langen (J.), 208
Lao Tzü, chh. i. and ii.; 1, 6, 34, 40
Lathe of heaven, 19, 129
Laughing philos., 4, 5
Lazaros of Kyros, 210
Le Roy (É.), 282, 286, 288, 293, 294
Legge (J.), chh. i. and ii.; 3, 21
Liberal, Bud., 52
Liébault, 230
Liechtenhan, 179, 180, 181
Lieh Tzü, 1
Life's Basis, 306
'Lift up your heads,' 213
Light, 184, 186, 187; great, 18; world, 166
Literati, 1, 11
Locke, 260
Logic of emotions, 260; task of 258
Logion, 159
Logos, 52, 173, 175, 186, 187
Louis the pious, 204
Love, mysteries of, 190; sins of, 94
Lucidity, 230
Lyre of Logos, 173

M.

Mabūg, 209
Mādhya-mārga, 71
Mādhyam.-sh., 70
Magic circle, 14; papyri, 163, 182, 183, 196
Mahā karuṇā, 64; puruṣha, 71
Mahāyāna (*see* great vehicle), 47, 52, 53, 66, 73
Main Currents of Mod. Thought, 310
Makranthrōpos, 192
Mahāyāna Buddh., Outlines, 46
Man, cosmic, 192; gnosis of, 74; heavenly, 192; perfect, 29
Manichæan confession, 80
Manomaya, 88
Marriage, sacred, 170, 189
Matter, Berg., 294f.
Matrix, psychic, 130
Matière et mémoire, 290
Māyāvi rūpa, 88
Me, the, 100
Meaning and Value of Life, 304
Mediævalism, Bud., 95
Meditation, objs. of, 113
Mediumship, 92, 246
Memory, ancestral, 139; Berg., 290
Men of Tao, 29
Mental properties, 103, 110, 112
Mere and merely, Euck., 304
Mesmerism, 229
Metaphysics, Berg., 289; Euck., 307, 325
Metaphysics, Introd. to, 277
Métaphysique, Rev. de, 277
Metempsychosis, 128
Michael the stammerer, 204
Middle state, 26
Midst, ways of the, 213
Mind, born in, 155; divine, 152, 153, 217; door, 103; initiator, 191; light of, 30; of masterhood, 152; perfect, 223; religion of, 183; sons of, 199
Mindless, 199

Mitchell (A.), 277
Mithra, 127, 164, 168; liturgy, so-called, 163, 191, 192
Mithriaca, 163, 164
Mobility, Berg., 298
Monad, 186, 189
Monophysite, 203, 204, 209, 210
Moses, legend, 196
Moses, Life of, 159, 188
Mount of gnosis, 195
Mount, Secret Sermon on, 154, 196
Mouth of emancipation, 119
Mystagogue, 174, 196
Mysterien-religionen, 177
Mysteriis, De, 151, 162
Mysterion, 171
Mystery, cosmic, 173; cults, 78, 177; drama, Christian earliest, 174ff.; great, 15; religions, 78-80, 237
Mystes, 163, 188, 190, 191
Mysticism, Bud., 98; Euck., 308
Mysticism (Sharpe), 205

N.

Naassene document, 74, 192, 196
Nāgārjuna, 70
Nameless, 16
Nan-hua, Classic of, 3
Natural goodness, 32, 33, 36; integrity, 29
Nature, light of, 30
Necessity, 127, 129
Negationism, Bud., 65
Negative power, 18
Nibbāna (*see* nirvāṇa), 98, 103, 104, 116
Nietzsche, 248, 249
Nihilists, 71
Nirmāṇakāya, 68, 88
Nirvāṇa (*see* nibbāna), chh. iii. and iv.; 46-49, 61, 62, 69-72, 73; is, 63; is saṁsāra, 46, 47; of eye, 64, 76; of heart, 64; orig. meaning, 83; progressive view, 66; sukha, 65
Nirvānic cons., 58
No, no! 6, 63; ego theory, 98, 104, 131-133
Nobel prize, 303
Non-angularity, 27
Noölogical, 321

O.

Obscure, the, 4, 6, 45
Odes of Solomon, 23
Ogdoad, 173
Old philosopher, 34
Olympus, 195
Origen, 122, 178, 209; on pre-existence, 123-125; on resurrect. body, 169
Orphic, 117, 122, 127, 128
Otherworld, 231, 242

P.

Pāli, 48, 98
Panlogism, 311
Pantomorph, 165
Paradisaical period, 29
Paradise, supernal, 219
Parā-gata, 82
Pāramitā (*see* transcendental), 81, 82
Parā vidyā, 62
Passion, mystery play of, 175
Path, distressful, 115; insight, 119; middle, 71; of good, 151, 194; of gnosis, 194; the, 118, 120
Paul, St., 80, 168, 183, 203, 207, 208
Pegasus, magical, 166
Perdurance, 109
Perfect Sermon, 153, 184, 185, 199
Perfecting in dark, 154
Perfection, 185; perfect, 81, 74, 192
Permanence, 185
Person, Discourse on Gt., 71
Personal being, 14, 48, 54, 59
Personality, Bud., 98; Euck., 306ff., 316, 320; moral, 244; Tao., 41
Phelps (Stuart), 310
Pherecydes, 127
Philo, 152, 159, 168, 186, 188
Philosophy, ideal of, Berg., 290, 301; independent, Euck., 323
Pipe, celestial, 173
Planes of existence, 107
Plato, 129, 162, 183, 190; Berg., 296-298

Platonists, 122; later, 129, 162, 206
Plērōma, 167, 187
Plotinus, 129, 160, 162, 167, 168, 183, 197, 202, 610; Berg., 296-298; intelligible world, 297; method of ecstasis, 160-162; touch, 119
Pœmandrist, 152, 168, 187, 189
Pogson, 276
Poimandrēs, 152, 191
Poise, 25
Porphyry, 129, 160
Portal of God, 16; of Tao., 14
Positive power, 18
Positivism, critical, 253
Powers, lower, 117; superintellectual, 116
Pragmatism, 253, 290, 313
Prajāpati, 59, 60
Prajñā, 53, 54, 62, 63, 82, 87
Prayer, 55
Preëxistence, 121, 122, 125
Prehellenic relig., 127
Presence, 93, 157; divine, 89, 145, 150, 156, 162, 172
Process, divine, 81
Proclus, 206
Prophet, Chr., 153; Herm., 164
Protectors of world, 80
Proteus, 245
Psyche, the, 254-257, 274
Psychic, life, Bud., 111; meaning of, 227; tide, ch. x.
Psychics, Herm., 199
Psychical, and intellect, 245; literature, 232; research, 149, 238
Psychism, eastern, 232; flood of, 150
Psychology, Alexandrian, 129, 131, 168; Bud., ch. v.; Tao., 20-22, 33
Psychometry, 118
Poussin, De la Vallée, 50, 56, 73, 91
Purgatory, 213, 220
Pureman, 42
Purity, of transcending doubt, 101, 119; of views, 118
Purpose, divine, 81
Pythagoras, 137
Pythagorœan, 122, 127, 128, 129

Q.

Quest, Euck., 311
Quest, The, 285
Quietism, 241, 299

R.

Race, divine, 155
Reality, Brah. and Bud., 62, 63
Reason, Euck., 314
Rebirth, 154-156, 214
Regeneration, 114, 154-156
Reification of concepts, 249
Reitzenstein, 79, 177, 179, 188, 190
Religion, new, 236
Religions orientales (Cumont) 177
Reincarnation, ch. vi.; and after-death states, 142-144; and biblical texts, 122; and Buddhism, 131; and Church Fathers, 122; and memory, 137, 138, 140, 141; primitive view of, 136, 137
Reminiscence, Platonic, 144
Renunciation, supreme, 64
Resurrection, body of, 169, 193
Rev. d. Deux Mondes, 282
Rhys Davids, Prof., 51, 57, 90; Mrs., ch.vi., 96, 99
Right speech, etc., 103
Ripening of beings, 77
River, ever-flowing, 99, 107; of life, 105, 106
Rochester knockings, 231
Rocket, simile, Berg., 291
Root, Tao., 10, 14, 18
Rūpa, cons., 113, 114; heavens, 115; loka, 107, 109; states, 116

S.

Sacramentum, 163, 170, 171
Sacrifice, perpetual self-, 148
Salvation, harbours of, 195
Samādhi, 91, 92
Sambhoga (*see* bliss), 68
Saṁgha, 73
Saṁsāra, 46, 47, 48, 65, 66, 67, 69-72, 76, 82, 106
Samyak sambodhi, 76, 77, 78; sambuddha, 74
Sandwich men, 236

Sāra, 82
Saviour, 171, 174, 187, 196; god, 164; gnostic, 56; Tao., 43
S.B.E., 90
Scepticism, 253, 254
Scheinkörper, 88
Scholasticism, Bud., 95
Seas, four, 32
Self, advertisement, 246; Berg., 290, 292; consciousness, Bud., 106; generated, 89; transcendental, 99
Seminarium, 130, 168
Sense of intelligence, 197
Sequels, informed, 99
Servant of God, 159
Sethite gnosis, 22
Shaker communities, 231
Shākhyamuni, 68, 76, 91, 92
Shāntideva, 79, 80, 86
Sharpe (A. B.), 205, 206
Sheep, lost, 171
Shen Tao, 9
Sheol, 217, 219
Shepherd of men, 152
Shīkṣhāsam., 93
Shīla, 85
Shrimala-s., 71
Sidereal relig., 56
Silver thread, 41
Sinn u. W. d. Lebens, 314
Skull, story of, 39
Slave, 80
Sleep, deep, 60
Smṛiti, 70
Social end, 147
Socrates, 9
Soft period, 327
Som., De, 187
Son, Herm., 155; Mithr., 164
Sophia, 171, 172, 173
Soul, Euck., 319
Source, deathless, 166
Sovereign method, Euck., 320
Space, boundless, 15, 126; Bud. concept of, 104
Speech, perfect, 6
Spencer (Herbert), 323
Spheres, celestial, 161, 173
Spirit, holy, 173; meaning of, 228; of clouds, 5; Tao., 15; way of, 5
Spiritism, modern, 231
Spiritual, meaning of, 227; Euck., 303, 309
Stallo, 249
Stephen Bar Sudaili, 208-211
Stewart (J. A.), 296
Stobæus, 198
Store of light, 132
Stream, ever-flowing, 99; of activity, 132
Subconscious, 75, 139
Subject and object, Euck., 305, 314
Sublime cons., 138
Subliminal, 75; Bud., 106
Substance, primal, 166
Suchness, 70, 71
Suffering, mystery of, 178
Sūfīs, 198
Sūfism, 74
Suggestion, 156
Sumedha, 76, 77
Superhuman core, Euck., 319
Supernaturalists, 91
Supernormal cons., Bud., 110, 118
Suppliant, 171, 174, 186
Supplication or vow, 76
Supraconsciousness, Berg., 290ff.
Supraliminal, Bud., 109
Survival, 234
Suzuki, 46, 61, 67, 69, 70
Sympathy, 241, 243, 286; intellectual, 285, 286; means of, Bud., 84
Symposium (Plato), 190
Synergism, 307, 328
Synthesis, Euck., 322

T.

Tact, 110
Tao., chh. i. and ii.
Taoism, Texts of, 3
Taoist thinkers, 128
Tao-Teh-Ching, 1
Task of future, Euck., 326f.
Tat, 151, 154
Tathā-gata, 67, 82
Tathā-tā, 67, 70, 71
Tat-tva, 87
Tauler, 204
Teh, 13, 14

Teḥuti, 151
Telepathy, 117
Texts and Studies, 169
Thales, 127
Theiōsis, 186
Theodosios of Antioch, 209
Theodotus, Excepts from, 180
Therapeut, 152, 159, 186
Theurgist, 164, 165
Thing in itself, 270, 273
Thoth, 151
Thought, instant, 111; moment, 111; nature of (Vaih.), 258; new, 264; pictures, 107; powers, 117; reading, 118
Three, the, Herm., 200; teachings, China, 1; worlds, 107-109
Threshold of cons., 105
Thrice-conditioned, 113
Thrice-greatest, degree, 164; meaning of, 152; Hermes, 151ff. and ch. viii.
Thrice-greatest Herm., 74
Time, clock, 281; endless, 15, 17, 126
Time and Free Will (Berg.), 276, 282
Trance, speaking, 92
Tranquillisation, 115
Transcendental, cons., 109; nirvānic, 83; powers, 82; the, 120; virtues, 78, 81
Transcorporation, 122, 126
Transformation, body of (*see* nirmāṇa), 68, 88
Transmigration, 82
Treasure house, Tao., 30
Tree of life, 218
Trikāya, 67
Trismegistic, 77, 151ff., ch. viii., 297
Truth, circle of, 183; embodiment of, 87; great, 15; plain of, 183
Twelve, the, 171, 173, 174
Tyrrell (G.), 285

U.

Unio mystica, 170
Unity, great, 11, 15, 19
Upanishads, 6, 55, 59, 62, 290
Use of useless, 8

V.

Vaihinger, ch. xi., 300
Valentinian school, 183; apocalypse, 201
Vasubandha, 69, 71
Vedānta, 48
Vedic folk faith, 128
Vehicle, great, 47, 134 (*see* mahāyāna); little, 76, 134 (*see* hīnayāna)
Via negativa, 24, 86
Vicarious atonement, 68; Bud., 94
Victor, eternal, 148
Victor, Hugo of St., 204
Virgin of the World, 154
Virtue, Tao., 13, 14, 16, 31; invocation of, Herm., 156; man of, 44; natural, 43; of heaven and earth, 18, 28; transcendental, 78, 81
Vīrya, 86
Visheshachinta., 70
Vital principle, 5
Vocation, 78
Voidness, 48
Volition, Bud., 111
Vow, great, 64, 76, 78, 79; text of, 79-81
Vowel chants, 163

W.

Walking, regularised falling, 259
Way, great, 11; of beginner, 113; of spirit, 20, 39
Weltenmantel, 126
Wheel, of becoming, 40, 127, 128; of destiny, 39; of necessity, 19
Wholeness, 305
Widgery (A. G.), 306
Will, Herm., 155
Wisdom, gnostic, 56, 158, 173
Withdrawn writings, 205, 208
Wobbermin, 312
World, order, divine, 162; soul, 127; view, ancient, 158
Worlds, three, Bud., 107-109

X.

Xenaias, Mar, 210

Y.

Yang and yin, 17
'Yas kleshas,' 69
'Ye are my brethren,' 221
'Ye have eaten dead things,' 239
Yellow Emperor, 18
Yoga, 24, 54

Z.

Zervanist, 17, 127
Zoroaster, 22
Zosimus, 199, 200

00016087

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Dr. Rani Karur
on 12 April, 2019